The politics of weapons inspections :: assessing WMD monitoring and verification regimes /
Given recent controversies over suspected WMD programs in proliferating countries, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective monitoring and verification regimes-the international mechanisms, including on-site inspections, intended in part to clarify the status of WMD programs in suspected p...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Stanford, California :
Stanford University Press,
2017.
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | Given recent controversies over suspected WMD programs in proliferating countries, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective monitoring and verification regimes-the international mechanisms, including on-site inspections, intended in part to clarify the status of WMD programs in suspected proliferators. Yet the strengths and limitations of these nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms remain unclear. How should these regimes best be implemented? What are the technological, political, and other limitations to these tools? What technologies and other innovations should be utilized to make these regimes most effective? How should recent developments, such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or Syria's declared renunciation and actual use of its chemical weapons, influence their architecture? The Politics of Weapons Inspections examines the successes, failures, and lessons that can be learned from WMD monitoring and verification regimes in order to help determine how best to maintain and strengthen these regimes in the future. In addition to examining these regimes' technological, political, and legal contexts, Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat reevaluate the track record of monitoring and verification in the historical cases of South Africa, Libya, and Iraq; assess the prospects of using these mechanisms in verifying arms control and disarmament; and apply the lessons learned from these cases to contemporary controversies over suspected or confirmed programs in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Finally, they provide a forward-looking set of policy recommendations for the future. -- Provided by publisher. |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource |
Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
ISBN: | 9781503601628 1503601625 |
Internformat
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245 | 1 | 4 | |a The politics of weapons inspections : |b assessing WMD monitoring and verification regimes / |c Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat. |
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264 | 1 | |a Stanford, California : |b Stanford University Press, |c 2017. | |
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504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
505 | 0 | |a What are monitoring and verification regimes? -- South Africa -- Iraq -- Libya -- Verifying global disarmament -- Applying lessons to the "difficult cases" : North Korea, Iran, and Syria -- Conclusion : strengthening monitoring and verification regimes. | |
588 | 0 | |a Print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed. | |
520 | |a Given recent controversies over suspected WMD programs in proliferating countries, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective monitoring and verification regimes-the international mechanisms, including on-site inspections, intended in part to clarify the status of WMD programs in suspected proliferators. Yet the strengths and limitations of these nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms remain unclear. How should these regimes best be implemented? What are the technological, political, and other limitations to these tools? What technologies and other innovations should be utilized to make these regimes most effective? How should recent developments, such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or Syria's declared renunciation and actual use of its chemical weapons, influence their architecture? The Politics of Weapons Inspections examines the successes, failures, and lessons that can be learned from WMD monitoring and verification regimes in order to help determine how best to maintain and strengthen these regimes in the future. In addition to examining these regimes' technological, political, and legal contexts, Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat reevaluate the track record of monitoring and verification in the historical cases of South Africa, Libya, and Iraq; assess the prospects of using these mechanisms in verifying arms control and disarmament; and apply the lessons learned from these cases to contemporary controversies over suspected or confirmed programs in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Finally, they provide a forward-looking set of policy recommendations for the future. -- Provided by publisher. | ||
650 | 0 | |a Weapons of mass destruction. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh96004190 | |
650 | 0 | |a Nuclear arms control |x Verification. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85092944 | |
650 | 0 | |a Chemical arms control |x Verification. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh90001358 | |
650 | 0 | |a Biological arms control |x Verification. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh90004232 | |
650 | 0 | |a Disarmament |x On-site inspection. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh99004038 | |
650 | 6 | |a Armes de destruction massive. | |
650 | 6 | |a Armes nucléaires |x Contrôle |x Vérification. | |
650 | 6 | |a Armes chimiques |x Contrôle |x Vérification. | |
650 | 6 | |a Armes biologiques |x Contrôle |x Vérification. | |
650 | 6 | |a Désarmement |x Inspection sur place. | |
650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x Government |x International. |2 bisacsh | |
650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x International Relations |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
650 | 7 | |a Biological arms control |x Verification |2 fast | |
650 | 7 | |a Chemical arms control |x Verification |2 fast | |
650 | 7 | |a Disarmament |x On-site inspection |2 fast | |
650 | 7 | |a Nuclear arms control |x Verification |2 fast | |
650 | 7 | |a Weapons of mass destruction |2 fast | |
700 | 1 | |a Pilat, Joseph F., |e author. | |
758 | |i has work: |a The politics of weapons inspections (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCFTX4vMBKFcDwGJhjrdRKd |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
DE-BY-FWS_katkey | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn952567239 |
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adam_text | |
any_adam_object | |
author | Busch, Nathan E., 1971- Pilat, Joseph F. |
author_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2003118437 |
author_facet | Busch, Nathan E., 1971- Pilat, Joseph F. |
author_role | aut aut |
author_sort | Busch, Nathan E., 1971- |
author_variant | n e b ne neb j f p jf jfp |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | localFWS |
callnumber-first | U - Military Science |
callnumber-label | U793 |
callnumber-raw | U793 |
callnumber-search | U793 |
callnumber-sort | U 3793 |
callnumber-subject | U - General Military Science |
collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
contents | What are monitoring and verification regimes? -- South Africa -- Iraq -- Libya -- Verifying global disarmament -- Applying lessons to the "difficult cases" : North Korea, Iran, and Syria -- Conclusion : strengthening monitoring and verification regimes. |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)952567239 |
dewey-full | 327.1/745 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 327 - International relations |
dewey-raw | 327.1/745 |
dewey-search | 327.1/745 |
dewey-sort | 3327.1 3745 |
dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
discipline | Politologie |
format | Electronic eBook |
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id | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn952567239 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:27:15Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9781503601628 1503601625 |
language | English |
lccn | 2016030198 |
oclc_num | 952567239 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
owner_facet | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
physical | 1 online resource |
