Bound :: essays on free will and responsibility /
The problem of free will arises from ordinary, commonsense reflection. Shaun Nichols examines these ordinary attitudes from a naturalistic perspective. He offers a psychological account of the origins of the problem of free will. According to his account the problem arises because of two naturally e...
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1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
2015.
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Ausgabe: | First edition. |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | The problem of free will arises from ordinary, commonsense reflection. Shaun Nichols examines these ordinary attitudes from a naturalistic perspective. He offers a psychological account of the origins of the problem of free will. According to his account the problem arises because of two naturally emerging ways of thinking about ourselves and the world, one of which makes determinism plausible while the other makes determinism implausible. Although contemporary cognitive science does not settle whether choices are determined, Nichols argues that our belief in indeterminist choice is grounded in faulty inference and should be regarded as unjustified. However, even if our belief in indeterminist choice is false, it's a further substantive question whether that means that free will doesn't exist. Nichols argues that, because of the flexibility of reference, there is no single answer to whether free will exists. In some contexts, it will be true to say 'free will exists'; in other contexts, it will be false to say that. With this substantive background in place, this book promotes a pragmatic approach to prescriptive issues. In some contexts, the prevailing practical considerations suggest that we should deny the existence of free will and moral responsibility; in other contexts the practical considerations suggest that we should affirm free will and moral responsibility. This allows for the possibility that in some contexts, it is morally apt to exact retributive punishment; in other contexts, it can be apt to take up the exonerating attitude of hard incompatibilism. |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (viii, 188 pages) |
Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
ISBN: | 9780191040085 0191040088 9780191795473 019179547X 0191040096 9780191040092 0198801319 9780198801313 |
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520 | 8 | |a The problem of free will arises from ordinary, commonsense reflection. Shaun Nichols examines these ordinary attitudes from a naturalistic perspective. He offers a psychological account of the origins of the problem of free will. According to his account the problem arises because of two naturally emerging ways of thinking about ourselves and the world, one of which makes determinism plausible while the other makes determinism implausible. Although contemporary cognitive science does not settle whether choices are determined, Nichols argues that our belief in indeterminist choice is grounded in faulty inference and should be regarded as unjustified. However, even if our belief in indeterminist choice is false, it's a further substantive question whether that means that free will doesn't exist. Nichols argues that, because of the flexibility of reference, there is no single answer to whether free will exists. In some contexts, it will be true to say 'free will exists'; in other contexts, it will be false to say that. With this substantive background in place, this book promotes a pragmatic approach to prescriptive issues. In some contexts, the prevailing practical considerations suggest that we should deny the existence of free will and moral responsibility; in other contexts the practical considerations suggest that we should affirm free will and moral responsibility. This allows for the possibility that in some contexts, it is morally apt to exact retributive punishment; in other contexts, it can be apt to take up the exonerating attitude of hard incompatibilism. | |
588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
505 | 0 | 0 | |g Agency. |t The folk psychology of agency ; |t The indeterminist intuition : source and status ; |t Free will and error -- |g Moral responsibility. |t Incompatibilism : intuitive and isolated ; |t Debunking arguments ; |t Brute retributivism ; |t After incompatibilism. |
546 | |a English. | ||
650 | 0 | |a Free will and determinism. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85051686 | |
650 | 0 | |a Responsibility. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85113235 | |
650 | 6 | |a Libre arbitre et déterminisme. | |
650 | 6 | |a Responsabilité. | |
650 | 7 | |a PHILOSOPHY |x History & Surveys |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
650 | 7 | |a PHILOSOPHY |x History & Surveys |x Modern. |2 bisacsh | |
650 | 7 | |a Responsibility |2 fast | |
650 | 7 | |a Free will and determinism |2 fast | |
650 | 1 | 7 | |a Vrije wil. |2 gtt |0 (NL-LeOCL)07895228X |
650 | 1 | 7 | |a Determinisme. |2 gtt |0 (NL-LeOCL)078483026 |
655 | 4 | |a Electronic book. | |
758 | |i has work: |a Bound (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCFDqHCpDQDh3hWyRJq98kC |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Nichols, Shaun. |t Bound. |b First Edition. |d Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2015 |z 9780199291847 |w (OCoLC)903162207 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
DE-BY-FWS_katkey | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn896826678 |
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adam_text | |
any_adam_object | |
author | Nichols, Shaun |
author_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2003107311 |
author_facet | Nichols, Shaun |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Nichols, Shaun |
author_variant | s n sn |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | localFWS |
callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
callnumber-label | B790-5739 |
callnumber-raw | B790-5739 |
callnumber-search | B790-5739 |
callnumber-sort | B 3790 45739 |
callnumber-subject | B - Philosophy |
collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
contents | The folk psychology of agency ; The indeterminist intuition : source and status ; Free will and error -- Incompatibilism : intuitive and isolated ; Debunking arguments ; Brute retributivism ; After incompatibilism. |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)896826678 |
dewey-full | 190 |
dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
dewey-ones | 190 - Modern western philosophy |
dewey-raw | 190 |
dewey-search | 190 |
dewey-sort | 3190 |
