Judicial independence and the American constitution :: a democratic paradox /
"The Framers of the American Constitution took special pains to ensure that the governing principles of the republic were insulated from the reach of simple majorities. Only super-majoritarian amendments could modify these fundamental constitutional dictates. The Framers established a judicial...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Stanford, California :
Stanford Law Books, an imprint of Stanford University Press,
[2017]
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The Framers of the American Constitution took special pains to ensure that the governing principles of the republic were insulated from the reach of simple majorities. Only super-majoritarian amendments could modify these fundamental constitutional dictates. The Framers established a judicial branch shielded from direct majoritarian political accountability to protect and enforce these constitutional limits. Paradoxically, only a counter-majoritarian judicial branch could ensure the continued vitality of our representational form of government. This important lesson of the paradox of American democracy has been challenged and often ignored by office holders and legal scholars. [This book] defends the centrality of these special protections of judicial independence. [The author] explains how the nation's system of counter-majoritarian constitutionalism cannot survive absent the vesting of final powers of constitutional interpretation and enforcement in the one branch of government expressly protected by the Constitution from direct political accountability: the judicial branch. He uncovers how the current framework of American constitutional law has been unwisely allowed to threaten or undermine these core precepts of judicial independence."--Back cover. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (260 pages) |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780804792905 0804792909 9781503601840 1503601846 |
Internformat
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| 100 | 1 | |a Redish, Martin H., |e author. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n82040055 | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Judicial independence and the American constitution : |b a democratic paradox / |c Martin H. Redish. |
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| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Introduction : America's contribution to political thought : prophylactic judicial independence as an instrument of democratic constitutionalism -- The foundations of American constitutionalism -- A taxonomy of judicial independence -- Judicial impeachment, judicial discipline, and American constitutionalism -- State courts, due process and the dangers of popular constitutionalism -- Constitutionalism, democracy, and the pathology of legislative deception -- Habeas corpus, due process, and American constitutionalism. | |
| 588 | 0 | |a Online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on January 19, 2018). | |
| 520 | |a "The Framers of the American Constitution took special pains to ensure that the governing principles of the republic were insulated from the reach of simple majorities. Only super-majoritarian amendments could modify these fundamental constitutional dictates. The Framers established a judicial branch shielded from direct majoritarian political accountability to protect and enforce these constitutional limits. Paradoxically, only a counter-majoritarian judicial branch could ensure the continued vitality of our representational form of government. This important lesson of the paradox of American democracy has been challenged and often ignored by office holders and legal scholars. [This book] defends the centrality of these special protections of judicial independence. [The author] explains how the nation's system of counter-majoritarian constitutionalism cannot survive absent the vesting of final powers of constitutional interpretation and enforcement in the one branch of government expressly protected by the Constitution from direct political accountability: the judicial branch. He uncovers how the current framework of American constitutional law has been unwisely allowed to threaten or undermine these core precepts of judicial independence."--Back cover. | ||
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| author | Redish, Martin H. |
| author_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n82040055 |
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| contents | Introduction : America's contribution to political thought : prophylactic judicial independence as an instrument of democratic constitutionalism -- The foundations of American constitutionalism -- A taxonomy of judicial independence -- Judicial impeachment, judicial discipline, and American constitutionalism -- State courts, due process and the dangers of popular constitutionalism -- Constitutionalism, democracy, and the pathology of legislative deception -- Habeas corpus, due process, and American constitutionalism. |
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| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
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| indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:27:28Z |
