The myth of the intuitive :: experimental philosophy and philosophical method /
"In The myth of the intuitive, Max Deutsch defends the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge mounted by the practitioners of experimental philosophy (xphi). This challenge concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition--in particular, the exte...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England :
A Bradford Book, The MIT Press,
[2015]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Bradford Book
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "In The myth of the intuitive, Max Deutsch defends the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge mounted by the practitioners of experimental philosophy (xphi). This challenge concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition--in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people's intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. Deutsch argues forcefully that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of 'metaphilosophical folklore, ' and he supports his argument with close examinations of results from xphi and of a number of influential arguments in analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but, Deutsch writes, philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. Deutsch discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier's refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke's Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the 'Multiple Concepts' and 'Expertise' replies, to be severely lacking"--MIT CogNet. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xx, 194 pages) |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 183-188) and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780262327374 0262327376 0262028956 9780262028950 9780262327381 0262327384 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Deutsch, Max, |d 1971- |e author. |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjGgyDC4rGfpHDFP9Bxtw3 | |
| 245 | 1 | 4 | |a The myth of the intuitive : |b experimental philosophy and philosophical method / |c Max Deutsch. |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Massachusetts ; |a London, England : |b A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, |c [2015] | |
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| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 183-188) and index. | ||
| 505 | 0 | 0 | |t Varieties of Xphi, pragmatic distortion, and the no-theory theory of intuitions -- |t Intuitions and counterexamples -- |t The relocation problem and Williamson on "judgment skepticism" -- |t The evidence for the evidence : arguing for gettier judgments -- |t More evidence for the evidence and the relocation problem redux -- |t Other replies to Xphi : the expertise and multiple concepts replies -- |t Conclusion : armchairs vs. lab-coats? |
| 520 | |a "In The myth of the intuitive, Max Deutsch defends the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge mounted by the practitioners of experimental philosophy (xphi). This challenge concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition--in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people's intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. Deutsch argues forcefully that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of 'metaphilosophical folklore, ' and he supports his argument with close examinations of results from xphi and of a number of influential arguments in analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but, Deutsch writes, philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. Deutsch discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier's refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke's Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the 'Multiple Concepts' and 'Expertise' replies, to be severely lacking"--MIT CogNet. | ||
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| 650 | 0 | |a Philosophy |x Research. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Intuition. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85067653 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Méthodologie. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Philosophie |x Recherche. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Deutsch, Max, 1971- |
| author_facet | Deutsch, Max, 1971- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Deutsch, Max, 1971- |
| author_variant | m d md |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | localFWS |
| callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
| callnumber-label | B53 |
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| contents | Varieties of Xphi, pragmatic distortion, and the no-theory theory of intuitions -- Intuitions and counterexamples -- The relocation problem and Williamson on "judgment skepticism" -- The evidence for the evidence : arguing for gettier judgments -- More evidence for the evidence and the relocation problem redux -- Other replies to Xphi : the expertise and multiple concepts replies -- Conclusion : armchairs vs. lab-coats? |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)908192421 |
| dewey-full | 121/.3 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 121 - Epistemology (Theory of knowledge) |
| dewey-raw | 121/.3 |
| dewey-search | 121/.3 |
| dewey-sort | 3121 13 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:26:36Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780262327374 0262327376 0262028956 9780262028950 9780262327381 0262327384 |
| language | English |
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| series2 | Bradford Book |
