Game theory and mechanism design /:
This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Hackensack, New Jersey :
World Scientific,
2014.
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IISc lecture notes series ;
v. 4. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the "science" behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society. The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sci |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (532 pages) |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 1306566282 9781306566285 9789814525053 9814525057 |
Internformat
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| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
| 520 | |a This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the "science" behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society. The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sci | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Dedication; Foreword; Opinions on the Book; About the Author; Preface; Acronyms; Symbols and Notations; Contents; 1. Introduction and Overview; 1.1 Game Theory: The Science of Strategic Interactions; Value of Game Theory and Mechanism Design; Game Theory: A Rich History; 1.2 Current Trends and Modern Applications; Current Trends; Some Modern Applications; 1.3 Outline of this Book; References; NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; 2. Key Notions in Game Theory; 2.1 Strategic Form Games; 2.2 Preferences; 2.3 Utilities; 2.4 Rationality; 2.5 Intelligence; Common Knowledge; 2.6 Classification of Games. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 2.7 Summary and ReferencesReferences; 3. Extensive Form Games; 3.1 Illustrative Examples; 3.2 Extensive Form Games: Definitions; 3.3 Transforming Extensive Form to Strategic Form; 3.4 Summary and References; References; 3.5 Exercises; 4. Strategic Form Games; 4.1 Preliminaries; 4.2 Matching Pennies with Simultaneous Moves; 4.3 Rock-Paper-Scissors Game; 4.4 BOS (Bach or Stravinsky) Game; 4.5 A Coordination Game; 4.6 Prisoner's Dilemma Game; 4.7 Company's Dilemma Game; 4.8 A Non-Symmetric Company's Dilemma Game; 4.9 A Duopoly Pricing Game; 4.10 Tragedy of the Commons. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 4.11 Bandwidth Sharing Game4.12 A Sealed Bid Auction; 4.13 Pigou's Network Game; 4.14 Braess Paradox Game; 4.15 Summary and References; References; 4.16 Exercises; 5. Dominant Strategy Equilibria; 5.1 Strong Dominance; 5.2 Weak Dominance; 5.3 Very Weak Dominance; 5.4 Illustrations of Dominant Strategy Equilibria; 5.5 Summary and References; References; 5.6 Exercises; 6. Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria; 6.1 The Notion of Nash Equilibrium; 6.2 Illustrative Examples of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 6.3 Games without a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 6.4 Interpretations of Nash Equilibrium. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 6.5 Existence of Multiple Nash Equilibria6.6 Maxmin Values and Minmax Values; Maxmin Value and Maxmin Strategy; Minmax Value; 6.7 Equilibria in Extensive Form Games; Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; 6.8 Summary and References; References; 6.9 Exercises; 7. Mixed Strategies and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 7.1 Mixed Strategies; 7.2 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 7.3 Properties of Mixed Strategies. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 7.4 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Profile to be a Mixed Strategy Nash EquilibriumImplications of the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria of the BOS Game; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria of the Coordination Game; 7.5 Maxmin Values and Minmax Values in Mixed Strategies; Maxmin Value in Mixed Strategies; Minmax Value in Mixed Strategies; 7.6 Domination in Mixed Strategies; Dominating Strategies and Dominated Strategies; Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies; 7.7 Summary and References; References; 7.8 Exercises; 8. Utility Theory. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| _version_ | 1816882267529674752 |
| adam_text | |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Narahari, Y. |
| author_facet | Narahari, Y. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Narahari, Y. |
| author_variant | y n yn |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | localFWS |
| callnumber-first | Q - Science |
| callnumber-label | QA269 |
| callnumber-raw | QA269 |
| callnumber-search | QA269 |
| callnumber-sort | QA 3269 |
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| contents | Dedication; Foreword; Opinions on the Book; About the Author; Preface; Acronyms; Symbols and Notations; Contents; 1. Introduction and Overview; 1.1 Game Theory: The Science of Strategic Interactions; Value of Game Theory and Mechanism Design; Game Theory: A Rich History; 1.2 Current Trends and Modern Applications; Current Trends; Some Modern Applications; 1.3 Outline of this Book; References; NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; 2. Key Notions in Game Theory; 2.1 Strategic Form Games; 2.2 Preferences; 2.3 Utilities; 2.4 Rationality; 2.5 Intelligence; Common Knowledge; 2.6 Classification of Games. 2.7 Summary and ReferencesReferences; 3. Extensive Form Games; 3.1 Illustrative Examples; 3.2 Extensive Form Games: Definitions; 3.3 Transforming Extensive Form to Strategic Form; 3.4 Summary and References; References; 3.5 Exercises; 4. Strategic Form Games; 4.1 Preliminaries; 4.2 Matching Pennies with Simultaneous Moves; 4.3 Rock-Paper-Scissors Game; 4.4 BOS (Bach or Stravinsky) Game; 4.5 A Coordination Game; 4.6 Prisoner's Dilemma Game; 4.7 Company's Dilemma Game; 4.8 A Non-Symmetric Company's Dilemma Game; 4.9 A Duopoly Pricing Game; 4.10 Tragedy of the Commons. 