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publishDate | 2017 |
publishDateSearch | 2017 |
publishDateSort | 2017 |
publisher | Stanford University Press, |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Busch, Nathan E., 1971- author. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2003118437 The politics of weapons inspections : assessing WMD monitoring and verification regimes / Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat. 1702 Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2017. 1 online resource text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index. What are monitoring and verification regimes? -- South Africa -- Iraq -- Libya -- Verifying global disarmament -- Applying lessons to the "difficult cases" : North Korea, Iran, and Syria -- Conclusion : strengthening monitoring and verification regimes. Print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed. Given recent controversies over suspected WMD programs in proliferating countries, there is an increasingly urgent need for effective monitoring and verification regimes-the international mechanisms, including on-site inspections, intended in part to clarify the status of WMD programs in suspected proliferators. Yet the strengths and limitations of these nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms remain unclear. How should these regimes best be implemented? What are the technological, political, and other limitations to these tools? What technologies and other innovations should be utilized to make these regimes most effective? How should recent developments, such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or Syria's declared renunciation and actual use of its chemical weapons, influence their architecture? The Politics of Weapons Inspections examines the successes, failures, and lessons that can be learned from WMD monitoring and verification regimes in order to help determine how best to maintain and strengthen these regimes in the future. In addition to examining these regimes' technological, political, and legal contexts, Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat reevaluate the track record of monitoring and verification in the historical cases of South Africa, Libya, and Iraq; assess the prospects of using these mechanisms in verifying arms control and disarmament; and apply the lessons learned from these cases to contemporary controversies over suspected or confirmed programs in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Finally, they provide a forward-looking set of policy recommendations for the future. -- Provided by publisher. Weapons of mass destruction. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh96004190 Nuclear arms control Verification. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85092944 Chemical arms control Verification. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh90001358 Biological arms control Verification. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh90004232 Disarmament On-site inspection. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh99004038 Armes de destruction massive. Armes nucléaires Contrôle Vérification. Armes chimiques Contrôle Vérification. Armes biologiques Contrôle Vérification. Désarmement Inspection sur place. POLITICAL SCIENCE Government International. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE International Relations General. bisacsh Biological arms control Verification fast Chemical arms control Verification fast Disarmament On-site inspection fast Nuclear arms control Verification fast Weapons of mass destruction fast Pilat, Joseph F., author. has work: The politics of weapons inspections (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCFTX4vMBKFcDwGJhjrdRKd https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Busch, Nathan E., 1971- Politics of weapons inspections. Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2017 9780804797436 (DLC) 2016029020 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1441716 Volltext |
spellingShingle | Busch, Nathan E., 1971- Pilat, Joseph F. The politics of weapons inspections : assessing WMD monitoring and verification regimes / What are monitoring and verification regimes? -- South Africa -- Iraq -- Libya -- Verifying global disarmament -- Applying lessons to the "difficult cases" : North Korea, Iran, and Syria -- Conclusion : strengthening monitoring and verification regimes. Weapons of mass destruction. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh96004190 Nuclear arms control Verification. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85092944 Chemical arms control Verification. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh90001358 Biological arms control Verification. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh90004232 Disarmament On-site inspection. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh99004038 Armes de destruction massive. Armes nucléaires Contrôle Vérification. Armes chimiques Contrôle Vérification. Armes biologiques Contrôle Vérification. Désarmement Inspection sur place. POLITICAL SCIENCE Government International. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE International Relations General. bisacsh Biological arms control Verification fast Chemical arms control Verification fast Disarmament On-site inspection fast Nuclear arms control Verification fast Weapons of mass destruction fast |
subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh96004190 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85092944 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh90001358 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh90004232 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh99004038 |
title | The politics of weapons inspections : assessing WMD monitoring and verification regimes / |
title_auth | The politics of weapons inspections : assessing WMD monitoring and verification regimes / |
title_exact_search | The politics of weapons inspections : assessing WMD monitoring and verification regimes / |
title_full | The politics of weapons inspections : assessing WMD monitoring and verification regimes / Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat. |
title_fullStr | The politics of weapons inspections : assessing WMD monitoring and verification regimes / Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat. |
title_full_unstemmed | The politics of weapons inspections : assessing WMD monitoring and verification regimes / Nathan E. Busch and Joseph F. Pilat. |
title_short | The politics of weapons inspections : |
title_sort | politics of weapons inspections assessing wmd monitoring and verification regimes |
title_sub | assessing WMD monitoring and verification regimes / |
topic | Weapons of mass destruction. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh96004190 Nuclear arms control Verification. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85092944 Chemical arms control Verification. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh90001358 Biological arms control Verification. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh90004232 Disarmament On-site inspection. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh99004038 Armes de destruction massive. Armes nucléaires Contrôle Vérification. Armes chimiques Contrôle Vérification. Armes biologiques Contrôle Vérification. Désarmement Inspection sur place. POLITICAL SCIENCE Government International. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE International Relations General. bisacsh Biological arms control Verification fast Chemical arms control Verification fast Disarmament On-site inspection fast Nuclear arms control Verification fast Weapons of mass destruction fast |
topic_facet | Weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear arms control Verification. Chemical arms control Verification. Biological arms control Verification. Disarmament On-site inspection. Armes de destruction massive. Armes nucléaires Contrôle Vérification. Armes chimiques Contrôle Vérification. Armes biologiques Contrôle Vérification. Désarmement Inspection sur place. POLITICAL SCIENCE Government International. POLITICAL SCIENCE International Relations General. Biological arms control Verification Chemical arms control Verification Disarmament On-site inspection Nuclear arms control Verification Weapons of mass destruction |
url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1441716 |
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