Corruption, taxes and compliance /:
This paper revisits the effects of corruption on the state's capacity to raise revenue, building on the existing empirical literature using new and more disaggregated data. We use a comprehensive dataset for 147 countries spanning 1995-2014, compiled by the IMF. It finds that-consistent with th...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund,
[2017]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IMF working paper ;
WP/17/255. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper revisits the effects of corruption on the state's capacity to raise revenue, building on the existing empirical literature using new and more disaggregated data. We use a comprehensive dataset for 147 countries spanning 1995-2014, compiled by the IMF. It finds that-consistent with the existing literature-corruption is negatively associated with overall tax revenue, and most of its components. This relationship is predominantly influenced by the way corruption interacts with tax compliance. The establishment of large taxpayer offices improves tax compliance by dampening the perception of corruption, thereby boosting revenue. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (32 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9781484330203 148433020X |
Internformat
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| 520 | 3 | |a This paper revisits the effects of corruption on the state's capacity to raise revenue, building on the existing empirical literature using new and more disaggregated data. We use a comprehensive dataset for 147 countries spanning 1995-2014, compiled by the IMF. It finds that-consistent with the existing literature-corruption is negatively associated with overall tax revenue, and most of its components. This relationship is predominantly influenced by the way corruption interacts with tax compliance. The establishment of large taxpayer offices improves tax compliance by dampening the perception of corruption, thereby boosting revenue. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover -- Content -- I. Introduction -- II. Literature Review -- III. Dataset -- IV. Stylized Facts -- V. Revisiting The Impact Of Corruption On Tax Revenue -- VI. Improving Compliance-The Impact Of Institutions -- VII. Policy Conclusions -- References -- Figures -- 1. Total Tax Revenue -- 2. Tax Revenue Components and Corruption -- 3. Tax Compliance and Corruption -- 5. Effectiveness of Compliance Offices -- Tables -- 1. Literature Summary of Panel Estimation Techniques for the Impact of Corruption on Public Revenue -- 2. The effect of corruption on tax revenue -- 3. The effect of corruption on tax revenues components -- 4. Impact of Institutions on Corruption and Tax Revenue -- Baseline -- 5. Impact of LTOs on Tax Revenue-Robustness -- Appendices -- I. Variance Decomposition of Corruption, Instruments, and Tax Revenues-to-GDP -- II. First Stage -- III. Results with ICTD -- IV. LTO, MTO, and ACA Establishment Dates -- V. Summary Statistics. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Tax evasion. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85132819 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Taxpayer compliance. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh86005848 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Taxation. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85132846 | |
| 650 | 2 | |a Taxes |0 https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D013660 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Fraude fiscale. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Impôt. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Tax evasion |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Taxation |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Taxpayer compliance |2 fast | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Gupta, Sanjeev, |e author. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n82038393 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Kimani, Elijah, |e author. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2016149031 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Tapsoba, Sampawende J.-A. |q (Sampawende Jules-Armand), |e author. |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjCVK8WjD9y9yXgBHrFTjK |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2011150417 | |
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| author | Baum, Anja Gupta, Sanjeev Kimani, Elijah Tapsoba, Sampawende J.-A. (Sampawende Jules-Armand) |
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| contents | Cover -- Content -- I. Introduction -- II. Literature Review -- III. Dataset -- IV. Stylized Facts -- V. Revisiting The Impact Of Corruption On Tax Revenue -- VI. Improving Compliance-The Impact Of Institutions -- VII. Policy Conclusions -- References -- Figures -- 1. Total Tax Revenue -- 2. Tax Revenue Components and Corruption -- 3. Tax Compliance and Corruption -- 5. Effectiveness of Compliance Offices -- Tables -- 1. Literature Summary of Panel Estimation Techniques for the Impact of Corruption on Public Revenue -- 2. The effect of corruption on tax revenue -- 3. The effect of corruption on tax revenues components -- 4. Impact of Institutions on Corruption and Tax Revenue -- Baseline -- 5. Impact of LTOs on Tax Revenue-Robustness -- Appendices -- I. Variance Decomposition of Corruption, Instruments, and Tax Revenues-to-GDP -- II. First Stage -- III. Results with ICTD -- IV. LTO, MTO, and ACA Establishment Dates -- V. Summary Statistics. |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1020031002 |
| dewey-full | 364.13380973 |
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| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
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| id | ZDB-4-EBA-on1020031002 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:28:11Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781484330203 148433020X |
| language | English |
| oclc_num | 1020031002 |
| open_access_boolean | |
