The fallacies of Cold War deterrence and a new direction /:

In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamber...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Payne, Keith B.
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Lexington : University Press of Kentucky, ©2001.
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:DE-862
DE-863
Zusammenfassung:In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamberlain's policy was doomed because he had greatly misjudged Hitler's basic beliefs and thus his behavior. U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence policy was similarly based on the confident but questionable assumption that Soviet leaders would be rational by Washington's standards; they would behave reasonably wh.
Beschreibung:1 online resource (240 pages)
Format:Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliographie:Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:9780813148496
0813148499
0813127750
9780813127750

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