Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.:
This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February-March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February-late May 2014). It examines Russia's approach, draws inferences from Moscow's intentions, and evaluates the l...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Weitere Verfasser: | , , , , |
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica :
RAND Corporation,
2017.
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Research report (Rand Corporation) ;
RR-1498-A. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February-March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February-late May 2014). It examines Russia's approach, draws inferences from Moscow's intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods being used again elsewhere. These two distinct campaigns overlap somewhat but offer different lessons for participants and observers. The report finds that Russia's operation to annex Crimea represented a decisive and competent use of military force in pursuit of political ends. Russia's operations in Crimea benefited from highly favorable circumstances--political, historical, geographical, and military--that limit their generalizability. Analysis of the operation underscores that there are many remaining unknowns about Russia's military capabilities, especially in the aftermath of its military reforms and modernization program. The report also finds that the campaign in Eastern Ukraine was an ineffectually implemented--and perhaps ill-conceived--effort to achieve political fragmentation of Ukraine via federalization and retain Russian influence. Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation. This study thus questions the desirability for Moscow to replicate a course of events similar to the campaign in Eastern Ukraine. Conversely, the operation to annex Crimea was a highly successful employment of select elements within Russia's armed forces, making it an attractive use of military power, but the structural and operation factors contributing to its success raise doubts whether it can be repeated elsewhere. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (128 pages) |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 95-109). |
| ISBN: | 9780833096173 0833096176 9780833096067 0833096060 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Kofman, Michael. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. |
| 260 | |a Santa Monica : |b RAND Corporation, |c 2017. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (128 pages) | ||
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| 505 | 0 | |a Cover ; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures and Table; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; CHAPTER TWO: The Annexation of Crimea; How Russia Annexed Crimea; The Balance of Forces; A Chronology of Events; Russia's Information Campaign; Characteristics of the Crimean Operation; Russian-Crimean History; Cultural Proximity Between Russia and Crimea; Geography; Russia's Force Posture and Transit Arrangements with Ukraine; Target of Opportunity; Ukrainian Actions Contributing to Russian Success; Factors Enabling Russia's Operational Successes. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Force CompositionMobility; Use of Deception at the Tactical and Strategic Levels; Use of Conventional Exercises as Cover; Privileging Speed, Agility, and Communications over Firepower; Preparing for Counterattack; Factors Contributing to Russia's Operational Shortcomings; Turning Local Forces; Psychological Operations; Planning for Nonviolent Resistance; Political Management of Local Elites; Information Operations; Conclusion: Implications and Effects; CHAPTER THREE: Separatism and Aggression in Eastern Ukraine (March-May 2014); How Russia Destabilized Eastern Ukraine; Chronology of Events. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Characteristics of the Eastern Ukraine OperationThe Ukrainian Context; The Information Campaign; The "Separatists"; The Powerful Nonstate Actors Behind Each Camp; Russia's Possible Lessons Learned; Small Investments Yield Small Benefits; Political Warfare Requires Knowing Your Target; Irregular Forces Are Difficult to Control; Nonstate Actors Matter; Former Soviet Republics Have an Ample Pool of Available Fighters; Conventional Forces Are Only a Temporary Deterrent; Political Timing Is Important; Russia's Operational Shortcomings; Russia Struggled to Control Political Warfare. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Russia Was Ineffective at Inspiring SeparatismPoor Assumptions Guided Moscow's Strategy; Hybrid War Was a Brief Adaptation in This Conflict; Conclusion: Implications and Effects; CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusion; APPENDIXES; A. Information Campaign; B. Timeline (February 18-May 31, 2014); References. | |
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 95-109). | ||
