Naturalism and the first-person perspective /:
This text investigates the limits of scientific naturalism. It has three goals: to show that no wholly impersonal account of reality can be adequate to all phenomena; to formulate a nonCartesian account of the first-person perspective; to develop a 'near-naturalism' that accommodates the w...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford, U.K. ; New York, NY :
Oxford University Press,
©2013.
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This text investigates the limits of scientific naturalism. It has three goals: to show that no wholly impersonal account of reality can be adequate to all phenomena; to formulate a nonCartesian account of the first-person perspective; to develop a 'near-naturalism' that accommodates the world of our encounters and interactions. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xxiv, 248 pages) |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 235-244) and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780199914739 0199914737 9780199347483 0199347484 |
Internformat
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| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 235-244) and index. | ||
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| 520 | 8 | |a This text investigates the limits of scientific naturalism. It has three goals: to show that no wholly impersonal account of reality can be adequate to all phenomena; to formulate a nonCartesian account of the first-person perspective; to develop a 'near-naturalism' that accommodates the world of our encounters and interactions. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- What is the Problem? -- PART I: THE CORE ARGUMENT -- 1. Varieties of Naturalism -- What Counts As "Science"? -- Reductive Naturalism -- Nonreductive Naturalism -- Two Responses to Naturalism: Disenchantment and Optimism -- 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective -- What Is Naturalization? -- The Robust First-Person Perspective -- The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective -- 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective -- John Perry and an Epistemic Account of the Self -- David Lewis on De Se Belief -- A Comment on John Searle -- Does Cognitive Science Save the Day for Naturalism? -- Conclusion -- 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective -- Daniel Dennett on Consciousness -- Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory -- My Recommendation -- 5. Arguments against First-Person Naturalization -- From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties -- A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person Properties -- A Metaphysical Argument against Ontological Naturalism -- Conclusion -- PART II: AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE -- 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person Perspective -- The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness -- Language and the Acquisition of Concepts -- How to Acquire a Self-Concept -- Human Persons: Wrap Up -- 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent? -- Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach -- Objections and Replies -- Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory -- Johnston's Critique Sidestepped -- Conclusion -- 8. A Metaphysical Framework for the First-Person Perspective -- First-Person Properties -- Dispositional Properties -- Haecceitistic Implications -- Conclusion. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 9 Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of the First-Person Perspective -- Personhood -- Varieties of Agency -- Artifacts -- Moral Responsibility -- Conclusion -- 10. Natural Reality -- Near-Naturalism -- Property-Constitution and Causation -- Emergentism and Downward Causation -- How Naturalistic Is Near-Naturalism? -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Z. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Naturalism. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85090269 | |
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| author | Baker, Lynne Rudder, 1944-2017 |
| author_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n87844300 |
| author_facet | Baker, Lynne Rudder, 1944-2017 |
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| contents | Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- What is the Problem? -- PART I: THE CORE ARGUMENT -- 1. Varieties of Naturalism -- What Counts As "Science"? -- Reductive Naturalism -- Nonreductive Naturalism -- Two Responses to Naturalism: Disenchantment and Optimism -- 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective -- What Is Naturalization? -- The Robust First-Person Perspective -- The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective -- 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective -- John Perry and an Epistemic Account of the Self -- David Lewis on De Se Belief -- A Comment on John Searle -- Does Cognitive Science Save the Day for Naturalism? -- Conclusion -- 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective -- Daniel Dennett on Consciousness -- Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory -- My Recommendation -- 5. Arguments against First-Person Naturalization -- From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties -- A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person Properties -- A Metaphysical Argument against Ontological Naturalism -- Conclusion -- PART II: AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE -- 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person Perspective -- The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness -- Language and the Acquisition of Concepts -- How to Acquire a Self-Concept -- Human Persons: Wrap Up -- 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent? -- Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach -- Objections and Replies -- Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory -- Johnston's Critique Sidestepped -- Conclusion -- 8. A Metaphysical Framework for the First-Person Perspective -- First-Person Properties -- Dispositional Properties -- Haecceitistic Implications -- Conclusion. 9 Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of the First-Person Perspective -- Personhood -- Varieties of Agency -- Artifacts -- Moral Responsibility -- Conclusion -- 10. Natural Reality -- Near-Naturalism -- Property-Constitution and Causation -- Emergentism and Downward Causation -- How Naturalistic Is Near-Naturalism? -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Z. |
