Manipulative voting dynamics /:
One of the most actively growing subareas in multi-agent systems is computational social choice theory, which provides a theoretical foundation for preference aggregation and collective decision-making in multi-agent domains. It is concerned with the application of techniques developed in computer s...
Gespeichert in:
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Newcastle upon Tyne :
Cambridge Scholars Publishing,
2017.
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | One of the most actively growing subareas in multi-agent systems is computational social choice theory, which provides a theoretical foundation for preference aggregation and collective decision-making in multi-agent domains. It is concerned with the application of techniques developed in computer science, including complexity analysis and algorithm design, in the study of social choice mechanisms, such as voting. It seeks to import concepts from social choice theory into Artificial Intelligence and computing. People often have to reach a joint decision despite conflicting preferences over the. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 9781443892308 1443892300 |
Internformat
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| 100 | 1 | |a Gohar, Neelam, |e author. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Manipulative voting dynamics / |c by NeelamGohar. |
| 260 | |a Newcastle upon Tyne : |b Cambridge Scholars Publishing, |c 2017. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource | ||
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| 505 | 0 | |a Abstract; Acknowledgments; List of Figures; Chapter One; 1.1 Background; 1.1.1 Manipulative Dynamics; 1.1.2 Tactical Voting Dynamics; 1.2 Related Work; 1.3 Problem Statement; 1.3.1 Contribution and Comparison with Previous Work; 1.3.2 Significance and Importance of the Problem; 1.3.3 Specific Research Questions; 1.4 Structure of Book; Chapter Two; 2.1 Notation and Assumptions; 2.2 Definitions; 2.2.1 Manipulations; 2.2.1.1 Types of Moves; 2.2.1.2 Types of Manipulations; 2.2.1.3 Weights Settings; 2.2.2 Existence of Potential Functions and Pure Nash Equilibria; 2.3 Summary | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Chapter Three3.1 Tactical Voting; 3.1.1 Process Termination for Plurality Rule; 3.1.2 Process Termination for other Positional Scoring Rules; 3.1.2.1 Borda; 3.1.2.2 Veto and K-approval Voting Rule; 3.2 Weighted Votes; 3.2.1 The Plurality Rule; 3.2.2 Borda; 3.3 Conclusions; Chapter Four; 4.1 Increased Support Manipulative Dynamics with Weighted Votes; 4.1.1 A Few Examples of Manipulative Dynamics with Increased Support for the Winning Candidate at Each State; 4.1.2 Upper Bound for General Weight Setting; 4.1.3 Bound for a Small Number of Voters | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 4.1.3.1 Upper Bound for Bounded Real Weight Setting4.1.4 Upper Bound when the Smallest Weight is <1; 4.1.5 An Upper Bound under Bounded Integer Weight Setting; 4.1.6 Efficient Process; 4.2 Other Voting Rules like Copeland; 4.2.1 Process Termination; 4.2.2 A Few Examples of Manipulative Dynamics with Copeland Voting Scheme; 4.3 Decreased Support Manipulative Dynamics; 4.3.1 How Long is the Sequence of Moves?; 4.4 Conclusions; Chapter Five; 5.1 Mixture of Different Moves; 5.2 Bounds in Terms of the Number of Distinct Weights; 5.2.1 Manipulation dynamics with un-weighted voters | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 5.3 ConclusionsChapter Six; 6.1 Termination with a Tie-breaking Rule; 6.1.1 Veto Rule; 6.1.2 Borda Rule; 6.1.3 k-Ma jority Rule or k-Approval Voting Rule; 6.1.4 Copeland's Rule; 6.1.5 Bucklin Scheme; 6.1.6 Plurality with Run-off; 6.2 Process Termination when in Initial Settings, True and Declared Preferences of Voters are the same; 6.2.1 Borda Rule; 6.2.2 k-Approval Voting Rule; 6.2.3 Copeland's Rule; 6.2.4 Bucklin Scheme; 6.2.5 Veto Rule; 6.3 Conclusions; Chapter Seven; 7.1 Summary of Major Findings; 7.2 Implications of the Findings; 7.3 Suggestions for Further Research; Endnotes | |
| 520 | |a One of the most actively growing subareas in multi-agent systems is computational social choice theory, which provides a theoretical foundation for preference aggregation and collective decision-making in multi-agent domains. It is concerned with the application of techniques developed in computer science, including complexity analysis and algorithm design, in the study of social choice mechanisms, such as voting. It seeks to import concepts from social choice theory into Artificial Intelligence and computing. People often have to reach a joint decision despite conflicting preferences over the. | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Artificial intelligence. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85008180 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Intelligent agents (Computer software) |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh97000493 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Voting. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85144418 | |
