Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics :: the myth of neutrality /
"Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the dev...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2013.
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks."--Provided by publisher |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xxiii, 357 pages) : illustrations |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 319-342) and index. |
| ISBN: | 9781139616812 1139616811 9781139626118 1139626116 9781139622394 1139622390 9781139506762 1139506765 9781139613095 113961309X |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000cam a2200000 a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | ZDB-4-EBU-ocn844940155 | ||
| 003 | OCoLC | ||
| 005 | 20241004212047.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
| 007 | cr cnu---unuuu | ||
| 008 | 130529s2013 nyua ob 001 0 eng d | ||
| 040 | |a N$T |b eng |e pn |c N$T |d E7B |d COD |d GZM |d OCLCF |d OCLCQ |d CAMBR |d YDX |d YDXCP |d IDEBK |d CDX |d OCLCQ |d ISM |d Z5A |d OCLCQ |d UWO |d OL$ |d LOA |d K6U |d OCLCQ |d OCLCO |d INTCL |d OCLCO |d OCLCQ |d OCLCO |d OCLCL |d OCLCQ |d SFB | ||
| 019 | |a 841486146 |a 841495192 |a 978500040 |a 978803475 |a 978989977 |a 979320390 |a 979799651 |a 1071410015 |a 1107746606 |a 1109940182 |a 1117866775 | ||
| 020 | |a 9781139616812 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 1139616811 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 9781139626118 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 1139626116 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 9781139622394 | ||
| 020 | |a 1139622390 | ||
| 020 | |a 9781139506762 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 1139506765 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 9781139613095 |q (EBL) | ||
| 020 | |a 113961309X | ||
| 020 | |z 9781107032613 | ||
| 020 | |z 110703261X | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)844940155 |z (OCoLC)841486146 |z (OCoLC)841495192 |z (OCoLC)978500040 |z (OCoLC)978803475 |z (OCoLC)978989977 |z (OCoLC)979320390 |z (OCoLC)979799651 |z (OCoLC)1071410015 |z (OCoLC)1107746606 |z (OCoLC)1109940182 |z (OCoLC)1117866775 | ||
| 037 | |a 1099952 |b EBL | ||
| 050 | 4 | |a HG230.3 |b .A36 2013eb | |
| 072 | 7 | |a BUS |x 004000 |2 bisacsh | |
| 082 | 7 | |a 332.1/1 |2 23 | |
| 049 | |a MAIN | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Adolph, Christopher, |d 1976- |e author. |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJrRkG3H4rxhvrrYQFjV4q |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2012045067 | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : |b the myth of neutrality / |c Christopher Adolph. |
| 260 | |a New York : |b Cambridge University Press, |c 2013. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (xxiii, 357 pages) : |b illustrations | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 347 | |a data file | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Cambridge series in comparative politics | |
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 319-342) and index. | ||
| 520 | |a "Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks."--Provided by publisher | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 505 | 0 | 0 | |g 1. |t Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance -- |g 3. |t Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies -- |g 4. |t Careers and monetary policy process -- |g 5. |t Careers and inflation in developing countries -- |g 6. |t How central bankers use their independence -- |g 7. |t Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy -- |g 8. |t The politics of central banker appointment -- |g 9. |t The politics of central banker tenure -- |g 10. |t Conclusion: The Dilemma of Discretion. |
| 650 | 0 | |a Monetary policy. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85086787 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Banks and banking, Central |x Political aspects. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Bureaucracy. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85018047 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Politique monétaire. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Banques centrales |x Aspect politique. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Bureaucratie. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Banks & Banking. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Banks and banking, Central |x Political aspects |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Bureaucracy |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Monetary policy |2 fast | |
| 655 | 0 | |a Electronic books. | |
| 655 | 4 | |a Electronic books. | |
| 758 | |i has work: |a Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCFP7fh3BJ9qfVvmvTvk8kC |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Adolph, Christopher, 1976- |t Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics. |d New York : Cambridge University Press, 2013 |z 9781107032613 |w (DLC) 2012027612 |w (OCoLC)800720605 |
| 830 | 0 | |a Cambridge studies in comparative politics. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n91089840 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |l FWS01 |p ZDB-4-EBU |q FWS_PDA_EBU |u https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=508328 |3 Volltext |
| 938 | |a Coutts Information Services |b COUT |n 25590685 | ||
| 938 | |a ebrary |b EBRY |n ebr10695287 | ||
| 938 | |a EBSCOhost |b EBSC |n 508328 | ||
| 938 | |a ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection |b IDEB |n cis25590685 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 10703635 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 10698323 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 10440919 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 10689818 | ||
| 994 | |a 92 |b GEBAY | ||
| 912 | |a ZDB-4-EBU | ||
| 049 | |a DE-863 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-FWS_katkey | ZDB-4-EBU-ocn844940155 |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1816796909182910464 |
| adam_text | |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Adolph, Christopher, 1976- |
| author_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2012045067 |
| author_facet | Adolph, Christopher, 1976- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Adolph, Christopher, 1976- |
| author_variant | c a ca |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | localFWS |
| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | HG230 |
| callnumber-raw | HG230.3 .A36 2013eb |
| callnumber-search | HG230.3 .A36 2013eb |
| callnumber-sort | HG 3230.3 A36 42013EB |
| callnumber-subject | HG - Finance |
| collection | ZDB-4-EBU |
| contents | Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance -- Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies -- Careers and monetary policy process -- Careers and inflation in developing countries -- How central bankers use their independence -- Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy -- The politics of central banker appointment -- The politics of central banker tenure -- Conclusion: The Dilemma of Discretion. |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)844940155 |
| dewey-full | 332.1/1 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 332 - Financial economics |
| dewey-raw | 332.1/1 |
| dewey-search | 332.1/1 |
