The Origin of Oughtness :: a Case for Metaethical Conativism /
How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin ; Boston :
De Gruyter,
[2018]
|
Schriftenreihe: | Practical Philosophy ;
volume 22 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff she judges essential, but the opponents do not think this to be a major flaw. In an attempt to meet the problem of gridlock head-on, the current investigation approaches oughtness differently. I start with the introduction of a grounding framework for thinking about oughtness that allows a lucid presentation of the views on the market. It soon becomes clear that one necessary part of any plausible assessment of accounts of oughtness is a discussion of their adequacy conditions. I continue with a detailed evaluation of four different accounts, as presented by Halbig (2007), Schroeder (2007), Stemmer (2006), and Scanlon (2014). My main result is that desire-based or Humean theories of oughtness are more plausible because desire-independent accounts fail to explain something crucial: the for-me character of oughtness. Based on the insights gathered thus far, I then develop a new Humean theory - metaethical conativism - and defend it against some historically influential objections. |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (297 pages) |
Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
ISBN: | 9783110599855 3110599856 9783110599787 3110599783 |
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520 | |a How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff she judges essential, but the opponents do not think this to be a major flaw. In an attempt to meet the problem of gridlock head-on, the current investigation approaches oughtness differently. I start with the introduction of a grounding framework for thinking about oughtness that allows a lucid presentation of the views on the market. It soon becomes clear that one necessary part of any plausible assessment of accounts of oughtness is a discussion of their adequacy conditions. I continue with a detailed evaluation of four different accounts, as presented by Halbig (2007), Schroeder (2007), Stemmer (2006), and Scanlon (2014). My main result is that desire-based or Humean theories of oughtness are more plausible because desire-independent accounts fail to explain something crucial: the for-me character of oughtness. Based on the insights gathered thus far, I then develop a new Humean theory - metaethical conativism - and defend it against some historically influential objections. | ||
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adam_text | |
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author | Fischer, Stefan |
author_facet | Fischer, Stefan |
author_role | aut |
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author_variant | s f sf |
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bvnumber | localFWS |
callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
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callnumber-subject | BJ - Ethics |
collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
contents | Frontmatter -- Preface and acknowledgments -- Contents -- Part i: the phenomenon and how to explain it -- 1 the phenomenon of oughtness -- 2 the grounds for explaining oughtness -- 3 two angles and a dialectical dead end -- Part ii: four theories of oughtness -- 4 stemmer's humean theory of oughtness -- 5 halbig's value realism -- 6 schroeder's hypotheticalism -- 7 scanlon's reasons fundamentalism -- 8 why humeanism 'wins' -- Part iii: constructing conativism -- 9 a look ahead -- 10 an anthropological framework for humeanism -- 11 the argument from favored desires -- 12 the nature of desiring -- 13 promoting desires -- 14 idealization, epistemic error, and autonomy -- 15 the nature of practical reasons -- 16 the weight of favorings -- 17 conativism and the morality angle -- 18 the origin of oughtness: a recapitulation -- Bibliography -- Index. |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1049627104 |
dewey-full | 170 |
dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
dewey-ones | 170 - Ethics (Moral philosophy) |
dewey-raw | 170 |
dewey-search | 170 |
dewey-sort | 3170 |
dewey-tens | 170 - Ethics (Moral philosophy) |
discipline | Philosophie |
format | Electronic eBook |
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spelling | Fischer, Stefan, author. The Origin of Oughtness : a Case for Metaethical Conativism / Stefan Fischer. Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter, [2018] ©2018 1 online resource (297 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Practical Philosophy ; volume 22 Includes bibliographical references and index. Frontmatter -- Preface and acknowledgments -- Contents -- Part i: the phenomenon and how to explain it -- 1 the phenomenon of oughtness -- 2 the grounds for explaining oughtness -- 3 two angles and a dialectical dead end -- Part ii: four theories of oughtness -- 4 stemmer's humean theory of oughtness -- 5 halbig's value realism -- 6 schroeder's hypotheticalism -- 7 scanlon's reasons fundamentalism -- 8 why humeanism 'wins' -- Part iii: constructing conativism -- 9 a look ahead -- 10 an anthropological framework for humeanism -- 11 the argument from favored desires -- 12 the nature of desiring -- 13 promoting desires -- 14 idealization, epistemic error, and autonomy -- 15 the