| 520 | |a This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February-March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February-late May 2014). It examines Russia's approach, draws inferences from Moscow's intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods being used again elsewhere. These two distinct campaigns overlap somewhat but offer different lessons for participants and observers. The report finds that Russia's operation to annex Crimea represented a decisive and competent use of military force in pursuit of political ends. Russia's operations in Crimea benefited from highly favorable circumstances--political, historical, geographical, and military--that limit their generalizability. Analysis of the operation underscores that there are many remaining unknowns about Russia's military capabilities, especially in the aftermath of its military reforms and modernization program. The report also finds that the campaign in Eastern Ukraine was an ineffectually implemented--and perhaps ill-conceived--effort to achieve political fragmentation of Ukraine via federalization and retain Russian influence. Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation. This study thus questions the desirability for Moscow to replicate a course of events similar to the campaign in Eastern Ukraine. Conversely, the operation to annex Crimea was a highly successful employment of select elements within Russia's armed forces, making it an attractive use of military power, but the structural and operation factors contributing to its success raise doubts whether it can be repeated elsewhere. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Russo-Ukrainian War, 2014- | |
| 651 | 0 | |a Crimea (Ukraine) |x History, Military |y 21st century. | |
| 651 | 0 | |a Russia (Federation) |x Relations |z Ukraine. | |
| 651 | 0 | |a Russia (Federation) |x History, Military |y 21st century. | |
| 651 | 0 | |a Ukraine |x Relations |z Russia (Federation) | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Frozen conflicts. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Grey areas. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Territorial disputes. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Guerre russo-ukrainienne, 2014- | |
| 650 | 7 | |a HISTORY |z Europe |x Eastern. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a HISTORY |z Europe |x Former Soviet Republics. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a HISTORY |z Europe |x Russia & the Former Soviet Union. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a International relations |2 fast | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Russia |2 fast | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Russia (Federation) |2 fast |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJhhmCp3jtcMQbx3WgpXVC | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Ukraine |2 fast |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJkMMfGYRhk8WcWRp3xJjC | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Ukraine |z Crimea |2 fast |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39QbtfRyqbdXRrRDhtWTfDvQY | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Russian Federation. |2 pplt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Ukraine. |2 pplt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Crimea. |2 pplt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Annexation. |2 pplt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Armed forces. |2 pplt | |
| 650 | 7 | |a International relations. |2 pplt | |
| 647 | 7 | |a Ukraine Conflict |d (2014- ) |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst01921502 |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39Qhp4vB9x3fwFFVmCfTjGT4y | |
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| 700 | 1 | |a Tkacheva, Olesya. | |
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| author | Kofman, Michael |
| author2 | Migacheva, Katya Nichiporuk, Brian, 1966- Radin, Andrew Tkacheva, Olesya Oberholtzer, Jenny |
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| contents | Cover ; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures and Table; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; CHAPTER TWO: The Annexation of Crimea; How Russia Annexed Crimea; The Balance of Forces; A Chronology of Events; Russia's Information Campaign; Characteristics of the Crimean Operation; Russian-Crimean History; Cultural Proximity Between Russia and Crimea; Geography; Russia's Force Posture and Transit Arrangements with Ukraine; Target of Opportunity; Ukrainian Actions Contributing to Russian Success; Factors Enabling Russia's Operational Successes. Force CompositionMobility; Use of Deception at the Tactical and Strategic Levels; Use of Conventional Exercises as Cover; Privileging Speed, Agility, and Communications over Firepower; Preparing for Counterattack; Factors Contributing to Russia's Operational Shortcomings; Turning Local Forces; Psychological Operations; Planning for Nonviolent Resistance; Political Management of Local Elites; Information Operations; Conclusion: Implications and Effects; CHAPTER THREE: Separatism and Aggression in Eastern Ukraine (March-May 2014); How Russia Destabilized Eastern Ukraine; Chronology of Events. Characteristics of the Eastern Ukraine OperationThe Ukrainian Context; The Information Campaign; The "Separatists"; The Powerful Nonstate Actors Behind Each Camp; Russia's Possible Lessons Learned; Small Investments Yield Small Benefits; Political Warfare Requires Knowing Your Target; Irregular Forces Are Difficult to Control; Nonstate Actors Matter; Former Soviet Republics Have an Ample Pool of Available Fighters; Conventional Forces Are Only a Temporary Deterrent; Political Timing Is Important; Russia's Operational Shortcomings; Russia Struggled to Control Political Warfare. Russia Was Ineffective at Inspiring SeparatismPoor Assumptions Guided Moscow's Strategy; Hybrid War Was a Brief Adaptation in This Conflict; Conclusion: Implications and Effects; CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusion; APPENDIXES; A. Information Campaign; B. Timeline (February 18-May 31, 2014); References. |