| dewey-sort | 3332.1 11 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>05338cam a2200793 a 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">ZDB-4-EBU-ocn844940155</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">OCoLC</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20241004212047.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="006">m o d </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr cnu---unuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">130529s2013 nyua ob 001 0 eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">N$T</subfield><subfield code="b">eng</subfield><subfield code="e">pn</subfield><subfield code="c">N$T</subfield><subfield code="d">E7B</subfield><subfield code="d">COD</subfield><subfield code="d">GZM</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCF</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">CAMBR</subfield><subfield code="d">YDX</subfield><subfield code="d">YDXCP</subfield><subfield code="d">IDEBK</subfield><subfield code="d">CDX</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">ISM</subfield><subfield code="d">Z5A</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">UWO</subfield><subfield code="d">OL$</subfield><subfield code="d">LOA</subfield><subfield code="d">K6U</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">INTCL</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCL</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">SFB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="019" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">841486146</subfield><subfield code="a">841495192</subfield><subfield code="a">978500040</subfield><subfield code="a">978803475</subfield><subfield code="a">978989977</subfield><subfield code="a">979320390</subfield><subfield code="a">979799651</subfield><subfield code="a">1071410015</subfield><subfield code="a">1107746606</subfield><subfield code="a">1109940182</subfield><subfield code="a">1117866775</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781139616812</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1139616811</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781139626118</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1139626116</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781139622394</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1139622390</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781139506762</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1139506765</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781139613095</subfield><subfield code="q">(EBL)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">113961309X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="z">9781107032613</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="z">110703261X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)844940155</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)841486146</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)841495192</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)978500040</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)978803475</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)978989977</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)979320390</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)979799651</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)1071410015</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)1107746606</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)1109940182</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)1117866775</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="037" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1099952</subfield><subfield code="b">EBL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">HG230.3</subfield><subfield code="b">.A36 2013eb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="072" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">BUS</subfield><subfield code="x">004000</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">332.1/1</subfield><subfield code="2">23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MAIN</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Adolph, Christopher,</subfield><subfield code="d">1976-</subfield><subfield code="e">author.</subfield><subfield code="1">https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJrRkG3H4rxhvrrYQFjV4q</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2012045067</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics :</subfield><subfield code="b">the myth of neutrality /</subfield><subfield code="c">Christopher Adolph.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">New York :</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge University Press,</subfield><subfield code="c">2013.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (xxiii, 357 pages) :</subfield><subfield code="b">illustrations</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">computer</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">online resource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="347" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">data file</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Cambridge series in comparative politics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="504" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references (pages 319-342) and index.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks."--Provided by publisher</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="588" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Print version record.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="g">1.</subfield><subfield code="t">Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance --</subfield><subfield code="g">3.</subfield><subfield code="t">Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies --</subfield><subfield code="g">4.</subfield><subfield code="t">Careers and monetary policy process --</subfield><subfield code="g">5.</subfield><subfield code="t">Careers and inflation in developing countries --</subfield><subfield code="g">6.</subfield><subfield code="t">How central bankers use their independence --</subfield><subfield code="g">7.</subfield><subfield code="t">Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy --</subfield><subfield code="g">8.</subfield><subfield code="t">The politics of central banker appointment --</subfield><subfield code="g">9.</subfield><subfield code="t">The politics of central banker tenure --</subfield><subfield code="g">10.</subfield><subfield code="t">Conclusion: The Dilemma of Discretion.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Monetary policy.</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85086787</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Banks and banking, Central</subfield><subfield code="x">Political aspects.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Bureaucracy.</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85018047</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Politique monétaire.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Banques centrales</subfield><subfield code="x">Aspect politique.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Bureaucratie.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">BUSINESS & ECONOMICS</subfield><subfield code="x">Banks & Banking.</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Banks and banking, Central</subfield><subfield code="x">Political aspects</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Bureaucracy</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Monetary policy</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Electronic books.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Electronic books.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="758" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="i">has work:</subfield><subfield code="a">Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics (Text)</subfield><subfield code="1">https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCFP7fh3BJ9qfVvmvTvk8kC</subfield><subfield code="4">https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Print version:</subfield><subfield code="a">Adolph, Christopher, 1976-</subfield><subfield code="t">Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics.</subfield><subfield code="d">New York : Cambridge University Press, 2013</subfield><subfield code="z">9781107032613</subfield><subfield code="w">(DLC) 2012027612</subfield><subfield code="w">(OCoLC)800720605</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Cambridge studies in comparative politics.