Common value auctions and the winner's curse /:
Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "...
Gespeichert in:
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton, N.J. :
Princeton University Press,
©2002.
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies su |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xvi, 401 pages) : illustrations |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 9781400830138 1400830133 9780691016672 0691016674 1282158759 9781282158757 9786612158759 6612158751 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Kagel, John H. |q (John Henry), |d 1942- |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJcRfkFWwpYHtdh8VTfKBP |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n87108929 | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Common value auctions and the winner's curse / |c John H. Kagel and Dan Levin. |
| 260 | |a Princeton, N.J. : |b Princeton University Press, |c ©2002. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (xvi, 401 pages) : |b illustrations | ||
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| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
| 505 | 0 | 0 | |t Bidding in common value auctions: a survey of experimental research / |r John H. Kagel, Dan Levin -- |t First-price common value auctions: bidder behavior and the "winner's curse" / |r John H. Kagel [and others] -- |t Winner's curse and public information in common value auctions / |r John H. Kagel, Dan Levin -- |t Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions / |r John H. Kagel, Dan Levin, Ronald M. Harstad -- |t Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: a laboratory study / |r John H. Kagel, Ronald M. Harstad, Dan Levin -- |t Revenue effects and information processing in English common value auctions / |r Dan Levin, John H. Kagel, Jean-François Richard -- |t Common value auctions with insider information / |r John H. Kagel, Dan Levin -- |t Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions? / |r Colin Campbell, Dan Levin -- |t Second-price auctions with asymmetric payoffs: an experimental investigation / |r Christopher Avery, John H. Kagel -- |t Learning in common value auctions: some initial observations / |r Susan Garvin, John H. Kagel -- |t Cross-game learning: experimental evidence from first-price and English common value auctions / |r John H. Kagel -- |t Comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions: a laboratory analysis / |r Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel, Dan Levin -- |t Bidding in common value auctions: how the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner's curse / |r Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel. |
| 520 | |a Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies su | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 546 | |a English. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Auctions. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85009444 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Paradoxes. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85097758 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Value. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85141930 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Vente aux enchères. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Paradoxes. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Valeur. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a value (economic concept) |2 aat | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Industries |x Retailing. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Marketing |x Direct. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a TRAVEL |x Shopping. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Investments & Securities |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Auctions |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Paradoxes |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Value |2 fast | |
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| 650 | 1 | 7 | |a Economische waarde. |2 gtt |
| 700 | 1 | |a Levin, Dan, |d 1947- |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJmpbwYBBbTx4yVTM9XPQq |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2002101972 | |
| 758 | |i has work: |a Common value auctions and the winner's curse (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGtFv6T9hFYFD7pQtgpfhd |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Kagel, John H. (John Henry), 1942- |t Common value auctions and the winner's curse. |d Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, ©2002 |z 0691016674 |z 9780691016672 |w (DLC) 2002072254 |w (OCoLC)49638477 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | |
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| author | Kagel, John H. (John Henry), 1942- |
| author2 | Levin, Dan, 1947- |
| author2_role | |
| author2_variant | d l dl |
| author_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n87108929 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2002101972 |
| author_additional | John H. Kagel, Dan Levin -- John H. Kagel [and others] -- John H. Kagel, Dan Levin, Ronald M. Harstad -- John H. Kagel, Ronald M. Harstad, Dan Levin -- Dan Levin, John H. Kagel, Jean-François Richard -- Colin Campbell, Dan Levin -- Christopher Avery, John H. Kagel -- Susan Garvin, John H. Kagel -- John H. Kagel -- Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel, Dan Levin -- Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel. |
| author_facet | Kagel, John H. (John Henry), 1942- Levin, Dan, 1947- |
| author_role | |
| author_sort | Kagel, John H. 1942- |
| author_variant | j h k jh jhk |
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| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
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| callnumber-raw | HF5476 .K27 2002eb |
| callnumber-search | HF5476 .K27 2002eb |
| callnumber-sort | HF 45476 K27 42002EB |
| callnumber-subject | HF - Commerce |
| collection | ZDB-4-EBU |
| contents | Bidding in common value auctions: a survey of experimental research / First-price common value auctions: bidder behavior and the "winner's curse" / Winner's curse and public information in common value auctions / Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions / Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: a laboratory study / Revenue effects and information processing in English common value auctions / Common value auctions with insider information / Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions? / Second-price auctions with asymmetric payoffs: an experimental investigation / Learning in common value auctions: some initial observations / Cross-game learning: experimental evidence from first-price and English common value auctions / Comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions: a laboratory analysis / Bidding in common value auctions: how the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner's curse / |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)436086269 |
| dewey-full | 381/.17 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 381 - Commerce (Trade) |
| dewey-raw | 381/.17 |
| dewey-search | 381/.17 |
| dewey-sort | 3381 217 |
| dewey-tens | 380 - Commerce, communications, transportation |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | ZDB-4-EBU-ocn436086269 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-16T15:03:42Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781400830138 1400830133 9780691016672 0691016674 1282158759 9781282158757 9786612158759 6612158751 |
| language | English |
| oclc_num | 436086269 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 online resource (xvi, 401 pages) : illustrations |
| psigel | ZDB-4-EBU |
| publishDate | 2002 |
| publishDateSearch | 2002 |
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| publisher | Princeton University Press, |
