State strategies in international bargaining :: play by the rules or change them? /

Bargaining between states in the international system is governed by rules, which shape and constrain their bargaining behavior. However, these rules can be changed. When, why, and how do states bargain differently? Drawing on original qualitative and quantitative evidence, this book demonstrates ho...

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1. Verfasser: McKibben, Heather Elko (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Schriftenreihe:Cambridge studies in international relations ; 134.
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Online-Zugang:Volltext
Zusammenfassung:Bargaining between states in the international system is governed by rules, which shape and constrain their bargaining behavior. However, these rules can be changed. When, why, and how do states bargain differently? Drawing on original qualitative and quantitative evidence, this book demonstrates how the rules of the game influence the cooperative or coercive nature of the strategies adopted by all states in a negotiation. These effects influence each state's incentives regarding whether to play by the rules or to change them. Examining these incentives, as well as the conditions under which states can act on them, McKibben explains the wide variation in states' bargaining strategies. Several bargaining interactions are analyzed, including decision-making in the European Union, multilateral trade negotiations, climate change negotiations, and negotiations over the future status of Kosovo. This book provides a rich understanding of the nuances of states' behavior in international bargaining processes.--Publisher description.
Beschreibung:1 online resource (xx, 324 pages) : illustrations
Bibliographie:Includes bibliographical references (pages 284-299) and index.
ISBN:9781316091128
1316091120
9781316248478
131624847X
9781316252253
1316252256
1107086094
9781107086098
1107450543
9781107450547

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