| 650 | 2 | |a Artificial Intelligence |0 https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D001185 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Intelligence artificielle. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Agents intelligents (Logiciels) | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Vote. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a artificial intelligence. |2 aat | |
| 650 | 7 | |a voting. |2 aat | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Political science & theory. |2 bicssc | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Society & social sciences. |2 bicssc | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Mathematics. |2 bicssc | |
| 650 | 7 | |a COMPUTERS |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Artificial intelligence |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Intelligent agents (Computer software) |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Voting |2 fast | |
| 758 | |i has work: |a Manipulative voting dynamics (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGwHM6J7hWPmRwKpvm3DG3 |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Gohar, Neelam. |t Manipulative voting dynamics. |d Newcastle upon Tyne : Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017 |z 1443898791 |z 9781443898799 |w (OCoLC)973905228 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| contents | Abstract; Acknowledgments; List of Figures; Chapter One; 1.1 Background; 1.1.1 Manipulative Dynamics; 1.1.2 Tactical Voting Dynamics; 1.2 Related Work; 1.3 Problem Statement; 1.3.1 Contribution and Comparison with Previous Work; 1.3.2 Significance and Importance of the Problem; 1.3.3 Specific Research Questions; 1.4 Structure of Book; Chapter Two; 2.1 Notation and Assumptions; 2.2 Definitions; 2.2.1 Manipulations; 2.2.1.1 Types of Moves; 2.2.1.2 Types of Manipulations; 2.2.1.3 Weights Settings; 2.2.2 Existence of Potential Functions and Pure Nash Equilibria; 2.3 Summary Chapter Three3.1 Tactical Voting; 3.1.1 Process Termination for Plurality Rule; 3.1.2 Process Termination for other Positional Scoring Rules; 3.1.2.1 Borda; 3.1.2.2 Veto and K-approval Voting Rule; 3.2 Weighted Votes; 3.2.1 The Plurality Rule; 3.2.2 Borda; 3.3 Conclusions; Chapter Four; 4.1 Increased Support Manipulative Dynamics with Weighted Votes; 4.1.1 A Few Examples of Manipulative Dynamics with Increased Support for the Winning Candidate at Each State; 4.1.2 Upper Bound for General Weight Setting; 4.1.3 Bound for a Small Number of Voters 4.1.3.1 Upper Bound for Bounded Real Weight Setting4.1.4 Upper Bound when the Smallest Weight is <1; 4.1.5 An Upper Bound under Bounded Integer Weight Setting; 4.1.6 Efficient Process; 4.2 Other Voting Rules like Copeland; 4.2.1 Process Termination; 4.2.2 A Few Examples of Manipulative Dynamics with Copeland Voting Scheme; 4.3 Decreased Support Manipulative Dynamics; 4.3.1 How Long is the Sequence of Moves?; 4.4 Conclusions; Chapter Five; 5.1 Mixture of Different Moves; 5.2 Bounds in Terms of the Number of Distinct Weights; 5.2.1 Manipulation dynamics with un-weighted voters 5.3 ConclusionsChapter Six; 6.1 Termination with a Tie-breaking Rule; 6.1.1 Veto Rule; 6.1.2 Borda Rule; 6.1.3 k-Ma jority Rule or k-Approval Voting Rule; 6.1.4 Copeland's Rule; 6.1.5 Bucklin Scheme; 6.1.6 Plurality with Run-off; 6.2 Process Termination when in Initial Settings, True and Declared Preferences of Voters are the same; 6.2.1 Borda Rule; 6.2.2 k-Approval Voting Rule; 6.2.3 Copeland's Rule; 6.2.4 Bucklin Scheme; 6.2.5 Veto Rule; 6.3 Conclusions; Chapter Seven; 7.1 Summary of Major Findings; 7.2 Implications of the Findings; 7.3 Suggestions for Further Research; Endnotes |
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| discipline | Informatik |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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Acknowledgments; List of Figures; Chapter One; 1.1 Background; 1.1.1 Manipulative Dynamics; 1.1.2 Tactical Voting Dynamics; 1.2 Related Work; 1.3 Problem Statement; 1.3.1 Contribution and Comparison with Previous Work; 1.3.2 Significance and Importance of the Problem; 1.3.3 Specific Research Questions; 1.4 Structure of Book; Chapter Two; 2.1 Notation and Assumptions; 2.2 Definitions; 2.2.1 Manipulations; 2.2.1.1 Types of Moves; 2.2.1.2 Types of Manipulations; 2.2.1.3 Weights Settings; 2.2.2 Existence of Potential Functions and Pure Nash Equilibria; 2.3 Summary</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Chapter Three3.1 Tactical Voting; 3.1.1 Process Termination for Plurality Rule; 3.1.2 Process Termination for other Positional Scoring Rules; 3.1.2.1 Borda; 3.1.2.2 Veto and K-approval Voting Rule; 3.2 Weighted Votes; 3.2.1 The Plurality Rule; 3.2.2 Borda; 3.3 Conclusions; Chapter Four; 4.1 Increased Support Manipulative Dynamics with Weighted Votes; 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| publisher | Cambridge Scholars Publishing, |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Gohar, Neelam, author. Manipulative voting dynamics / by NeelamGohar. Newcastle upon Tyne : Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017. 