dewey-tens | 190 - Modern western philosophy |
discipline | Philosophie |
edition | First edition. |
format | Electronic eBook |
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genre | Electronic book. |
genre_facet | Electronic book. |
id | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn896826678 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:26:20Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780191040085 0191040088 9780191795473 019179547X 0191040096 9780191040092 0198801319 9780198801313 |
language | English |
oclc_num | 896826678 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
owner_facet | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
physical | 1 online resource (viii, 188 pages) |
psigel | ZDB-4-EBA |
publishDate | 2015 |
publishDateSearch | 2015 |
publishDateSort | 2015 |
publisher | Oxford University Press, |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Nichols, Shaun, author. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2003107311 Bound : essays on free will and responsibility / Shaun Nichols. First edition. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2015. 1 online resource (viii, 188 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier The problem of free will arises from ordinary, commonsense reflection. Shaun Nichols examines these ordinary attitudes from a naturalistic perspective. He offers a psychological account of the origins of the problem of free will. According to his account the problem arises because of two naturally emerging ways of thinking about ourselves and the world, one of which makes determinism plausible while the other makes determinism implausible. Although contemporary cognitive science does not settle whether choices are determined, Nichols argues that our belief in indeterminist choice is grounded in faulty inference and should be regarded as unjustified. However, even if our belief in indeterminist choice is false, it's a further substantive question whether that means that free will doesn't exist. Nichols argues that, because of the flexibility of reference, there is no single answer to whether free will exists. In some contexts, it will be true to say 'free will exists'; in other contexts, it will be false to say that. With this substantive background in place, this book promotes a pragmatic approach to prescriptive issues. In some contexts, the prevailing practical considerations suggest that we should deny the existence of free will and moral responsibility; in other contexts the practical considerations suggest that we should affirm free will and moral responsibility. This allows for the possibility that in some contexts, it is morally apt to exact retributive punishment; in other contexts, it can be apt to take up the exonerating attitude of hard incompatibilism. Print version record. Includes bibliographical references and index. Agency. The folk psychology of agency ; The indeterminist intuition : source and status ; Free will and error -- Moral responsibility. Incompatibilism : intuitive and isolated ; Debunking arguments ; Brute retributivism ; After incompatibilism. English. Free will and determinism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85051686 Responsibility. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85113235 Libre arbitre et déterminisme. Responsabilité. PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys General. bisacsh PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys Modern. bisacsh Responsibility fast Free will and determinism fast Vrije wil. gtt (NL-LeOCL)07895228X Determinisme. gtt (NL-LeOCL)078483026 Electronic book. has work: Bound (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCFDqHCpDQDh3hWyRJq98kC https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Nichols, Shaun. Bound. First Edition. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2015 9780199291847 (OCoLC)903162207 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=909695 Volltext |
spellingShingle | Nichols, Shaun Bound : essays on free will and responsibility / The folk psychology of agency ; The indeterminist intuition : source and status ; Free will and error -- Incompatibilism : intuitive and isolated ; Debunking arguments ; Brute retributivism ; After incompatibilism. Free will and determinism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85051686 Responsibility. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85113235 Libre arbitre et déterminisme. Responsabilité. PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys General. bisacsh PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys Modern. bisacsh Responsibility fast Free will and determinism fast Vrije wil. gtt (NL-LeOCL)07895228X Determinisme. gtt (NL-LeOCL)078483026 |
subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85051686 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85113235 (NL-LeOCL)07895228X (NL-LeOCL)078483026 |
title | Bound : essays on free will and responsibility / |
title_alt | The folk psychology of agency ; The indeterminist intuition : source and status ; Free will and error -- Incompatibilism : intuitive and isolated ; Debunking arguments ; Brute retributivism ; After incompatibilism. |
title_auth | Bound : essays on free will and responsibility / |
title_exact_search | Bound : essays on free will and responsibility / |
title_full | Bound : essays on free will and responsibility / Shaun Nichols. |
title_fullStr | Bound : essays on free will and responsibility / Shaun Nichols. |
title_full_unstemmed | Bound : essays on free will and responsibility / Shaun Nichols. |
title_short | Bound : |
title_sort | bound essays on free will and responsibility |
title_sub | essays on free will and responsibility / |
topic | Free will and determinism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85051686 Responsibility. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85113235 Libre arbitre et déterminisme. Responsabilité. PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys General. bisacsh PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys Modern. bisacsh Responsibility fast Free will and determinism fast Vrije wil. gtt (NL-LeOCL)07895228X Determinisme. gtt (NL-LeOCL)078483026 |
topic_facet | Free will and determinism. Responsibility. Libre arbitre et déterminisme. Responsabilité. PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys General. PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys Modern. Responsibility Free will and determinism Vrije wil. Determinisme. Electronic book. |
url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=909695 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT nicholsshaun boundessaysonfreewillandresponsibility |