Prosecutors in the boardroom :: using criminal law to regulate corporate conduct /

Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companie...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Weitere Verfasser: Barkow, Anthony S., Barkow, Rachel E.
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: New York : New York University Press, ©2011.
Schriftenreihe:NYU series in social and cultural analysis.
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Zusammenfassung:Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is too little oversight of these agreements, a.
Beschreibung:1 online resource (x, 277 pages) : illustrations
Bibliographie:Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:9780814709375
0814709370
9780814723142
0814723144

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