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| dewey-full | 146 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 146 - Naturalism and related systems |
| dewey-raw | 146 |
| dewey-search | 146 |
| dewey-sort | 3146 |
| dewey-tens | 140 - Specific philosophical schools |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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It has three goals: to show that no wholly impersonal account of reality can be adequate to all phenomena; to formulate a nonCartesian account of the first-person perspective; to develop a 'near-naturalism' that accommodates the world of our encounters and interactions.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- What is the Problem? -- PART I: THE CORE ARGUMENT -- 1. Varieties of Naturalism -- What Counts As "Science"? -- Reductive Naturalism -- Nonreductive Naturalism -- Two Responses to Naturalism: Disenchantment and Optimism -- 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective -- What Is Naturalization? -- The Robust First-Person Perspective -- The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective -- 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective -- John Perry and an Epistemic Account of the Self -- David Lewis on De Se Belief -- A Comment on John Searle -- Does Cognitive Science Save the Day for Naturalism? -- Conclusion -- 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective -- Daniel Dennett on Consciousness -- Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory -- My Recommendation -- 5. Arguments against First-Person Naturalization -- From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties -- A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person Properties -- A Metaphysical Argument against Ontological Naturalism -- Conclusion -- PART II: AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE -- 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person Perspective -- The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness -- Language and the Acquisition of Concepts -- How to Acquire a Self-Concept -- Human Persons: Wrap Up -- 7. 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| publisher | Oxford University Press, |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Baker, Lynne Rudder, 1944-2017. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n87844300 Naturalism and the first-person perspective / Lynne Rudder Baker. Oxford, U.K. ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, ©2013. 1 online resource (xxiv, 248 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references (pages 235-244) and index. Print version record. This text investigates the limits of scientific naturalism. It has three goals: to show that no wholly impersonal account of reality can be adequate to all phenomena; to formulate a nonCartesian account of the first-person perspective; to develop a 'near-naturalism' that accommodates the world of our encounters and interactions. Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- What is the Problem? -- PART I: THE CORE ARGUMENT -- 1. Varieties of Naturalism -- What Counts As "Science"? -- Reductive Naturalism -- Nonreductive Naturalism -- Two Responses to Naturalism: Disenchantment and Optimism -- 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective -- What Is Naturalization? -- The Robust First-Person Perspective -- The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective -- 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective -- John Perry and an Epistemic Account of the Self -- David Lewis on De Se Belief -- A Comment on John Searle -- Does Cognitive Science Save the Day for Naturalism? -- Conclusion -- 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective -- Daniel Dennett on Consciousness -- Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory -- My Recommendation -- 5. Arguments against First-Person Naturalization -- From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties -- A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person Properties -- A Metaphysical Argument against Ontological Naturalism -- Conclusion -- PART II: AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE -- 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person Perspective -- The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness -- Language and the Acquisition of Concepts -- How to Acquire a Self-Concept -- Human Persons: Wrap Up -- 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent? -- Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach -- Objections and Replies -- Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory -- Johnston's Critique Sidestepped -- Conclusion -- 8. A Metaphysical Framework for the First-Person Perspective -- First-Person Properties -- Dispositional Properties -- Haecceitistic Implications -- Conclusion. 