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| discipline | Militärwissenschaft |
| era | 2000-2099 fast |
| era_facet | 2000-2099 |
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Ukraine; Target of Opportunity; Ukrainian Actions Contributing to Russian Success; Factors Enabling Russia's Operational Successes.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Force CompositionMobility; Use of Deception at the Tactical and Strategic Levels; Use of Conventional Exercises as Cover; Privileging Speed, Agility, and Communications over Firepower; Preparing for Counterattack; Factors Contributing to Russia's Operational Shortcomings; Turning Local Forces; Psychological Operations; Planning for Nonviolent Resistance; Political Management of Local Elites; Information Operations; Conclusion: Implications and Effects; CHAPTER THREE: Separatism and Aggression in Eastern Ukraine (March-May 2014); How Russia Destabilized Eastern Ukraine; Chronology of Events.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Characteristics of the Eastern Ukraine OperationThe Ukrainian Context; The Information Campaign; The "Separatists"; The Powerful Nonstate Actors Behind Each Camp; Russia's Possible Lessons Learned; Small Investments Yield Small Benefits; Political Warfare Requires Knowing Your Target; Irregular Forces Are Difficult to Control; Nonstate Actors Matter; Former Soviet Republics Have an Ample Pool of Available Fighters; Conventional Forces Are Only a Temporary Deterrent; Political Timing Is Important; Russia's Operational Shortcomings; Russia Struggled to Control Political Warfare.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Russia Was Ineffective at Inspiring SeparatismPoor Assumptions Guided Moscow's Strategy; Hybrid War Was a Brief Adaptation in This Conflict; Conclusion: Implications and Effects; CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusion; APPENDIXES; A. Information Campaign; B. Timeline (February 18-May 31, 2014); References.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="504" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references (pages 95-109).</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February-March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February-late May 2014). It examines Russia's approach, draws inferences from Moscow's intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods being used again elsewhere. These two distinct campaigns overlap somewhat but offer different lessons for participants and observers. The report finds that Russia's operation to annex Crimea represented a decisive and competent use of military force in pursuit of political ends. Russia's operations in Crimea benefited from highly favorable circumstances--political, historical, geographical, and military--that limit their generalizability. Analysis of the operation underscores that there are many remaining unknowns about Russia's military capabilities, especially in the aftermath of its military reforms and modernization program. The report also finds that the campaign in Eastern Ukraine was an ineffectually implemented--and perhaps ill-conceived--effort to achieve political fragmentation of Ukraine via federalization and retain Russian influence. Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation. This study thus questions the desirability for Moscow to replicate a course of events similar to the campaign in Eastern Ukraine. 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| genre | Military history fast |
| genre_facet | Military history |
| geographic | Crimea (Ukraine) History, Military 21st century. Russia (Federation) Relations Ukraine. Russia (Federation) History, Military 21st century. Ukraine Relations Russia (Federation) Russia fast Russia (Federation) fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJhhmCp3jtcMQbx3WgpXVC Ukraine fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJkMMfGYRhk8WcWRp3xJjC Ukraine Crimea fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39QbtfRyqbdXRrRDhtWTfDvQY |
| geographic_facet | Crimea (Ukraine) History, Military 21st century. Russia (Federation) Relations Ukraine. Russia (Federation) History, Military 21st century. Ukraine Relations Russia (Federation) Russia Russia (Federation) Ukraine Ukraine Crimea |
| id | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn990544142 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:27:53Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780833096173 0833096176 9780833096067 0833096060 |
| language | English |
