Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation /:
This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors'...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Körperschaft: | |
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
©2012.
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IMF working paper ;
WP/12/204. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation. |
| Beschreibung: | Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed August 13, 2012). "Middle East and Central Asia Dept." "August 2012." |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (37 pages) |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 1475559577 9781475559576 147550554X 9781475505542 147553924X 9781475539240 1475520212 9781475520217 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Annen, Kurt, |d 1967- |e author. |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjxwcgv3v9VkTT7CMJxcrq |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no98127897 | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation / |c prepared by Kurt Annen and Luc Moers. |
| 260 | |a [Washington, D.C.] : |b International Monetary Fund, |c ©2012. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (37 pages) | ||
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| 500 | |a Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed August 13, 2012). | ||
| 520 | |a This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation. | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references. | ||
| 500 | |a "Middle East and Central Asia Dept." | ||
| 500 | |a "August 2012." | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index. | |
| 546 | |a English. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Economic assistance. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040767 | |
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| 650 | 7 | |a Economic assistance |2 fast | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Moers, Luc, |e author. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2003069990 | |
| 710 | 2 | |a International Monetary Fund. |b Middle East and Central Asia Department. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2004029012 | |
| 758 | |i has work: |a Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGkHFw48JjPr39BvrGg4YP |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
| 830 | 0 | |a IMF working paper ; |v WP/12/204. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263 | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| _version_ | 1816796905236070400 |
| adam_text | |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Annen, Kurt, 1967- Moers, Luc |
| author_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no98127897 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2003069990 |
| author_corporate | International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Department |
| author_corporate_role | |
| author_facet | Annen, Kurt, 1967- Moers, Luc International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Department |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Annen, Kurt, 1967- |
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| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | HG3881 |
| callnumber-raw | HG3881.5.I58 W67 No. 12/204eb |
| callnumber-search | HG3881.5.I58 W67 No. 12/204eb |
| callnumber-sort | HG 43881.5 I58 W67 NO 212 3204EB |
| callnumber-subject | HG - Finance |
| collection | ZDB-4-EBU |
| contents | Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size. 2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index. |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)805985260 |
| dewey-full | 339.22 |
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| dewey-ones | 339 - Macroeconomics and related topics |
| dewey-raw | 339.22 |
| dewey-search | 339.22 |
| dewey-sort | 3339.22 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="504" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"Middle East and Central Asia Dept."</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"August 2012."</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="546" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">English.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Economic assistance.</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040767</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Aide économique.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">assistance.</subfield><subfield code="2">aat</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">BUSINESS & ECONOMICS</subfield><subfield code="x">Economics</subfield><subfield code="x">Macroeconomics.</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">POLITICAL SCIENCE</subfield><subfield code="x">Economic Conditions.</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Economic assistance</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Moers, Luc,</subfield><subfield code="e">author.</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2003069990</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="710" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">International Monetary Fund.</subfield><subfield code="b">Middle East and Central Asia Department.</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2004029012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="758" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="i">has work:</subfield><subfield code="a">Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation (Text)</subfield><subfield code="1">https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGkHFw48JjPr39BvrGg4YP</subfield><subfield code="4">https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">IMF working paper ;</subfield><subfield code="v">WP/12/204.</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="l">FWS01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-4-EBU</subfield><subfield code="q">FWS_PDA_EBU</subfield><subfield code="u">https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=568141</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBL - Ebook Library</subfield><subfield code="b">EBLB</subfield><subfield code="n">EBL1606936</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ebrary</subfield><subfield code="b">EBRY</subfield><subfield code="n">ebr10627044</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBSCOhost</subfield><subfield code="b">EBSC</subfield><subfield code="n">568141</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">YBP Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">YANK</subfield><subfield code="n">10691568</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">YBP Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">YANK</subfield><subfield code="n">9927197</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="994" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">92</subfield><subfield code="b">GEBAY</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-4-EBU</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | ZDB-4-EBU-ocn805985260 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-11-26T14:49:06Z |
| institution | BVB |
| institution_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2004029012 |
| isbn | 1475559577 9781475559576 147550554X 9781475505542 147553924X 9781475539240 1475520212 9781475520217 |
| language | English |
| oclc_num | 805985260 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 online resource (37 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-4-EBU |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publishDateSearch | 2012 |
| publishDateSort | 2012 |
| publisher | International Monetary Fund, |
| record_format | marc |
| series | IMF working paper ; |
| series2 | IMF working paper ; |
| spelling | Annen, Kurt, 1967- author. https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjxwcgv3v9VkTT7CMJxcrq http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no98127897 Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation / prepared by Kurt Annen and Luc Moers. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2012. 1 online resource (37 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier polychrome. rdacc http://rdaregistry.info/termList/RDAColourContent/1003 text file rdaft IMF working paper ; WP/12/204 Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed August 13, 2012). This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation. Includes bibliographical references. "Middle East and Central Asia Dept." "August 2012." Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size. 2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index. English. Economic assistance. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040767 Aide économique. assistance. aat BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Economics Macroeconomics. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Economic Conditions. bisacsh Economic assistance fast Moers, Luc, author. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2003069990 International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Department. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2004029012 has work: Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGkHFw48JjPr39BvrGg4YP https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork IMF working paper ; WP/12/204. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBU FWS_PDA_EBU https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=568141 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Annen, Kurt, 1967- Moers, Luc Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation / IMF working paper ; Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size. 2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index. Economic assistance. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040767 Aide économique. assistance. aat BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Economics Macroeconomics. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Economic Conditions. bisacsh Economic assistance fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040767 |
| title | Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation / |
| title_auth | Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation / |
| title_exact_search | Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation / |
| title_full | Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation / prepared by Kurt Annen and Luc Moers. |
| title_fullStr | Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation / prepared by Kurt Annen and Luc Moers. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation / prepared by Kurt Annen and Luc Moers. |
| title_short | Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation / |
| title_sort | donor competition for aid impact and aid fragmentation |
| topic | Economic assistance. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040767 Aide économique. assistance. aat BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Economics Macroeconomics. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Economic Conditions. bisacsh Economic assistance fast |
| topic_facet | Economic assistance. Aide économique. assistance. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Economics Macroeconomics. POLITICAL SCIENCE Economic Conditions. Economic assistance |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=568141 |
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