You never give me your money? :: sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending /
"We review the impact of the global financial crisis, and its spillovers into the sovereign sector of the euro area, on the international "rules of the game" for dealing with sovereign debt crises. These rules rest on two main pillars. The most important is the IMF's lending fram...
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
©2013.
|
Schriftenreihe: | IMF working paper ;
WP/13/20. |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | "We review the impact of the global financial crisis, and its spillovers into the sovereign sector of the euro area, on the international "rules of the game" for dealing with sovereign debt crises. These rules rest on two main pillars. The most important is the IMF's lending framework (policies, financing facilities, and financial resources), which is designed to support macroeconomic adjustment packages based on the key notion of public debt sustainability. The complementary pillar is represented by such contractual provisions as Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds, which aim to facilitate coordination among private creditors in order to contain the costs of a debt default or restructuring. We analyze the most significant changes (and their consequences) prompted by the recent crises to the Fund's lending framework, not only in terms of additional financial resources, new financing facilities (including precautionary ones), and cooperation with euro-area institutions, but also as regards the criteria governing exceptional access to the Fund's financial resources. We highlight a crucial innovation to these criteria, namely that, for the first time, they now explicitly take account of the risk of international systemic spillovers. Finally, we discuss how the recent crises have provided new political support for a broader dissemination of CACs in euro-area sovereign bonds. Importantly, in the first case involving an advanced economy, CACs were activated in the debt exchange undertaken by Greece in Spring 2012"--Page 2 of pdf. |
Beschreibung: | Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Feb. 4, 2013). "Office of the Executive Director for Albania, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and San Marino"--Page 2 of pdf. "January 2013"--Page 2 of pdf. |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (50 pages) : color illustrations |
Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 42-49). |
ISBN: | 9781475528589 1475528582 |
ISSN: | 2227-8885 ; |
Internformat
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245 | 1 | 0 | |a You never give me your money? : |b sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending / |c Marco Committeri, Francesco Spadafora. |
246 | 3 | 0 | |a Sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending |
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500 | |a "Office of the Executive Director for Albania, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and San Marino"--Page 2 of pdf. | ||
500 | |a "January 2013"--Page 2 of pdf. | ||
520 | |a "We review the impact of the global financial crisis, and its spillovers into the sovereign sector of the euro area, on the international "rules of the game" for dealing with sovereign debt crises. These rules rest on two main pillars. The most important is the IMF's lending framework (policies, financing facilities, and financial resources), which is designed to support macroeconomic adjustment packages based on the key notion of public debt sustainability. The complementary pillar is represented by such contractual provisions as Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds, which aim to facilitate coordination among private creditors in order to contain the costs of a debt default or restructuring. We analyze the most significant changes (and their consequences) prompted by the recent crises to the Fund's lending framework, not only in terms of additional financial resources, new financing facilities (including precautionary ones), and cooperation with euro-area institutions, but also as regards the criteria governing exceptional access to the Fund's financial resources. We highlight a crucial innovation to these criteria, namely that, for the first time, they now explicitly take account of the risk of international systemic spillovers. Finally, we discuss how the recent crises have provided new political support for a broader dissemination of CACs in euro-area sovereign bonds. Importantly, in the first case involving an advanced economy, CACs were activated in the debt exchange undertaken by Greece in Spring 2012"--Page 2 of pdf. | ||
504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 42-49). | ||
505 | 0 | |a Cover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Sovereign Debt Crises and the Collective Action Problem; A. The Collective Action Problem; B. Bonded Debt and Litigation Risk; C. The Role of Official Financing in a Sovereign Debt Crisis; III. The Contractual Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring; A. Key Steps towards the Adoption of the Contractual Approach; B. The Dissemination of Collective Action Clauses until the Euro-Area Debt Crisis; IV. The IMF's Lending Framework: the First Phase, from the mid-1990s to 2008; A. Balance of Payments Need, Access Limits, and the Exceptional Circumstances Clause. | |
505 | 8 | |a ChartChart 1 -- IMF Lending Arrangements (*), Credit Outstanding, and Undrawn Balances Under GRA; B. The Exceptional Access Policy in Capital Account Crises (2002-2003); C. Earlier Tests of the Exceptional Access Policy; D. Greater Predictability as the Common Thread of Reforms; V. The Impact of the Global Crisis on the International Framework for Dealing with Sovereign Debt Crises; A. Overhaul and Systematization of the Fund's Lending Toolkit; B. The Greek Crisis, Contagion, and Systemic Risk; C. Exceptional Access Policy and International Systemic Spillovers. | |