| spelling | Deutsch, Max, 1971- author. https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjGgyDC4rGfpHDFP9Bxtw3 The myth of the intuitive : experimental philosophy and philosophical method / Max Deutsch. Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England : A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, [2015] ©2015 1 online resource (xx, 194 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Bradford Book Includes bibliographical references (pages 183-188) and index. Varieties of Xphi, pragmatic distortion, and the no-theory theory of intuitions -- Intuitions and counterexamples -- The relocation problem and Williamson on "judgment skepticism" -- The evidence for the evidence : arguing for gettier judgments -- More evidence for the evidence and the relocation problem redux -- Other replies to Xphi : the expertise and multiple concepts replies -- Conclusion : armchairs vs. lab-coats? "In The myth of the intuitive, Max Deutsch defends the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge mounted by the practitioners of experimental philosophy (xphi). This challenge concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition--in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people's intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. Deutsch argues forcefully that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of 'metaphilosophical folklore, ' and he supports his argument with close examinations of results from xphi and of a number of influential arguments in analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but, Deutsch writes, philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. Deutsch discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier's refutation of the JTB (justified true belief) theory and Kripke's Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the 'Multiple Concepts' and 'Expertise' replies, to be severely lacking"--MIT CogNet. Print version record. Methodology. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85084414 Philosophy Research. Intuition. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85067653 Méthodologie. Philosophie Recherche. Intuition. methodology. aat intuition. aat PHILOSOPHY Epistemology. bisacsh PHILOSOPHY Criticism. bisacsh Intuition fast Methodology fast Philosophy Research fast PHILOSOPHY/General PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General Print version: Deutsch, Max, 1971- Myth of the intuitive 9780262028950 (DLC) 2014034368 (OCoLC)897401884 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=986382 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Deutsch, Max, 1971- The myth of the intuitive : experimental philosophy and philosophical method / Varieties of Xphi, pragmatic distortion, and the no-theory theory of intuitions -- Intuitions and counterexamples -- The relocation problem and Williamson on "judgment skepticism" -- The evidence for the evidence : arguing for gettier judgments -- More evidence for the evidence and the relocation problem redux -- Other replies to Xphi : the expertise and multiple concepts replies -- Conclusion : armchairs vs. lab-coats? Methodology. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85084414 Philosophy Research. Intuition. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85067653 Méthodologie. Philosophie Recherche. Intuition. methodology. aat intuition. aat PHILOSOPHY Epistemology. bisacsh PHILOSOPHY Criticism. bisacsh Intuition fast Methodology fast Philosophy Research fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85084414 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85067653 |
| title | The myth of the intuitive : experimental philosophy and philosophical method / |
| title_alt | Varieties of Xphi, pragmatic distortion, and the no-theory theory of intuitions -- Intuitions and counterexamples -- The relocation problem and Williamson on "judgment skepticism" -- The evidence for the evidence : arguing for gettier judgments -- More evidence for the evidence and the relocation problem redux -- Other replies to Xphi : the expertise and multiple concepts replies -- Conclusion : armchairs vs. lab-coats? |
| title_auth | The myth of the intuitive : experimental philosophy and philosophical method / |
| title_exact_search | The myth of the intuitive : experimental philosophy and philosophical method / |
| title_full | The myth of the intuitive : experimental philosophy and philosophical method / Max Deutsch. |
| title_fullStr | The myth of the intuitive : experimental philosophy and philosophical method / Max Deutsch. |
| title_full_unstemmed | The myth of the intuitive : experimental philosophy and philosophical method / Max Deutsch. |
| title_short | The myth of the intuitive : |
| title_sort | myth of the intuitive experimental philosophy and philosophical method |
| title_sub | experimental philosophy and philosophical method / |
| topic | Methodology. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85084414 Philosophy Research. Intuition. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85067653 Méthodologie. Philosophie Recherche. Intuition. methodology. aat intuition. aat PHILOSOPHY Epistemology. bisacsh PHILOSOPHY Criticism. bisacsh Intuition fast Methodology fast Philosophy Research fast |
| topic_facet | Methodology. Philosophy Research. Intuition. Méthodologie. Philosophie Recherche. methodology. intuition. PHILOSOPHY Epistemology. PHILOSOPHY Criticism. Intuition Methodology Philosophy Research |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=986382 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT deutschmax themythoftheintuitiveexperimentalphilosophyandphilosophicalmethod AT deutschmax mythoftheintuitiveexperimentalphilosophyandphilosophicalmethod |