The handbook of market design /:
This handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors.
Gespeichert in:
| Weitere Verfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
2013.
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xxiv, 681 pages) : illustrations |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780191668432 0191668435 9780191765957 0191765953 1299939759 9781299939752 |
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| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 520 | 8 | |a This handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Contributors; Introduction; PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES; 1. What Have We Learned From Market Design?; 2. Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior; 3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory; PART II: CASES; SECTION II. A: MATCHING MARKETS; 4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange; 5. School Choice; 6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice; 7. Can the Job Market for Economists Be Improved?; 8. Designing Markets for Ideas; 9. Redesigning Microcredit; SECTION II. B: AUCTIONS. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 10. The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods11. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions; 12. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billitoris Ekati Diamonds; SECTION II. C: E-COMMERCE; 13. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior; 14. Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents; 15. The Design of Online Advertising Markets; 16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of Sourcing. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication BandwidthSECTION II. D: LAW DESIGN; 18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems; 19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences; PART III: EXPERIMENTS; 20. Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled-Assets Reverse Auction; 21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment; 22. Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions; 23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill; PART IV: COMPETING DESIGNS; 24. Competing Mechanisms; 25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets; Index; A. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a BC; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; W; Y. | |
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| 650 | 0 | |a Statistical matching. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2002004458 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Game theory. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 | |
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| 700 | 1 | |a Vulkan, Nir, |e editor. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Roth, Alvin E., |d 1951- |e editor. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n79103247 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Neeman, Zvika, |e editor. | |
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| contents | Cover; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Contributors; Introduction; PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES; 1. What Have We Learned From Market Design?; 2. Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior; 3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory; PART II: CASES; SECTION II. A: MATCHING MARKETS; 4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange; 5. School Choice; 6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice; 7. Can the Job Market for Economists Be Improved?; 8. Designing Markets for Ideas; 9. Redesigning Microcredit; SECTION II. B: AUCTIONS. 10. The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods11. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions; 12. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billitoris Ekati Diamonds; SECTION II. C: E-COMMERCE; 13. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior; 14. Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents; 15. The Design of Online Advertising Markets; 16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of Sourcing. 17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication BandwidthSECTION II. D: LAW DESIGN; 18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems; 19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences; PART III: EXPERIMENTS; 20. Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled-Assets Reverse Auction; 21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment; 22. Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions; 23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill; PART IV: COMPETING DESIGNS; 24. Competing Mechanisms; 25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets; Index; A. BC; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; W; Y. |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)861692725 |
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| dewey-ones | 338 - Production |
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| dewey-search | 338.501 |
| dewey-sort | 3338.501 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| indexdate | 2024-07-16T15:03:58Z |
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| publisher | Oxford University Press, |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | The handbook of market design / edited by Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth and Zvika Neeman. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013. 1 online resource (xxiv, 681 pages) : illustrations text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier data file Includes bibliographical references and index. Print version record. This handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors. Cover; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Contributors; Introduction; PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES; 1. What Have We Learned From Market Design?; 2. Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior; 3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory; PART II: CASES; SECTION II. A: MATCHING MARKETS; 4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange; 5. School Choice; 6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice; 7. Can the Job Market for Economists Be Improved?; 8. Designing Markets for Ideas; 9. Redesigning Microcredit; SECTION II. B: AUCTIONS. 10. The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods11. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions; 12. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billitoris Ekati Diamonds; SECTION II. C: E-COMMERCE; 13. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior; 14. Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents; 15. The Design of Online Advertising Markets; 16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of Sourcing. 17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication BandwidthSECTION II. D: LAW DESIGN; 18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems; 19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences; PART III: EXPERIMENTS; 20. Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled-Assets Reverse Auction; 21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment; 22. Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions; 23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill; PART IV: COMPETING DESIGNS; 24. Competing Mechanisms; 25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets; Index; A. BC; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; W; Y. Markets Mathematical models. Supply and demand. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85130690 Statistical matching. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2002004458 Game theory. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 Game Theory https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D005716 Offre et demande. Appariement (Statistique) Théorie des jeux. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Industries General. bisacsh Game theory fast Markets Mathematical models fast Statistical matching fast Supply and demand fast Vulkan, Nir, editor. Roth, Alvin E., 1951- editor. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n79103247 Neeman, Zvika, editor. has work: The handbook of market design (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCFtm3CXHVJ4FFgqrgBWKwK https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Handbook of market design 9780199570515 (OCoLC)843807852 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBU FWS_PDA_EBU https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=644613 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | The handbook of market design / Cover; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Contributors; Introduction; PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES; 1. What Have We Learned From Market Design?; 2. Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior; 3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory; PART II: CASES; SECTION II. A: MATCHING MARKETS; 4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange; 5. School Choice; 6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice; 7. Can the Job Market for Economists Be Improved?; 8. Designing Markets for Ideas; 9. Redesigning Microcredit; SECTION II. B: AUCTIONS. 10. The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods11. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions; 12. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billitoris Ekati Diamonds; SECTION II. C: E-COMMERCE; 13. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior; 14. Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents; 15. The Design of Online Advertising Markets; 16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of Sourcing. 17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication BandwidthSECTION II. D: LAW DESIGN; 18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems; 19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences; PART III: EXPERIMENTS; 20. Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled-Assets Reverse Auction; 21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment; 22. Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions; 23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill; PART IV: COMPETING DESIGNS; 24. Competing Mechanisms; 25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets; Index; A. BC; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; W; Y. Markets Mathematical models. Supply and demand. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85130690 Statistical matching. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2002004458 Game theory. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 Game Theory https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D005716 Offre et demande. Appariement (Statistique) Théorie des jeux. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Industries General. bisacsh Game theory fast Markets Mathematical models fast Statistical matching fast Supply and demand fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85130690 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2002004458 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D005716 |
| title | The handbook of market design / |
| title_auth | The handbook of market design / |
| title_exact_search | The handbook of market design / |
| title_full | The handbook of market design / edited by Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth and Zvika Neeman. |
| title_fullStr | The handbook of market design / edited by Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth and Zvika Neeman. |
| title_full_unstemmed | The handbook of market design / edited by Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth and Zvika Neeman. |
| title_short | The handbook of market design / |
| title_sort | handbook of market design |
| topic | Markets Mathematical models. Supply and demand. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85130690 Statistical matching. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2002004458 Game theory. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 Game Theory https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D005716 Offre et demande. Appariement (Statistique) Théorie des jeux. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Industries General. bisacsh Game theory fast Markets Mathematical models fast Statistical matching fast Supply and demand fast |
| topic_facet | Markets Mathematical models. Supply and demand. Statistical matching. Game theory. Game Theory Offre et demande. Appariement (Statistique) Théorie des jeux. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Industries General. Game theory Markets Mathematical models Statistical matching Supply and demand |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=644613 |
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