9 Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of the First-Person Perspective -- Personhood -- Varieties of Agency -- Artifacts -- Moral Responsibility -- Conclusion -- 10. Natural Reality -- Near-Naturalism -- Property-Constitution and Causation -- Emergentism and Downward Causation -- How Naturalistic Is Near-Naturalism? -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Z. Naturalism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85090269 Self (Philosophy) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85119709 Perspective (Philosophy) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85100172 Naturalisme. Moi (Philosophie) Perspective (Philosophie) naturalism (philosophical movement) aat PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys General. bisacsh Naturalism fast Perspective (Philosophy) fast Self (Philosophy) fast Philosophy & Religion. hilcc Philosophy. hilcc Philosophy. ukslc has work: Naturalism and the first-person perspective (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCH8hBrDtr4FR4fcTcB6R8C https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Baker, Lynne Rudder, 1944- Naturalism and the first-person perspective. Oxford, U.K. ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, ©2013 9780199914746 (DLC) 2012030940 (OCoLC)804145875 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=578655 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Baker, Lynne Rudder, 1944-2017 Naturalism and the first-person perspective / Cover -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- What is the Problem? -- PART I: THE CORE ARGUMENT -- 1. Varieties of Naturalism -- What Counts As "Science"? -- Reductive Naturalism -- Nonreductive Naturalism -- Two Responses to Naturalism: Disenchantment and Optimism -- 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective -- What Is Naturalization? -- The Robust First-Person Perspective -- The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective -- 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective -- John Perry and an Epistemic Account of the Self -- David Lewis on De Se Belief -- A Comment on John Searle -- Does Cognitive Science Save the Day for Naturalism? -- Conclusion -- 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective -- Daniel Dennett on Consciousness -- Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory -- My Recommendation -- 5. Arguments against First-Person Naturalization -- From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties -- A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person Properties -- A Metaphysical Argument against Ontological Naturalism -- Conclusion -- PART II: AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE -- 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person Perspective -- The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness -- Language and the Acquisition of Concepts -- How to Acquire a Self-Concept -- Human Persons: Wrap Up -- 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent? -- Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach -- Objections and Replies -- Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory -- Johnston's Critique Sidestepped -- Conclusion -- 8. A Metaphysical Framework for the First-Person Perspective -- First-Person Properties -- Dispositional Properties -- Haecceitistic Implications -- Conclusion. 9 Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of the First-Person Perspective -- Personhood -- Varieties of Agency -- Artifacts -- Moral Responsibility -- Conclusion -- 10. Natural Reality -- Near-Naturalism -- Property-Constitution and Causation -- Emergentism and Downward Causation -- How Naturalistic Is Near-Naturalism? -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Z. Naturalism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85090269 Self (Philosophy) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85119709 Perspective (Philosophy) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85100172 Naturalisme. Moi (Philosophie) Perspective (Philosophie) naturalism (philosophical movement) aat PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys General. bisacsh Naturalism fast Perspective (Philosophy) fast Self (Philosophy) fast Philosophy & Religion. hilcc Philosophy. hilcc Philosophy. ukslc |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85090269 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85119709 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85100172 |
| title | Naturalism and the first-person perspective / |
| title_auth | Naturalism and the first-person perspective / |
| title_exact_search | Naturalism and the first-person perspective / |
| title_full | Naturalism and the first-person perspective / Lynne Rudder Baker. |
| title_fullStr | Naturalism and the first-person perspective / Lynne Rudder Baker. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Naturalism and the first-person perspective / Lynne Rudder Baker. |
| title_short | Naturalism and the first-person perspective / |
| title_sort | naturalism and the first person perspective |
| topic | Naturalism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85090269 Self (Philosophy) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85119709 Perspective (Philosophy) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85100172 Naturalisme. Moi (Philosophie) Perspective (Philosophie) naturalism (philosophical movement) aat PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys General. bisacsh Naturalism fast Perspective (Philosophy) fast Self (Philosophy) fast Philosophy & Religion. hilcc Philosophy. hilcc Philosophy. ukslc |
| topic_facet | Naturalism. Self (Philosophy) Perspective (Philosophy) Naturalisme. Moi (Philosophie) Perspective (Philosophie) naturalism (philosophical movement) PHILOSOPHY History & Surveys General. Naturalism Philosophy & Religion. Philosophy. |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=578655 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bakerlynnerudder naturalismandthefirstpersonperspective |