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| series | IMF working paper ; |
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| spelling | Baum, Anja, author. Corruption, taxes and compliance / by Anja Baum, Sanjeev Gupta, Elijah Kimani, and Sampawende Jules Tapsoba. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, [2017] ©2017 1 online resource (32 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier IMF Working Paper ; WP/17/255 Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed July 30, 2019) This paper revisits the effects of corruption on the state's capacity to raise revenue, building on the existing empirical literature using new and more disaggregated data. We use a comprehensive dataset for 147 countries spanning 1995-2014, compiled by the IMF. It finds that-consistent with the existing literature-corruption is negatively associated with overall tax revenue, and most of its components. This relationship is predominantly influenced by the way corruption interacts with tax compliance. The establishment of large taxpayer offices improves tax compliance by dampening the perception of corruption, thereby boosting revenue. Cover -- Content -- I. Introduction -- II. Literature Review -- III. Dataset -- IV. Stylized Facts -- V. Revisiting The Impact Of Corruption On Tax Revenue -- VI. Improving Compliance-The Impact Of Institutions -- VII. Policy Conclusions -- References -- Figures -- 1. Total Tax Revenue -- 2. Tax Revenue Components and Corruption -- 3. Tax Compliance and Corruption -- 5. Effectiveness of Compliance Offices -- Tables -- 1. Literature Summary of Panel Estimation Techniques for the Impact of Corruption on Public Revenue -- 2. The effect of corruption on tax revenue -- 3. The effect of corruption on tax revenues components -- 4. Impact of Institutions on Corruption and Tax Revenue -- Baseline -- 5. Impact of LTOs on Tax Revenue-Robustness -- Appendices -- I. Variance Decomposition of Corruption, Instruments, and Tax Revenues-to-GDP -- II. First Stage -- III. Results with ICTD -- IV. LTO, MTO, and ACA Establishment Dates -- V. Summary Statistics. Tax evasion. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85132819 Taxpayer compliance. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh86005848 Taxation. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85132846 Taxes https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D013660 Fraude fiscale. Impôt. Tax evasion fast Taxation fast Taxpayer compliance fast Gupta, Sanjeev, author. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n82038393 Kimani, Elijah, author. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2016149031 Tapsoba, Sampawende J.-A. (Sampawende Jules-Armand), author. https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjCVK8WjD9y9yXgBHrFTjK http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2011150417 IMF working paper ; WP/17/255. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no89010263 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1687309 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Baum, Anja Gupta, Sanjeev Kimani, Elijah Tapsoba, Sampawende J.-A. (Sampawende Jules-Armand) Corruption, taxes and compliance / IMF working paper ; Cover -- Content -- I. Introduction -- II. Literature Review -- III. Dataset -- IV. Stylized Facts -- V. Revisiting The Impact Of Corruption On Tax Revenue -- VI. Improving Compliance-The Impact Of Institutions -- VII. Policy Conclusions -- References -- Figures -- 1. Total Tax Revenue -- 2. Tax Revenue Components and Corruption -- 3. Tax Compliance and Corruption -- 5. Effectiveness of Compliance Offices -- Tables -- 1. Literature Summary of Panel Estimation Techniques for the Impact of Corruption on Public Revenue -- 2. The effect of corruption on tax revenue -- 3. The effect of corruption on tax revenues components -- 4. Impact of Institutions on Corruption and Tax Revenue -- Baseline -- 5. Impact of LTOs on Tax Revenue-Robustness -- Appendices -- I. Variance Decomposition of Corruption, Instruments, and Tax Revenues-to-GDP -- II. First Stage -- III. Results with ICTD -- IV. LTO, MTO, and ACA Establishment Dates -- V. Summary Statistics. Tax evasion. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85132819 Taxpayer compliance. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh86005848 Taxation. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85132846 Taxes https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D013660 Fraude fiscale. Impôt. Tax evasion fast Taxation fast Taxpayer compliance fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85132819 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh86005848 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85132846 https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D013660 |
| title | Corruption, taxes and compliance / |
| title_auth | Corruption, taxes and compliance / |
| title_exact_search | Corruption, taxes and compliance / |
| title_full | Corruption, taxes and compliance / by Anja Baum, Sanjeev Gupta, Elijah Kimani, and Sampawende Jules Tapsoba. |
| title_fullStr | Corruption, taxes and compliance / by Anja Baum, Sanjeev Gupta, Elijah Kimani, and Sampawende Jules Tapsoba. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Corruption, taxes and compliance / by Anja Baum, Sanjeev Gupta, Elijah Kimani, and Sampawende Jules Tapsoba. |
| title_short | Corruption, taxes and compliance / |
| title_sort | corruption taxes and compliance |
| topic | Tax evasion. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85132819 Taxpayer compliance. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh86005848 Taxation. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85132846 Taxes https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D013660 Fraude fiscale. Impôt. Tax evasion fast Taxation fast Taxpayer compliance fast |
| topic_facet | Tax evasion. Taxpayer compliance. Taxation. Taxes Fraude fiscale. Impôt. Tax evasion Taxation Taxpayer compliance |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1687309 |
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