4.11 Bandwidth Sharing Game4.12 A Sealed Bid Auction; 4.13 Pigou's Network Game; 4.14 Braess Paradox Game; 4.15 Summary and References; References; 4.16 Exercises; 5. Dominant Strategy Equilibria; 5.1 Strong Dominance; 5.2 Weak Dominance; 5.3 Very Weak Dominance; 5.4 Illustrations of Dominant Strategy Equilibria; 5.5 Summary and References; References; 5.6 Exercises; 6. Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria; 6.1 The Notion of Nash Equilibrium; 6.2 Illustrative Examples of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 6.3 Games without a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 6.4 Interpretations of Nash Equilibrium. 6.5 Existence of Multiple Nash Equilibria6.6 Maxmin Values and Minmax Values; Maxmin Value and Maxmin Strategy; Minmax Value; 6.7 Equilibria in Extensive Form Games; Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; 6.8 Summary and References; References; 6.9 Exercises; 7. Mixed Strategies and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 7.1 Mixed Strategies; 7.2 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 7.3 Properties of Mixed Strategies. 7.4 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Profile to be a Mixed Strategy Nash EquilibriumImplications of the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria of the BOS Game; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria of the Coordination Game; 7.5 Maxmin Values and Minmax Values in Mixed Strategies; Maxmin Value in Mixed Strategies; Minmax Value in Mixed Strategies; 7.6 Domination in Mixed Strategies; Dominating Strategies and Dominated Strategies; Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies; 7.7 Summary and References; References; 7.8 Exercises; 8. Utility Theory. |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)876345655 |
| dewey-full | 519.3 |
| dewey-hundreds | 500 - Natural sciences and mathematics |
| dewey-ones | 519 - Probabilities and applied mathematics |
| dewey-raw | 519.3 |
| dewey-search | 519.3 |
| dewey-sort | 3519.3 |
| dewey-tens | 510 - Mathematics |
| discipline | Mathematik |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn876345655 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:25:54Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 1306566282 9781306566285 9789814525053 9814525057 |
| language | English |
| oclc_num | 876345655 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 online resource (532 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-4-EBA |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publishDateSearch | 2014 |
| publishDateSort | 2014 |
| publisher | World Scientific, |
| record_format | marc |
| series | IISc lecture notes series ; |
| series2 | IISc lecture notes series ; |
| spelling | Narahari, Y., author. Game theory and mechanism design / Y. Narahari. Hackensack, New Jersey : World Scientific, 2014. 1 online resource (532 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier IISc lecture notes series ; v. 4 Print version record. Includes bibliographical references and index. This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the "science" behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society. The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sci Dedication; Foreword; Opinions on the Book; About the Author; Preface; Acronyms; Symbols and Notations; Contents; 1. Introduction and Overview; 1.1 Game Theory: The Science of Strategic Interactions; Value of Game Theory and Mechanism Design; Game Theory: A Rich History; 1.2 Current Trends and Modern Applications; Current Trends; Some Modern Applications; 1.3 Outline of this Book; References; NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; 2. Key Notions in Game Theory; 2.1 Strategic Form Games; 2.2 Preferences; 2.3 Utilities; 2.4 Rationality; 2.5 Intelligence; Common Knowledge; 2.6 Classification of Games. 2.7 Summary and ReferencesReferences; 3. Extensive Form Games; 3.1 Illustrative Examples; 3.2 Extensive Form Games: Definitions; 3.3 Transforming Extensive Form to Strategic Form; 3.4 Summary and References; References; 3.5 Exercises; 4. Strategic Form Games; 4.1 Preliminaries; 4.2 Matching Pennies with Simultaneous Moves; 4.3 Rock-Paper-Scissors Game; 4.4 BOS (Bach or Stravinsky) Game; 4.5 A Coordination Game; 4.6 Prisoner's Dilemma Game; 4.7 Company's Dilemma Game; 4.8 A Non-Symmetric Company's Dilemma Game; 4.9 A Duopoly Pricing Game; 4.10 Tragedy of the Commons. 4.11 Bandwidth Sharing Game4.12 A Sealed Bid Auction; 4.13 Pigou's Network Game; 4.14 Braess Paradox Game; 4.15 Summary and References; References; 4.16 Exercises; 5. Dominant Strategy Equilibria; 5.1 Strong Dominance; 5.2 Weak Dominance; 5.3 Very Weak Dominance; 5.4 Illustrations of Dominant Strategy Equilibria; 5.5 Summary and References; References; 5.6 Exercises; 6. Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria; 6.1 The Notion of Nash Equilibrium; 6.2 Illustrative Examples of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 6.3 Games without a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 6.4 Interpretations of Nash Equilibrium. 6.5 Existence of Multiple Nash Equilibria6.6 Maxmin Values and Minmax Values; Maxmin Value and Maxmin Strategy; Minmax Value; 6.7 Equilibria in Extensive Form Games; Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; 6.8 Summary and References; References; 6.9 Exercises; 7. Mixed Strategies and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 7.1 Mixed Strategies; 7.2 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 7.3 Properties of Mixed Strategies. 