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| spelling | Kagel, John H. (John Henry), 1942- https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJcRfkFWwpYHtdh8VTfKBP http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n87108929 Common value auctions and the winner's curse / John H. Kagel and Dan Levin. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, ©2002. 1 online resource (xvi, 401 pages) : illustrations text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier data file Includes bibliographical references and index. Bidding in common value auctions: a survey of experimental research / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin -- First-price common value auctions: bidder behavior and the "winner's curse" / John H. Kagel [and others] -- Winner's curse and public information in common value auctions / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin -- Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin, Ronald M. Harstad -- Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: a laboratory study / John H. Kagel, Ronald M. Harstad, Dan Levin -- Revenue effects and information processing in English common value auctions / Dan Levin, John H. Kagel, Jean-François Richard -- Common value auctions with insider information / John H. Kagel, Dan Levin -- Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions? / Colin Campbell, Dan Levin -- Second-price auctions with asymmetric payoffs: an experimental investigation / Christopher Avery, John H. Kagel -- Learning in common value auctions: some initial observations / Susan Garvin, John H. Kagel -- Cross-game learning: experimental evidence from first-price and English common value auctions / John H. Kagel -- Comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions: a laboratory analysis / Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel, Dan Levin -- Bidding in common value auctions: how the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner's curse / Douglas Dyer, John H. Kagel. Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies su Print version record. English. Auctions. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85009444 Paradoxes. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85097758 Value. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85141930 Vente aux enchères. Paradoxes. Valeur. value (economic concept) aat BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Industries Retailing. bisacsh BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Marketing Direct. bisacsh TRAVEL Shopping. bisacsh BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Investments & Securities General. bisacsh Auctions fast Paradoxes fast Value fast Veilingen. gtt Paradoxen. gtt Economische waarde. gtt Levin, Dan, 1947- https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJmpbwYBBbTx4yVTM9XPQq http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2002101972 has work: Common value auctions and the winner's curse (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGtFv6T9hFYFD7pQtgpfhd https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Kagel, John H. (John Henry), 1942- Common value auctions and the winner's curse. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, ©2002 0691016674 9780691016672 (DLC) 2002072254 (OCoLC)49638477 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBU FWS_PDA_EBU https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=286778 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Kagel, John H. (John Henry), 1942- Common value auctions and the winner's curse / Bidding in common value auctions: a survey of experimental research / First-price common value auctions: bidder behavior and the "winner's curse" / Winner's curse and public information in common value auctions / Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions / Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: a laboratory study / Revenue effects and information processing in English common value auctions / Common value auctions with insider information / Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions? / Second-price auctions with asymmetric payoffs: an experimental investigation / Learning in common value auctions: some initial observations / Cross-game learning: experimental evidence from first-price and English common value auctions / Comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions: a laboratory analysis / Bidding in common value auctions: how the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner's curse / Auctions. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85009444 Paradoxes. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85097758 Value. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85141930 Vente aux enchères. Paradoxes. Valeur. value (economic concept) aat BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Industries Retailing. bisacsh BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Marketing Direct. bisacsh TRAVEL Shopping. bisacsh BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Investments & Securities General. bisacsh Auctions fast Paradoxes fast Value fast Veilingen. gtt Paradoxen. gtt Economische waarde. gtt |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85009444 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85097758 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85141930 |
| title | Common value auctions and the winner's curse / |
| title_alt | Bidding in common value auctions: a survey of experimental research / First-price common value auctions: bidder behavior and the "winner's curse" / Winner's curse and public information in common value auctions / Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions / Information impact and allocation rules in auctions with affiliated private values: a laboratory study / Revenue effects and information processing in English common value auctions / Common value auctions with insider information / Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions? / Second-price auctions with asymmetric payoffs: an experimental investigation / Learning in common value auctions: some initial observations / Cross-game learning: experimental evidence from first-price and English common value auctions / Comparison of naive and experienced bidders in common value offer auctions: a laboratory analysis / Bidding in common value auctions: how the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner's curse / |
| title_auth | Common value auctions and the winner's curse / |
| title_exact_search | Common value auctions and the winner's curse / |
| title_full | Common value auctions and the winner's curse / John H. Kagel and Dan Levin. |
| title_fullStr | Common value auctions and the winner's curse / John H. Kagel and Dan Levin. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Common value auctions and the winner's curse / John H. Kagel and Dan Levin. |
| title_short | Common value auctions and the winner's curse / |
| title_sort | common value auctions and the winner s curse |
| topic | Auctions. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85009444 Paradoxes. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85097758 Value. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85141930 Vente aux enchères. Paradoxes. Valeur. value (economic concept) aat BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Industries Retailing. bisacsh BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Marketing Direct. bisacsh TRAVEL Shopping. bisacsh BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Investments & Securities General. bisacsh Auctions fast Paradoxes fast Value fast Veilingen. gtt Paradoxen. gtt Economische waarde. gtt |
| topic_facet | Auctions. Paradoxes. Value. Vente aux enchères. Valeur. value (economic concept) BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Industries Retailing. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Marketing Direct. TRAVEL Shopping. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Investments & Securities General. Auctions Paradoxes Value Veilingen. Paradoxen. Economische waarde. |
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