1 online resource text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Abstract; Acknowledgments; List of Figures; Chapter One; 1.1 Background; 1.1.1 Manipulative Dynamics; 1.1.2 Tactical Voting Dynamics; 1.2 Related Work; 1.3 Problem Statement; 1.3.1 Contribution and Comparison with Previous Work; 1.3.2 Significance and Importance of the Problem; 1.3.3 Specific Research Questions; 1.4 Structure of Book; Chapter Two; 2.1 Notation and Assumptions; 2.2 Definitions; 2.2.1 Manipulations; 2.2.1.1 Types of Moves; 2.2.1.2 Types of Manipulations; 2.2.1.3 Weights Settings; 2.2.2 Existence of Potential Functions and Pure Nash Equilibria; 2.3 Summary Chapter Three3.1 Tactical Voting; 3.1.1 Process Termination for Plurality Rule; 3.1.2 Process Termination for other Positional Scoring Rules; 3.1.2.1 Borda; 3.1.2.2 Veto and K-approval Voting Rule; 3.2 Weighted Votes; 3.2.1 The Plurality Rule; 3.2.2 Borda; 3.3 Conclusions; Chapter Four; 4.1 Increased Support Manipulative Dynamics with Weighted Votes; 4.1.1 A Few Examples of Manipulative Dynamics with Increased Support for the Winning Candidate at Each State; 4.1.2 Upper Bound for General Weight Setting; 4.1.3 Bound for a Small Number of Voters 4.1.3.1 Upper Bound for Bounded Real Weight Setting4.1.4 Upper Bound when the Smallest Weight is <1; 4.1.5 An Upper Bound under Bounded Integer Weight Setting; 4.1.6 Efficient Process; 4.2 Other Voting Rules like Copeland; 4.2.1 Process Termination; 4.2.2 A Few Examples of Manipulative Dynamics with Copeland Voting Scheme; 4.3 Decreased Support Manipulative Dynamics; 4.3.1 How Long is the Sequence of Moves?; 4.4 Conclusions; Chapter Five; 5.1 Mixture of Different Moves; 5.2 Bounds in Terms of the Number of Distinct Weights; 5.2.1 Manipulation dynamics with un-weighted voters 5.3 ConclusionsChapter Six; 6.1 Termination with a Tie-breaking Rule; 6.1.1 Veto Rule; 6.1.2 Borda Rule; 6.1.3 k-Ma jority Rule or k-Approval Voting Rule; 6.1.4 Copeland's Rule; 6.1.5 Bucklin Scheme; 6.1.6 Plurality with Run-off; 6.2 Process Termination when in Initial Settings, True and Declared Preferences of Voters are the same; 6.2.1 Borda Rule; 6.2.2 k-Approval Voting Rule; 6.2.3 Copeland's Rule; 6.2.4 Bucklin Scheme; 6.2.5 Veto Rule; 6.3 Conclusions; Chapter Seven; 7.1 Summary of Major Findings; 7.2 Implications of the Findings; 7.3 Suggestions for Further Research; Endnotes One of the most actively growing subareas in multi-agent systems is computational social choice theory, which provides a theoretical foundation for preference aggregation and collective decision-making in multi-agent domains. It is concerned with the application of techniques developed in computer science, including complexity analysis and algorithm design, in the study of social choice mechanisms, such as voting. It seeks to import concepts from social choice theory into Artificial Intelligence and computing. People often have to reach a joint decision despite conflicting preferences over the. Includes bibliographical references. Artificial intelligence. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85008180 Intelligent agents (Computer software) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh97000493 Voting. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85144418 Artificial Intelligence https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D001185 Intelligence artificielle. Agents intelligents (Logiciels) Vote. artificial intelligence. aat voting. aat Political science & theory. bicssc Society & social sciences. bicssc Mathematics. bicssc COMPUTERS General. bisacsh Artificial intelligence fast Intelligent agents (Computer software) fast Voting fast has work: Manipulative voting dynamics (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGwHM6J7hWPmRwKpvm3DG3 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Gohar, Neelam. Manipulative voting dynamics. Newcastle upon Tyne : Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017 1443898791 9781443898799 (OCoLC)973905228 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1517769 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Gohar, Neelam Manipulative voting dynamics / Abstract; Acknowledgments; List of Figures; Chapter One; 1.1 Background; 1.1.1 Manipulative Dynamics; 1.1.2 Tactical Voting Dynamics; 1.2 Related Work; 1.3 Problem Statement; 1.3.1 Contribution and Comparison with Previous Work; 1.3.2 Significance and Importance of the Problem; 1.3.3 Specific Research Questions; 1.4 Structure of Book; Chapter Two; 2.1 Notation and Assumptions; 2.2 Definitions; 2.2.1 Manipulations; 2.2.1.1 Types of Moves; 2.2.1.2 Types of Manipulations; 2.2.1.3 Weights Settings; 2.2.2 Existence of Potential Functions and Pure Nash Equilibria; 2.3 Summary Chapter Three3.1 Tactical Voting; 3.1.1 Process Termination for Plurality Rule; 3.1.2 Process Termination for other Positional Scoring Rules; 3.1.2.1 Borda; 3.1.2.2 Veto and K-approval Voting Rule; 3.2 Weighted Votes; 3.2.1 The Plurality Rule; 3.2.2 Borda; 3.3 Conclusions; Chapter Four; 4.1 Increased Support Manipulative Dynamics with Weighted Votes; 4.1.1 A Few Examples of Manipulative Dynamics with Increased Support for the Winning Candidate at Each State; 4.1.2 Upper Bound for General Weight Setting; 4.1.3 Bound for a Small Number of Voters 4.1.3.1 Upper Bound for Bounded Real Weight Setting4.1.4 Upper Bound when the Smallest Weight is <1; 4.1.5 An Upper Bound under Bounded Integer Weight Setting; 4.1.6 Efficient Process; 4.2 Other Voting Rules like Copeland; 4.2.1 Process Termination; 4.2.2 A Few Examples of Manipulative Dynamics with Copeland Voting Scheme; 4.3 Decreased Support Manipulative Dynamics; 4.3.1 How Long is the Sequence of Moves?; 4.4 Conclusions; Chapter Five; 5.1 Mixture of Different Moves; 5.2 Bounds in Terms of the Number of Distinct Weights; 5.2.1 Manipulation dynamics with un-weighted voters 5.3 ConclusionsChapter Six; 6.1 Termination with a Tie-breaking Rule; 6.1.1 Veto Rule; 6.1.2 Borda Rule; 6.1.3 k-Ma jority Rule or k-Approval Voting Rule; 6.1.4 Copeland's Rule; 6.1.5 Bucklin Scheme; 6.1.6 Plurality with Run-off; 6.2 Process Termination when in Initial Settings, True and Declared Preferences of Voters are the same; 6.2.1 Borda Rule; 6.2.2 k-Approval Voting Rule; 6.2.3 Copeland's Rule; 6.2.4 Bucklin Scheme; 6.2.5 Veto Rule; 6.3 Conclusions; Chapter Seven; 7.1 Summary of Major Findings; 7.2 Implications of the Findings; 7.3 Suggestions for Further Research; Endnotes Artificial intelligence. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85008180 Intelligent agents (Computer software) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh97000493 Voting. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85144418 Artificial Intelligence https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D001185 Intelligence artificielle. Agents intelligents (Logiciels) Vote. artificial intelligence. aat voting. aat Political science & theory. bicssc Society & social sciences. bicssc Mathematics. bicssc COMPUTERS General. bisacsh Artificial intelligence fast Intelligent agents (Computer software) fast Voting fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85008180 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh97000493 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85144418 https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D001185 |
| title | Manipulative voting dynamics / |
| title_auth | Manipulative voting dynamics / |
| title_exact_search | Manipulative voting dynamics / |
| title_full | Manipulative voting dynamics / by NeelamGohar. |
| title_fullStr | Manipulative voting dynamics / by NeelamGohar. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Manipulative voting dynamics / by NeelamGohar. |
| title_short | Manipulative voting dynamics / |
| title_sort | manipulative voting dynamics |
| topic | Artificial intelligence. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85008180 Intelligent agents (Computer software) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh97000493 Voting. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85144418 Artificial Intelligence https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D001185 Intelligence artificielle. Agents intelligents (Logiciels) Vote. artificial intelligence. aat voting. aat Political science & theory. bicssc Society & social sciences. bicssc Mathematics. bicssc COMPUTERS General. bisacsh Artificial intelligence fast Intelligent agents (Computer software) fast Voting fast |
| topic_facet | Artificial intelligence. Intelligent agents (Computer software) Voting. Artificial Intelligence Intelligence artificielle. Agents intelligents (Logiciels) Vote. artificial intelligence. voting. Political science & theory. Society & social sciences. Mathematics. COMPUTERS General. Artificial intelligence Voting |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1517769 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT goharneelam manipulativevotingdynamics |