7.4 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Profile to be a Mixed Strategy Nash EquilibriumImplications of the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria of the BOS Game; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria of the Coordination Game; 7.5 Maxmin Values and Minmax Values in Mixed Strategies; Maxmin Value in Mixed Strategies; Minmax Value in Mixed Strategies; 7.6 Domination in Mixed Strategies; Dominating Strategies and Dominated Strategies; Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies; 7.7 Summary and References; References; 7.8 Exercises; 8. Utility Theory. Game theory. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 Game Theory https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D005716 Théorie des jeux. MATHEMATICS Applied. bisacsh MATHEMATICS Probability & Statistics General. bisacsh Game theory fast Print version IISc lecture notes series ; v. 4. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2010144744 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=752585 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Narahari, Y. Game theory and mechanism design / IISc lecture notes series ; Dedication; Foreword; Opinions on the Book; About the Author; Preface; Acronyms; Symbols and Notations; Contents; 1. Introduction and Overview; 1.1 Game Theory: The Science of Strategic Interactions; Value of Game Theory and Mechanism Design; Game Theory: A Rich History; 1.2 Current Trends and Modern Applications; Current Trends; Some Modern Applications; 1.3 Outline of this Book; References; NON-COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; 2. Key Notions in Game Theory; 2.1 Strategic Form Games; 2.2 Preferences; 2.3 Utilities; 2.4 Rationality; 2.5 Intelligence; Common Knowledge; 2.6 Classification of Games. 2.7 Summary and ReferencesReferences; 3. Extensive Form Games; 3.1 Illustrative Examples; 3.2 Extensive Form Games: Definitions; 3.3 Transforming Extensive Form to Strategic Form; 3.4 Summary and References; References; 3.5 Exercises; 4. Strategic Form Games; 4.1 Preliminaries; 4.2 Matching Pennies with Simultaneous Moves; 4.3 Rock-Paper-Scissors Game; 4.4 BOS (Bach or Stravinsky) Game; 4.5 A Coordination Game; 4.6 Prisoner's Dilemma Game; 4.7 Company's Dilemma Game; 4.8 A Non-Symmetric Company's Dilemma Game; 4.9 A Duopoly Pricing Game; 4.10 Tragedy of the Commons. 4.11 Bandwidth Sharing Game4.12 A Sealed Bid Auction; 4.13 Pigou's Network Game; 4.14 Braess Paradox Game; 4.15 Summary and References; References; 4.16 Exercises; 5. Dominant Strategy Equilibria; 5.1 Strong Dominance; 5.2 Weak Dominance; 5.3 Very Weak Dominance; 5.4 Illustrations of Dominant Strategy Equilibria; 5.5 Summary and References; References; 5.6 Exercises; 6. Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria; 6.1 The Notion of Nash Equilibrium; 6.2 Illustrative Examples of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 6.3 Games without a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 6.4 Interpretations of Nash Equilibrium. 6.5 Existence of Multiple Nash Equilibria6.6 Maxmin Values and Minmax Values; Maxmin Value and Maxmin Strategy; Minmax Value; 6.7 Equilibria in Extensive Form Games; Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; 6.8 Summary and References; References; 6.9 Exercises; 7. Mixed Strategies and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 7.1 Mixed Strategies; 7.2 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium; 7.3 Properties of Mixed Strategies. 7.4 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for a Profile to be a Mixed Strategy Nash EquilibriumImplications of the Necessary and Sufficient Conditions; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria of the BOS Game; Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria of the Coordination Game; 7.5 Maxmin Values and Minmax Values in Mixed Strategies; Maxmin Value in Mixed Strategies; Minmax Value in Mixed Strategies; 7.6 Domination in Mixed Strategies; Dominating Strategies and Dominated Strategies; Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies; 7.7 Summary and References; References; 7.8 Exercises; 8. Utility Theory. Game theory. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 Game Theory https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D005716 Théorie des jeux. MATHEMATICS Applied. bisacsh MATHEMATICS Probability & Statistics General. bisacsh Game theory fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D005716 |
| title | Game theory and mechanism design / |
| title_auth | Game theory and mechanism design / |
| title_exact_search | Game theory and mechanism design / |
| title_full | Game theory and mechanism design / Y. Narahari. |
| title_fullStr | Game theory and mechanism design / Y. Narahari. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Game theory and mechanism design / Y. Narahari. |
| title_short | Game theory and mechanism design / |
| title_sort | game theory and mechanism design |
| topic | Game theory. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 Game Theory https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D005716 Théorie des jeux. MATHEMATICS Applied. bisacsh MATHEMATICS Probability & Statistics General. bisacsh Game theory fast |
| topic_facet | Game theory. Game Theory Théorie des jeux. MATHEMATICS Applied. MATHEMATICS Probability & Statistics General. Game theory |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=752585 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT narahariy gametheoryandmechanismdesign |