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| spelling | Redish, Martin H., author. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n82040055 Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox / Martin H. Redish. Stanford, California : Stanford Law Books, an imprint of Stanford University Press, [2017] 1 online resource (260 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index. Introduction : America's contribution to political thought : prophylactic judicial independence as an instrument of democratic constitutionalism -- The foundations of American constitutionalism -- A taxonomy of judicial independence -- Judicial impeachment, judicial discipline, and American constitutionalism -- State courts, due process and the dangers of popular constitutionalism -- Constitutionalism, democracy, and the pathology of legislative deception -- Habeas corpus, due process, and American constitutionalism. Online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on January 19, 2018). "The Framers of the American Constitution took special pains to ensure that the governing principles of the republic were insulated from the reach of simple majorities. Only super-majoritarian amendments could modify these fundamental constitutional dictates. The Framers established a judicial branch shielded from direct majoritarian political accountability to protect and enforce these constitutional limits. Paradoxically, only a counter-majoritarian judicial branch could ensure the continued vitality of our representational form of government. This important lesson of the paradox of American democracy has been challenged and often ignored by office holders and legal scholars. [This book] defends the centrality of these special protections of judicial independence. [The author] explains how the nation's system of counter-majoritarian constitutionalism cannot survive absent the vesting of final powers of constitutional interpretation and enforcement in the one branch of government expressly protected by the Constitution from direct political accountability: the judicial branch. He uncovers how the current framework of American constitutional law has been unwisely allowed to threaten or undermine these core precepts of judicial independence."--Back cover. Judicial independence United States. Judicial power United States. Constitutional law United States. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85139986 Democracy United States. Indépendance judiciaire États-Unis. Pouvoir judiciaire États-Unis. LAW Civil Procedure. bisacsh LAW Legal Services. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Government Judicial Branch. bisacsh LAW Constitutional. bisacsh Constitutional law fast Democracy fast Judicial independence fast Judicial power fast United States fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq has work: Judicial independence and the American constitution (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCFH9Xj8chhxt8ycRgDvd8K https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Redish, Martin H. Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox. Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, ©2017 260 pages 9780804792905 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1519276 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Redish, Martin H. Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox / Introduction : America's contribution to political thought : prophylactic judicial independence as an instrument of democratic constitutionalism -- The foundations of American constitutionalism -- A taxonomy of judicial independence -- Judicial impeachment, judicial discipline, and American constitutionalism -- State courts, due process and the dangers of popular constitutionalism -- Constitutionalism, democracy, and the pathology of legislative deception -- Habeas corpus, due process, and American constitutionalism. Judicial independence United States. Judicial power United States. Constitutional law United States. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85139986 Democracy United States. Indépendance judiciaire États-Unis. Pouvoir judiciaire États-Unis. LAW Civil Procedure. bisacsh LAW Legal Services. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Government Judicial Branch. bisacsh LAW Constitutional. bisacsh Constitutional law fast Democracy fast Judicial independence fast Judicial power fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85139986 |
| title | Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox / |
| title_auth | Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox / |
| title_exact_search | Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox / |
| title_full | Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox / Martin H. Redish. |
| title_fullStr | Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox / Martin H. Redish. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Judicial independence and the American constitution : a democratic paradox / Martin H. Redish. |
| title_short | Judicial independence and the American constitution : |
| title_sort | judicial independence and the american constitution a democratic paradox |
| title_sub | a democratic paradox / |
| topic | Judicial independence United States. Judicial power United States. Constitutional law United States. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85139986 Democracy United States. Indépendance judiciaire États-Unis. Pouvoir judiciaire États-Unis. LAW Civil Procedure. bisacsh LAW Legal Services. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Government Judicial Branch. bisacsh LAW Constitutional. bisacsh Constitutional law fast Democracy fast Judicial independence fast Judicial power fast |
| topic_facet | Judicial independence United States. Judicial power United States. Constitutional law United States. Democracy United States. Indépendance judiciaire États-Unis. Pouvoir judiciaire États-Unis. LAW Civil Procedure. LAW Legal Services. POLITICAL SCIENCE Government Judicial Branch. LAW Constitutional. Constitutional law Democracy Judicial independence Judicial power United States |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1519276 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT redishmartinh judicialindependenceandtheamericanconstitutionademocraticparadox |