505 | 8 | |a D. New Impetus for Collective Action ClausesVI. Concluding Remarks; References. | |
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adam_text | |
any_adam_object | |
author | Committeri, Marco |
author2 | Spadafora, Francesco, 1966- |
author2_role | |
author2_variant | f s fs |
author_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no96028316 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2002057796 |
author_corporate | International Monetary Fund. Office of the Executive Director for Albania, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and San Marino |
author_corporate_role | |
author_facet | Committeri, Marco Spadafora, Francesco, 1966- International Monetary Fund. Office of the Executive Director for Albania, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and San Marino |
author_role | |
author_sort | Committeri, Marco |
author_variant | m c mc |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | localFWS |
callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
callnumber-label | HG3881 |
callnumber-raw | HG3881.5.I58 W67 No. 13/20eb |
callnumber-search | HG3881.5.I58 W67 No. 13/20eb |
callnumber-sort | HG 43881.5 I58 W67 NO 213 220EB |
callnumber-subject | HG - Finance |
collection | ZDB-4-EBU |
contents | Cover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Sovereign Debt Crises and the Collective Action Problem; A. The Collective Action Problem; B. Bonded Debt and Litigation Risk; C. The Role of Official Financing in a Sovereign Debt Crisis; III. The Contractual Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring; A. Key Steps towards the Adoption of the Contractual Approach; B. The Dissemination of Collective Action Clauses until the Euro-Area Debt Crisis; IV. The IMF's Lending Framework: the First Phase, from the mid-1990s to 2008; A. Balance of Payments Need, Access Limits, and the Exceptional Circumstances Clause. ChartChart 1 -- IMF Lending Arrangements (*), Credit Outstanding, and Undrawn Balances Under GRA; B. The Exceptional Access Policy in Capital Account Crises (2002-2003); C. Earlier Tests of the Exceptional Access Policy; D. Greater Predictability as the Common Thread of Reforms; V. The Impact of the Global Crisis on the International Framework for Dealing with Sovereign Debt Crises; A. Overhaul and Systematization of the Fund's Lending Toolkit; B. The Greek Crisis, Contagion, and Systemic Risk; C. Exceptional Access Policy and International Systemic Spillovers. D. New Impetus for Collective Action ClausesVI. Concluding Remarks; References. |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)826652711 |
dewey-full | 332.152 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 332 - Financial economics |
dewey-raw | 332.152 |
dewey-search | 332.152 |
dewey-sort | 3332.152 |
dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
era | 2008-2009 fast |
era_facet | 2008-2009 |
format | Electronic eBook |
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indexdate | 2024-07-16T15:03:53Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9781475528589 1475528582 |
issn | 2227-8885 ; |
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series | IMF working paper ; |
series2 | IMF working paper, |
spelling | Committeri, Marco. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no96028316 You never give me your money? : sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending / Marco Committeri, Francesco Spadafora. Sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2013. 1 online resource (50 pages) : color illustrations text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/13/20 Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Feb. 4, 2013). "Office of the Executive Director for Albania, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and San Marino"--Page 2 of pdf. "January 2013"--Page 2 of pdf. "We review the impact of the global financial crisis, and its spillovers into the sovereign sector of the euro area, on the international "rules of the game" for dealing with sovereign debt crises. These rules rest on two main pillars. The most important is the IMF's lending framework (policies, financing facilities, and financial resources), which is designed to support macroeconomic adjustment packages based on the key notion of public debt sustainability. The complementary pillar is represented by such contractual provisions as Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds, which aim to facilitate coordination among private creditors in order to contain the costs of a debt default or restructuring. We analyze the most significant changes (and their consequences) prompted by the recent crises to the Fund's lending framework, not only in terms of additional financial resources, new financing facilities (including precautionary ones), and cooperation with euro-area institutions, but also as regards the criteria governing exceptional access to the Fund's financial resources. We highlight a crucial innovation to these criteria, namely that, for the first time, they now explicitly take account of the risk of international systemic spillovers. Finally, we discuss how the recent crises have provided new political support for a broader dissemination of CACs in euro-area sovereign bonds. Importantly, in the first case involving an advanced economy, CACs were activated in the debt exchange undertaken by Greece in Spring 2012"--Page 2 of pdf. Includes bibliographical references (pages 42-49). Cover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Sovereign Debt Crises and the Collective Action Problem; A. The Collective Action Problem; B. Bonded Debt and Litigation Risk; C. The Role of Official Financing in a Sovereign Debt Crisis; III. The Contractual Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring; A. Key Steps towards the