nature of practical reasons -- 16 the weight of favorings -- 17 conativism and the morality angle -- 18 the origin of oughtness: a recapitulation -- Bibliography -- Index. How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff she judges essential, but the opponents do not think this to be a major flaw. In an attempt to meet the problem of gridlock head-on, the current investigation approaches oughtness differently. I start with the introduction of a grounding framework for thinking about oughtness that allows a lucid presentation of the views on the market. It soon becomes clear that one necessary part of any plausible assessment of accounts of oughtness is a discussion of their adequacy conditions. I continue with a detailed evaluation of four different accounts, as presented by Halbig (2007), Schroeder (2007), Stemmer (2006), and Scanlon (2014). My main result is that desire-based or Humean theories of oughtness are more plausible because desire-independent accounts fail to explain something crucial: the for-me character of oughtness. Based on the insights gathered thus far, I then develop a new Humean theory - metaethical conativism - and defend it against some historically influential objections. In English. Online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 21. Aug 2018). Metaethics. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2011005653 Métaéthique. PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys General. bisacsh PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys Modern. bisacsh Metaethics fast Meta-ethics. moral philosophy. normativity. has work: The origin of oughtness (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGwmyVYYvRMvVPTcvtX9cK https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: 9783110599251 Print version: 9783110600728 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1868109 Volltext |
spellingShingle | Fischer, Stefan The Origin of Oughtness : a Case for Metaethical Conativism / Frontmatter -- Preface and acknowledgments -- Contents -- Part i: the phenomenon and how to explain it -- 1 the phenomenon of oughtness -- 2 the grounds for explaining oughtness -- 3 two angles and a dialectical dead end -- Part ii: four theories of oughtness -- 4 stemmer's humean theory of oughtness -- 5 halbig's value realism -- 6 schroeder's hypotheticalism -- 7 scanlon's reasons fundamentalism -- 8 why humeanism 'wins' -- Part iii: constructing conativism -- 9 a look ahead -- 10 an anthropological framework for humeanism -- 11 the argument from favored desires -- 12 the nature of desiring -- 13 promoting desires -- 14 idealization, epistemic error, and autonomy -- 15 the nature of practical reasons -- 16 the weight of favorings -- 17 conativism and the morality angle -- 18 the origin of oughtness: a recapitulation -- Bibliography -- Index. Metaethics. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2011005653 Métaéthique. PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys General. bisacsh PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys Modern. bisacsh Metaethics fast |
subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2011005653 |
title | The Origin of Oughtness : a Case for Metaethical Conativism / |
title_alt | Frontmatter -- Preface and acknowledgments -- Contents -- Part i: the phenomenon and how to explain it -- 1 the phenomenon of oughtness -- 2 the grounds for explaining oughtness -- 3 two angles and a dialectical dead end -- Part ii: four theories of oughtness -- 4 stemmer's humean theory of oughtness -- 5 halbig's value realism -- 6 schroeder's hypotheticalism -- 7 scanlon's reasons fundamentalism -- 8 why humeanism 'wins' -- Part iii: constructing conativism -- 9 a look ahead -- 10 an anthropological framework for humeanism -- 11 the argument from favored desires -- 12 the nature of desiring -- 13 promoting desires -- 14 idealization, epistemic error, and autonomy -- 15 the nature of practical reasons -- 16 the weight of favorings -- 17 conativism and the morality angle -- 18 the origin of oughtness: a recapitulation -- Bibliography -- Index. |
title_auth | The Origin of Oughtness : a Case for Metaethical Conativism / |
title_exact_search | The Origin of Oughtness : a Case for Metaethical Conativism / |
title_full | The Origin of Oughtness : a Case for Metaethical Conativism / Stefan Fischer. |
title_fullStr | The Origin of Oughtness : a Case for Metaethical Conativism / Stefan Fischer. |
title_full_unstemmed | The Origin of Oughtness : a Case for Metaethical Conativism / Stefan Fischer. |
title_short | The Origin of Oughtness : |
title_sort | origin of oughtness a case for metaethical conativism |
title_sub | a Case for Metaethical Conativism / |
topic | Metaethics. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2011005653 Métaéthique. PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys General. bisacsh PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys Modern. bisacsh Metaethics fast |
topic_facet | Metaethics. Métaéthique. PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys General. PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys Modern. Metaethics |
url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1868109 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT fischerstefan theoriginofoughtnessacaseformetaethicalconativism AT fischerstefan originofoughtnessacaseformetaethicalconativism |