</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n91089840</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="l">FWS01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-4-EBU</subfield><subfield code="q">FWS_PDA_EBU</subfield><subfield code="u">https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=508328</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Coutts Information Services</subfield><subfield code="b">COUT</subfield><subfield code="n">25590685</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ebrary</subfield><subfield code="b">EBRY</subfield><subfield code="n">ebr10695287</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBSCOhost</subfield><subfield code="b">EBSC</subfield><subfield code="n">508328</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection</subfield><subfield code="b">IDEB</subfield><subfield code="n">cis25590685</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">YBP Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">YANK</subfield><subfield code="n">10703635</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">YBP Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">YANK</subfield><subfield code="n">10698323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">YBP Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">YANK</subfield><subfield code="n">10440919</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">YBP Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">YANK</subfield><subfield code="n">10689818</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="994" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">92</subfield><subfield code="b">GEBAY</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-4-EBU</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| genre | Electronic books. |
| genre_facet | Electronic books. |
| id | ZDB-4-EBU-ocn844940155 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-11-26T14:49:10Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781139616812 1139616811 9781139626118 1139626116 9781139622394 1139622390 9781139506762 1139506765 9781139613095 113961309X |
| language | English |
| oclc_num | 844940155 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 online resource (xxiii, 357 pages) : illustrations |
| psigel | ZDB-4-EBU |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publishDateSearch | 2013 |
| publishDateSort | 2013 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press, |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Cambridge studies in comparative politics. |
| series2 | Cambridge series in comparative politics |
| spelling | Adolph, Christopher, 1976- author. https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJrRkG3H4rxhvrrYQFjV4q http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2012045067 Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality / Christopher Adolph. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2013. 1 online resource (xxiii, 357 pages) : illustrations text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier data file Cambridge series in comparative politics Includes bibliographical references (pages 319-342) and index. "Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks."--Provided by publisher Print version record. 1. Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance -- 3. Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies -- 4. Careers and monetary policy process -- 5. Careers and inflation in developing countries -- 6. How central bankers use their independence -- 7. Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy -- 8. The politics of central banker appointment -- 9. The politics of central banker tenure -- 10. Conclusion: The Dilemma of Discretion. Monetary policy. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85086787 Banks and banking, Central Political aspects. Bureaucracy. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85018047 Politique monétaire. Banques centrales Aspect politique. Bureaucratie. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Banks & Banking. bisacsh Banks and banking, Central Political aspects fast Bureaucracy fast Monetary policy fast Electronic books. has work: Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCFP7fh3BJ9qfVvmvTvk8kC https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Adolph, Christopher, 1976- Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2013 9781107032613 (DLC) 2012027612 (OCoLC)800720605 Cambridge studies in comparative politics. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n91089840 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBU FWS_PDA_EBU https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=508328 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Adolph, Christopher, 1976- Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality / Cambridge studies in comparative politics. Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance -- Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies -- Careers and monetary policy process -- Careers and inflation in developing countries -- How central bankers use their independence -- Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy -- The politics of central banker appointment -- The politics of central banker tenure -- Conclusion: The Dilemma of Discretion. Monetary policy. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85086787 Banks and banking, Central Political aspects. Bureaucracy. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85018047 Politique monétaire. Banques centrales Aspect politique. Bureaucratie. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Banks & Banking. bisacsh Banks and banking, Central Political aspects fast Bureaucracy fast Monetary policy fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85086787 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85018047 |
| title | Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality / |
| title_alt | Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance -- Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies -- Careers and monetary policy process -- Careers and inflation in developing countries -- How central bankers use their independence -- Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy -- The politics of central banker appointment -- The politics of central banker tenure -- Conclusion: The Dilemma of Discretion. |
| title_auth | Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality / |
| title_exact_search | Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality / |
| title_full | Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality / Christopher Adolph. |
| title_fullStr | Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality / Christopher Adolph. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality / Christopher Adolph. |
| title_short | Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : |
| title_sort | bankers bureaucrats and central bank politics the myth of neutrality |
| title_sub | the myth of neutrality / |
| topic | Monetary policy. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85086787 Banks and banking, Central Political aspects. Bureaucracy. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85018047 Politique monétaire. Banques centrales Aspect politique. Bureaucratie. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Banks & Banking. bisacsh Banks and banking, Central Political aspects fast Bureaucracy fast Monetary policy fast |
| topic_facet | Monetary policy. Banks and banking, Central Political aspects. Bureaucracy. Politique monétaire. Banques centrales Aspect politique. Bureaucratie. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Banks & Banking. Banks and banking, Central Political aspects Bureaucracy Monetary policy Electronic books. |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=508328 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT adolphchristopher bankersbureaucratsandcentralbankpoliticsthemythofneutrality |