Adoption of the Contractual Approach; B. The Dissemination of Collective Action Clauses until the Euro-Area Debt Crisis; IV. The IMF's Lending Framework: the First Phase, from the mid-1990s to 2008; A. Balance of Payments Need, Access Limits, and the Exceptional Circumstances Clause. ChartChart 1 -- IMF Lending Arrangements (*), Credit Outstanding, and Undrawn Balances Under GRA; B. The Exceptional Access Policy in Capital Account Crises (2002-2003); C. Earlier Tests of the Exceptional Access Policy; D. Greater Predictability as the Common Thread of Reforms; V. The Impact of the Global Crisis on the International Framework for Dealing with Sovereign Debt Crises; A. Overhaul and Systematization of the Fund's Lending Toolkit; B. The Greek Crisis, Contagion, and Systemic Risk; C. Exceptional Access Policy and International Systemic Spillovers. D. New Impetus for Collective Action ClausesVI. Concluding Remarks; References. International Monetary Fund Europe, Southern Rules and practice. International Monetary Fund fast Loans Europe, Southern. Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2009003683 Prêts Europe méridionale. Crise financière mondiale, 2008-2009. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Banks & Banking. bisacsh Loans fast Southern Europe fast Global Financial Crisis (2008-2009) fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39Qhp4vBbr3T8xBMDbJhDhGmm (OCoLC)fst01755654 2008-2009 fast Rules fast Spadafora, Francesco, 1966- https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjtmQXBjfyb79yKCCmQvf3 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2002057796 International Monetary Fund. Office of the Executive Director for Albania, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and San Marino. has work: You never give me your money? (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCFVFtXX9j6yPMPtdyFDQFX https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print Version: 9781475528589 IMF working paper ; WP/13/20. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBU FWS_PDA_EBU https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=548023 Volltext |
spellingShingle | Committeri, Marco You never give me your money? : sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending / IMF working paper ; Cover; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Sovereign Debt Crises and the Collective Action Problem; A. The Collective Action Problem; B. Bonded Debt and Litigation Risk; C. The Role of Official Financing in a Sovereign Debt Crisis; III. The Contractual Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring; A. Key Steps towards the Adoption of the Contractual Approach; B. The Dissemination of Collective Action Clauses until the Euro-Area Debt Crisis; IV. The IMF's Lending Framework: the First Phase, from the mid-1990s to 2008; A. Balance of Payments Need, Access Limits, and the Exceptional Circumstances Clause. ChartChart 1 -- IMF Lending Arrangements (*), Credit Outstanding, and Undrawn Balances Under GRA; B. The Exceptional Access Policy in Capital Account Crises (2002-2003); C. Earlier Tests of the Exceptional Access Policy; D. Greater Predictability as the Common Thread of Reforms; V. The Impact of the Global Crisis on the International Framework for Dealing with Sovereign Debt Crises; A. Overhaul and Systematization of the Fund's Lending Toolkit; B. The Greek Crisis, Contagion, and Systemic Risk; C. Exceptional Access Policy and International Systemic Spillovers. D. New Impetus for Collective Action ClausesVI. Concluding Remarks; References. International Monetary Fund Europe, Southern Rules and practice. International Monetary Fund fast Loans Europe, Southern. Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2009003683 Prêts Europe méridionale. Crise financière mondiale, 2008-2009. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Banks & Banking. bisacsh Loans fast |
subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2009003683 (OCoLC)fst01755654 |
title | You never give me your money? : sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending / |
title_alt | Sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending |
title_auth | You never give me your money? : sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending / |
title_exact_search | You never give me your money? : sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending / |
title_full | You never give me your money? : sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending / Marco Committeri, Francesco Spadafora. |
title_fullStr | You never give me your money? : sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending / Marco Committeri, Francesco Spadafora. |
title_full_unstemmed | You never give me your money? : sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending / Marco Committeri, Francesco Spadafora. |
title_short | You never give me your money? : |
title_sort | you never give me your money sovereign debt crises collective action problems and imf lending |
title_sub | sovereign debt crises, collective action problems, and IMF lending / |
topic | International Monetary Fund Europe, Southern Rules and practice. International Monetary Fund fast Loans Europe, Southern. Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2009003683 Prêts Europe méridionale. Crise financière mondiale, 2008-2009. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Banks & Banking. bisacsh Loans fast |
topic_facet | International Monetary Fund Europe, Southern Rules and practice. International Monetary Fund Loans Europe, Southern. Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. Prêts Europe méridionale. Crise financière mondiale, 2008-2009. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Banks & Banking. Loans Southern Europe Rules |
url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=548023 |
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