On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance :: an empirical analysis of Spain's regions /
This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain's Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, District of Columbia] :
International Monetary Fund,
2017.
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IMF working paper ;
WP/17/5. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain's Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance among Spain's regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring enforcement procedures are politically credible. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (34 pages) : illustrations, tables. |
| ISBN: | 1475569947 147556984X 9781475569841 9781475569940 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000cam a2200000Mi 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | ZDB-4-EBU-ocn975040586 | ||
| 003 | OCoLC | ||
| 005 | 20240405112445.0 | ||
| 006 | m d | ||
| 007 | cr ||||||||||| | ||
| 008 | 170217t20172017dcua ob 000 0 eng d | ||
| 040 | |a IDEBK |b eng |e rda |c IDEBK |d UWO |d YDX |d OCLCQ |d IDEBK |d OCLCQ |d OCLCF |d OCLCO |d OCLCA |d CEF |d OTZ |d N$T |d CUS |d OCLCO |d OCLCQ |d OCLCO |d OCLCL | ||
| 019 | |a 971942345 |a 972107456 |a 972272265 |a 972438239 |a 972540121 |a 980845464 | ||
| 020 | |a 1475569947 |q (ebk) | ||
| 020 | |a 147556984X | ||
| 020 | |a 9781475569841 | ||
| 020 | |a 9781475569940 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.5089/9781475569841.001 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)975040586 |z (OCoLC)971942345 |z (OCoLC)972107456 |z (OCoLC)972272265 |z (OCoLC)972438239 |z (OCoLC)972540121 |z (OCoLC)980845464 | ||
| 037 | |a 992546 |b MIL | ||
| 050 | 4 | |a HB171 | |
| 082 | 7 | |a 330 |2 23 | |
| 049 | |a MAIN | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Delgado-Téllez, Mar, |e author. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance : |b an empirical analysis of Spain's regions / |c by Mar Delgado-Téllez, Victor D. Lledó, and Javier J. Pérez. |
| 264 | 1 | |a [Washington, District of Columbia] : |b International Monetary Fund, |c 2017. | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2017 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (34 pages) : |b illustrations, tables. | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a IMF working paper ; |v WP/17/5 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain's Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance among Spain's regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring enforcement procedures are politically credible. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Economics. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040850 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Economics |z Spain. | |
| 650 | 2 | |a Economics |0 https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D004467 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Économie politique. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Économie politique |z Espagne. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a economics. |2 aat | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Economics |2 fast | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Spain |2 fast |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJqFTrvj6Mhw6JfTGmqJDq | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Lledó, Victor D., |e author. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Pérez, Javier J., |e author. | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Delgado-Tellez, Mar |t On the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance: An Empirical Analysis of Spain's Regions |d Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund,2017 |z 9781475569841 |
| 830 | 0 | |a IMF working paper ; |v WP/17/5. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |l FWS01 |p ZDB-4-EBU |q FWS_PDA_EBU |u https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1462978 |3 Volltext |
| 938 | |a ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection |b IDEB |n cis37553538 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 13416784 | ||
| 938 | |a EBSCOhost |b EBSC |n 1462978 | ||
| 994 | |a 92 |b GEBAY | ||
| 912 | |a ZDB-4-EBU | ||
| 049 | |a DE-863 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-FWS_katkey | ZDB-4-EBU-ocn975040586 |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1804748462996062208 |
| adam_text | |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Delgado-Téllez, Mar Lledó, Victor D. Pérez, Javier J. |
| author_facet | Delgado-Téllez, Mar Lledó, Victor D. Pérez, Javier J. |
| author_role | aut aut aut |
| author_sort | Delgado-Téllez, Mar |
| author_variant | m d t mdt v d l vd vdl j j p jj jjp |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | localFWS |
| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | HB171 |
| callnumber-raw | HB171 |
| callnumber-search | HB171 |
| callnumber-sort | HB 3171 |
| callnumber-subject | HB - Economic Theory and Demography |
| collection | ZDB-4-EBU |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)975040586 |
| dewey-full | 330 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 330 - Economics |
| dewey-raw | 330 |
| dewey-search | 330 |
| dewey-sort | 3330 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03581cam a2200565Mi 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">ZDB-4-EBU-ocn975040586</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">OCoLC</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20240405112445.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="006">m d </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr |||||||||||</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">170217t20172017dcua ob 000 0 eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">IDEBK</subfield><subfield code="b">eng</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield><subfield code="c">IDEBK</subfield><subfield code="d">UWO</subfield><subfield code="d">YDX</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">IDEBK</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCF</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCA</subfield><subfield code="d">CEF</subfield><subfield code="d">OTZ</subfield><subfield code="d">N$T</subfield><subfield code="d">CUS</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="019" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">971942345</subfield><subfield code="a">972107456</subfield><subfield code="a">972272265</subfield><subfield code="a">972438239</subfield><subfield code="a">972540121</subfield><subfield code="a">980845464</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1475569947</subfield><subfield code="q">(ebk)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">147556984X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781475569841</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781475569940</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.5089/9781475569841.001</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)975040586</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)971942345</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)972107456</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)972272265</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)972438239</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)972540121</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)980845464</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="037" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">992546</subfield><subfield code="b">MIL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">HB171</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="2">23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MAIN</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Delgado-Téllez, Mar,</subfield><subfield code="e">author.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance :</subfield><subfield code="b">an empirical analysis of Spain's regions /</subfield><subfield code="c">by Mar Delgado-Téllez, Victor D. Lledó, and Javier J. Pérez.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">[Washington, District of Columbia] :</subfield><subfield code="b">International Monetary Fund,</subfield><subfield code="c">2017.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="c">©2017</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (34 pages) :</subfield><subfield code="b">illustrations, tables.