| oclc_num | 990544142 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 online resource (128 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-4-EBA |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publishDateSearch | 2017 |
| publishDateSort | 2017 |
| publisher | RAND Corporation, |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Research report (Rand Corporation) ; |
| series2 | [Research report] ; |
| spelling | Kofman, Michael. Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Santa Monica : RAND Corporation, 2017. 1 online resource (128 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier [Research report] ; RR-1498-A Print version record. Cover ; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures and Table; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; CHAPTER TWO: The Annexation of Crimea; How Russia Annexed Crimea; The Balance of Forces; A Chronology of Events; Russia's Information Campaign; Characteristics of the Crimean Operation; Russian-Crimean History; Cultural Proximity Between Russia and Crimea; Geography; Russia's Force Posture and Transit Arrangements with Ukraine; Target of Opportunity; Ukrainian Actions Contributing to Russian Success; Factors Enabling Russia's Operational Successes. Force CompositionMobility; Use of Deception at the Tactical and Strategic Levels; Use of Conventional Exercises as Cover; Privileging Speed, Agility, and Communications over Firepower; Preparing for Counterattack; Factors Contributing to Russia's Operational Shortcomings; Turning Local Forces; Psychological Operations; Planning for Nonviolent Resistance; Political Management of Local Elites; Information Operations; Conclusion: Implications and Effects; CHAPTER THREE: Separatism and Aggression in Eastern Ukraine (March-May 2014); How Russia Destabilized Eastern Ukraine; Chronology of Events. Characteristics of the Eastern Ukraine OperationThe Ukrainian Context; The Information Campaign; The "Separatists"; The Powerful Nonstate Actors Behind Each Camp; Russia's Possible Lessons Learned; Small Investments Yield Small Benefits; Political Warfare Requires Knowing Your Target; Irregular Forces Are Difficult to Control; Nonstate Actors Matter; Former Soviet Republics Have an Ample Pool of Available Fighters; Conventional Forces Are Only a Temporary Deterrent; Political Timing Is Important; Russia's Operational Shortcomings; Russia Struggled to Control Political Warfare. Russia Was Ineffective at Inspiring SeparatismPoor Assumptions Guided Moscow's Strategy; Hybrid War Was a Brief Adaptation in This Conflict; Conclusion: Implications and Effects; CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusion; APPENDIXES; A. Information Campaign; B. Timeline (February 18-May 31, 2014); References. Includes bibliographical references (pages 95-109). This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February-March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February-late May 2014). It examines Russia's approach, draws inferences from Moscow's intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods being used again elsewhere. These two distinct campaigns overlap somewhat but offer different lessons for participants and observers. The report finds that Russia's operation to annex Crimea represented a decisive and competent use of military force in pursuit of political ends. Russia's operations in Crimea benefited from highly favorable circumstances--political, historical, geographical, and military--that limit their generalizability. Analysis of the operation underscores that there are many remaining unknowns about Russia's military capabilities, especially in the aftermath of its military reforms and modernization program. The report also finds that the campaign in Eastern Ukraine was an ineffectually implemented--and perhaps ill-conceived--effort to achieve political fragmentation of Ukraine via federalization and retain Russian influence. Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation. This study thus questions the desirability for Moscow to replicate a course of events similar to the campaign in Eastern Ukraine. Conversely, the operation to annex Crimea was a highly successful employment of select elements within Russia's armed forces, making it an attractive use of military power, but the structural and operation factors contributing to its success raise doubts whether it can be repeated elsewhere. Russo-Ukrainian War, 2014- Crimea (Ukraine) History, Military 21st century. Russia (Federation) Relations Ukraine. Russia (Federation) History, Military 21st century. Ukraine Relations Russia (Federation) Frozen conflicts. Grey areas. Territorial disputes. Guerre russo-ukrainienne, 2014- HISTORY Europe Eastern. bisacsh HISTORY Europe Former Soviet Republics. bisacsh HISTORY Europe Russia & the Former Soviet Union. bisacsh International relations fast Russia fast Russia (Federation) fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJhhmCp3jtcMQbx3WgpXVC Ukraine fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJkMMfGYRhk8WcWRp3xJjC Ukraine Crimea fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39QbtfRyqbdXRrRDhtWTfDvQY Russian Federation. pplt Ukraine. pplt Crimea. pplt Annexation. pplt Armed forces. pplt International relations. pplt Ukraine Conflict (2014- ) fast (OCoLC)fst01921502 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39Qhp4vB9x3fwFFVmCfTjGT4y 2000-2099 fast Military history fast Migacheva, Katya. Nichiporuk, Brian, 1966- https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjr99wtb3BwQVXjJvk7vHC http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n95091974 Radin, Andrew. