Reputation and International Cooperation :: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries.
How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He expl...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
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Princeton :
Princeton University Press,
2011.
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| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolve. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (324 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9781400842926 1400842921 1283379945 9781283379946 |
Internformat
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| 100 | 1 | |a Tomz, Michael. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Reputation and International Cooperation : |b Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. |
| 260 | |a Princeton : |b Princeton University Press, |c 2011. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (324 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
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| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; List of Tables; List of Figures; Preface; Part One: Theory; Chapter 1. The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt; Chapter 2. A Theory of Cooperation through Reputation; Part Two: Evidence; Chapter 3. Reputations of New and Seasoned Borrowers; Chapter 4. Reputation in Expert Opinion; Chapter 5. Reputations During Good Times and Bad; Chapter 6. Enforcement by Gunboats; Chapter 7. Enforcement through Trade Sanctions; Chapter 8. Enforcement through Collective Retaliation; Part Three: Implications. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Chapter 9. Reputation and Cooperation Under AnarchyBibliography; Index. | |
| 520 | |a How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolve. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Debts, External |x History. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Debtor and creditor |x History. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Dettes extérieures |x Histoire. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Débiteur et créancier |x Histoire. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Public Finance. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x Political Economy. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Debtor and creditor |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Debts, External |2 fast | |
| 655 | 7 | |a History |2 fast | |
| 758 | |i has work: |a Reputation and international cooperation (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGq9kmrCC34hbBdGmj3Bbm |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Tomz, Michael. |t Reputation and International Cooperation : Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. |d Princeton : Princeton University Press, ©2011 |z 9780691134697 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | |
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| author | Tomz, Michael |
| author_facet | Tomz, Michael |
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| building | Verbundindex |
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| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
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| contents | Cover; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; List of Tables; List of Figures; Preface; Part One: Theory; Chapter 1. The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt; Chapter 2. A Theory of Cooperation through Reputation; Part Two: Evidence; Chapter 3. Reputations of New and Seasoned Borrowers; Chapter 4. Reputation in Expert Opinion; Chapter 5. Reputations During Good Times and Bad; Chapter 6. Enforcement by Gunboats; Chapter 7. Enforcement through Trade Sanctions; Chapter 8. Enforcement through Collective Retaliation; Part Three: Implications. Chapter 9. Reputation and Cooperation Under AnarchyBibliography; Index. |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)769343159 |
| dewey-full | 336.343509 |
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| dewey-raw | 336.343509 |
| dewey-search | 336.343509 |
| dewey-sort | 3336.343509 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| genre | History fast |
| genre_facet | History |
| id | ZDB-4-EBU-ocn769343159 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-11-26T14:49:04Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781400842926 1400842921 1283379945 9781283379946 |
| language | English |
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| publisher | Princeton University Press, |
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| spelling | Tomz, Michael. Reputation and International Cooperation : Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2011. 1 online resource (324 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Print version record. Cover; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; List of Tables; List of Figures; Preface; Part One: Theory; Chapter 1. The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt; Chapter 2. A Theory of Cooperation through Reputation; Part Two: Evidence; Chapter 3. Reputations of New and Seasoned Borrowers; Chapter 4. Reputation in Expert Opinion; Chapter 5. Reputations During Good Times and Bad; Chapter 6. Enforcement by Gunboats; Chapter 7. Enforcement through Trade Sanctions; Chapter 8. Enforcement through Collective Retaliation; Part Three: Implications. Chapter 9. Reputation and Cooperation Under AnarchyBibliography; Index. How does cooperation emerge in a condition of international anarchy? Michael Tomz sheds new light on this fundamental question through a study of international debt across three centuries. Tomz develops a reputational theory of cooperation between sovereign governments and foreign investors. He explains how governments acquire reputations in the eyes of investors, and argues that concerns about reputation sustain international lending and repayment. Tomz's theory generates novel predictions about the dynamics of cooperation: how investors treat first-time borrowers, how access to credit evolve. Debts, External History. Debtor and creditor History. Dettes extérieures Histoire. Débiteur et créancier Histoire. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Public Finance. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Economy. bisacsh Debtor and creditor fast Debts, External fast History fast has work: Reputation and international cooperation (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGq9kmrCC34hbBdGmj3Bbm https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Tomz, Michael. Reputation and International Cooperation : Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. Princeton : Princeton University Press, ©2011 9780691134697 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBU FWS_PDA_EBU https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=421479 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Tomz, Michael Reputation and International Cooperation : Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. Cover; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; List of Tables; List of Figures; Preface; Part One: Theory; Chapter 1. The Puzzle of Cooperation in International Debt; Chapter 2. A Theory of Cooperation through Reputation; Part Two: Evidence; Chapter 3. Reputations of New and Seasoned Borrowers; Chapter 4. Reputation in Expert Opinion; Chapter 5. Reputations During Good Times and Bad; Chapter 6. Enforcement by Gunboats; Chapter 7. Enforcement through Trade Sanctions; Chapter 8. Enforcement through Collective Retaliation; Part Three: Implications. Chapter 9. Reputation and Cooperation Under AnarchyBibliography; Index. Debts, External History. Debtor and creditor History. Dettes extérieures Histoire. Débiteur et créancier Histoire. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Public Finance. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Economy. bisacsh Debtor and creditor fast Debts, External fast |
| title | Reputation and International Cooperation : Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. |
| title_auth | Reputation and International Cooperation : Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. |
| title_exact_search | Reputation and International Cooperation : Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. |
| title_full | Reputation and International Cooperation : Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. |
| title_fullStr | Reputation and International Cooperation : Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reputation and International Cooperation : Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. |
| title_short | Reputation and International Cooperation : |
| title_sort | reputation and international cooperation sovereign debt across three centuries |
| title_sub | Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. |
| topic | Debts, External History. Debtor and creditor History. Dettes extérieures Histoire. Débiteur et créancier Histoire. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Public Finance. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Economy. bisacsh Debtor and creditor fast Debts, External fast |
| topic_facet | Debts, External History. Debtor and creditor History. Dettes extérieures Histoire. Débiteur et créancier Histoire. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Public Finance. POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Economy. Debtor and creditor Debts, External History |
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| work_keys_str_mv | AT tomzmichael reputationandinternationalcooperationsovereigndebtacrossthreecenturies |