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">computer</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">online resource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">IMF working paper ;</subfield><subfield code="v">WP/17/5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain's Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance among Spain's regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring enforcement procedures are politically credible.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Economics.</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040850</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Economics</subfield><subfield code="z">Spain.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Economics</subfield><subfield code="0">https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D004467</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Économie politique.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Économie politique</subfield><subfield code="z">Espagne.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">economics.</subfield><subfield code="2">aat</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Economics</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Spain</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield><subfield code="1">https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJqFTrvj6Mhw6JfTGmqJDq</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Lledó, Victor D.,</subfield><subfield code="e">author.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Pérez, Javier J.,</subfield><subfield code="e">author.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Print version:</subfield><subfield code="a">Delgado-Tellez, Mar</subfield><subfield code="t">On the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance: An Empirical Analysis of Spain's Regions</subfield><subfield code="d">Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund,2017</subfield><subfield code="z">9781475569841</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">IMF working paper ;</subfield><subfield code="v">WP/17/5.</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="l">FWS01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-4-EBU</subfield><subfield code="q">FWS_PDA_EBU</subfield><subfield code="u">https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1462978</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection</subfield><subfield code="b">IDEB</subfield><subfield code="n">cis37553538</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">YBP Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">YANK</subfield><subfield code="n">13416784</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBSCOhost</subfield><subfield code="b">EBSC</subfield><subfield code="n">1462978</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="994" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">92</subfield><subfield code="b">GEBAY</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-4-EBU</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | Spain fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJqFTrvj6Mhw6JfTGmqJDq |
| geographic_facet | Spain |
| id | ZDB-4-EBU-ocn975040586 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-16T15:04:16Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 1475569947 147556984X 9781475569841 9781475569940 |
| language | English |
| oclc_num | 975040586 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 online resource (34 pages) : illustrations, tables. |
| psigel | ZDB-4-EBU |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publishDateSearch | 2017 |
| publishDateSort | 2017 |
| publisher | International Monetary Fund, |
| record_format | marc |
| series | IMF working paper ; |
| series2 | IMF working paper ; |
| spelling | Delgado-Téllez, Mar, author. On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance : an empirical analysis of Spain's regions / by Mar Delgado-Téllez, Victor D. Lledó, and Javier J. Pérez. [Washington, District of Columbia] : International Monetary Fund, 2017. ©2017 1 online resource (34 pages) : illustrations, tables. text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier IMF working paper ; WP/17/5 This paper proposes an empirical framework that distinguishes voluntary from involuntary compliance with fiscal deficit targets on the basis of economic, institutional, and political factors. The framework is applied to Spain's Autonomous Communities (regions) over the period 2002-2015. Fiscal noncompliance among Spain's regions has shown to be persistent. It increases with the size of growth forecast errors and the extent to which fiscal targets are tightened, factors not fully under the control of regional governments. Non-compliance also tends to increase during election years, when vertical fiscal imbalances accentuate, and market financing costs subside. Strong fiscal rules have not shown any significant impact in containing fiscal non-compliance. Reducing fiscal non-compliance in multilevel governance systems such as the one in Spain requires a comprehensive assessment of intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that looks beyond rules-based frameworks by ensuring enforcement procedures are politically credible. Economics. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040850 Economics Spain. Economics https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D004467 Économie politique. Économie politique Espagne. economics. aat Economics fast Spain fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJqFTrvj6Mhw6JfTGmqJDq Lledó, Victor D., author. Pérez, Javier J., author. Print version: Delgado-Tellez, Mar On the Determinants of Fiscal Non-Compliance: An Empirical Analysis of Spain's Regions Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund,2017 9781475569841 IMF working paper ; WP/17/5. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBU FWS_PDA_EBU https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1462978 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Delgado-Téllez, Mar Lledó, Victor D. Pérez, Javier J. On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance : an empirical analysis of Spain's regions / IMF working paper ; Economics. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040850 Economics Spain. Economics https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D004467 Économie politique. Économie politique Espagne. economics. aat Economics fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040850 https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D004467 |
| title | On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance : an empirical analysis of Spain's regions / |
| title_auth | On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance : an empirical analysis of Spain's regions / |
| title_exact_search | On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance : an empirical analysis of Spain's regions / |
| title_full | On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance : an empirical analysis of Spain's regions / by Mar Delgado-Téllez, Victor D. Lledó, and Javier J. Pérez. |
| title_fullStr | On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance : an empirical analysis of Spain's regions / by Mar Delgado-Téllez, Victor D. Lledó, and Javier J. Pérez. |
| title_full_unstemmed | On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance : an empirical analysis of Spain's regions / by Mar Delgado-Téllez, Victor D. Lledó, and Javier J. Pérez. |
| title_short | On the determinants of fiscal non-compliance : |
| title_sort | on the determinants of fiscal non compliance an empirical analysis of spain s regions |
| title_sub | an empirical analysis of Spain's regions / |
| topic | Economics. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040850 Economics Spain. Economics https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D004467 Économie politique. Économie politique Espagne. economics. aat Economics fast |
| topic_facet | Economics. Economics Spain. Economics Économie politique. Économie politique Espagne. economics. Spain |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1462978 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT delgadotellezmar onthedeterminantsoffiscalnoncomplianceanempiricalanalysisofspainsregions AT lledovictord onthedeterminantsoffiscalnoncomplianceanempiricalanalysisofspainsregions AT perezjavierj onthedeterminantsoffiscalnoncomplianceanempiricalanalysisofspainsregions |