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2017068781 Tkacheva, Olesya. Oberholtzer, Jenny. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2016107937 has work: Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGhVVKbQkBk8d4x3YXMbQy https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Kofman, Michael. Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Santa Monica : RAND Corporation, ©2017 9780833096067 Research report (Rand Corporation) ; RR-1498-A. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2013072664 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1532756 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Kofman, Michael Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Research report (Rand Corporation) ; Cover ; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures and Table; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; CHAPTER TWO: The Annexation of Crimea; How Russia Annexed Crimea; The Balance of Forces; A Chronology of Events; Russia's Information Campaign; Characteristics of the Crimean Operation; Russian-Crimean History; Cultural Proximity Between Russia and Crimea; Geography; Russia's Force Posture and Transit Arrangements with Ukraine; Target of Opportunity; Ukrainian Actions Contributing to Russian Success; Factors Enabling Russia's Operational Successes. Force CompositionMobility; Use of Deception at the Tactical and Strategic Levels; Use of Conventional Exercises as Cover; Privileging Speed, Agility, and Communications over Firepower; Preparing for Counterattack; Factors Contributing to Russia's Operational Shortcomings; Turning Local Forces; Psychological Operations; Planning for Nonviolent Resistance; Political Management of Local Elites; Information Operations; Conclusion: Implications and Effects; CHAPTER THREE: Separatism and Aggression in Eastern Ukraine (March-May 2014); How Russia Destabilized Eastern Ukraine; Chronology of Events. Characteristics of the Eastern Ukraine OperationThe Ukrainian Context; The Information Campaign; The "Separatists"; The Powerful Nonstate Actors Behind Each Camp; Russia's Possible Lessons Learned; Small Investments Yield Small Benefits; Political Warfare Requires Knowing Your Target; Irregular Forces Are Difficult to Control; Nonstate Actors Matter; Former Soviet Republics Have an Ample Pool of Available Fighters; Conventional Forces Are Only a Temporary Deterrent; Political Timing Is Important; Russia's Operational Shortcomings; Russia Struggled to Control Political Warfare. Russia Was Ineffective at Inspiring SeparatismPoor Assumptions Guided Moscow's Strategy; Hybrid War Was a Brief Adaptation in This Conflict; Conclusion: Implications and Effects; CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusion; APPENDIXES; A. Information Campaign; B. Timeline (February 18-May 31, 2014); References. Russo-Ukrainian War, 2014- Frozen conflicts. Grey areas. Territorial disputes. Guerre russo-ukrainienne, 2014- HISTORY Europe Eastern. bisacsh HISTORY Europe Former Soviet Republics. bisacsh HISTORY Europe Russia & the Former Soviet Union. bisacsh International relations fast Russian Federation. pplt Ukraine. pplt Crimea. pplt Annexation. pplt Armed forces. pplt International relations. pplt |
| subject_GND | (OCoLC)fst01921502 |
| title | Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. |
| title_auth | Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. |
| title_exact_search | Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. |
| title_full | Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. |
| title_fullStr | Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. |
| title_short | Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. |
| title_sort | lessons from russia s operations in crimea and eastern ukraine |
| topic | Russo-Ukrainian War, 2014- Frozen conflicts. Grey areas. Territorial disputes. Guerre russo-ukrainienne, 2014- HISTORY Europe Eastern. bisacsh HISTORY Europe Former Soviet Republics. bisacsh HISTORY Europe Russia & the Former Soviet Union. bisacsh International relations fast Russian Federation. pplt Ukraine. pplt Crimea. pplt Annexation. pplt Armed forces. pplt International relations. pplt |
| topic_facet | Russo-Ukrainian War, 2014- Crimea (Ukraine) History, Military 21st century. Russia (Federation) Relations Ukraine. Russia (Federation) History, Military 21st century. Ukraine Relations Russia (Federation) Frozen conflicts. Grey areas. Territorial disputes. Guerre russo-ukrainienne, 2014- HISTORY Europe Eastern. HISTORY Europe Former Soviet Republics. HISTORY Europe Russia & the Former Soviet Union. International relations Russia Russia (Federation) Ukraine Ukraine Crimea Russian Federation. Ukraine. Crimea. Annexation. Armed forces. International relations. Military history |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1532756 |
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