Why governments and parties manipulate elections :: theory, practice, and implications /
"Why do parties and governments cheat in elections they cannot lose? This book documents the widespread use of blatant and excessive manipulation of elections and explains what drives this practice. Alberto Simpser shows that, in many instances, elections are about more than winning. Electoral...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
©2013.
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Political economy of institutions and decisions.
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | DE-862 DE-863 |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Why do parties and governments cheat in elections they cannot lose? This book documents the widespread use of blatant and excessive manipulation of elections and explains what drives this practice. Alberto Simpser shows that, in many instances, elections are about more than winning. Electoral manipulation is not only a tool used to gain votes, but also a means of transmitting or distorting information. This manipulation conveys an image of strength, shaping the behavior of citizens, bureaucrats, politicians, parties, unions and businesspeople to the benefit of the manipulators, increasing the scope for the manipulators to pursue their goals while in government and mitigating future challenges to their hold on power. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections provides a general theory about what drives electoral manipulation and empirically documents global patterns of manipulation"-- |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (304 pages) |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 9781107306882 1107306884 9781107314634 1107314631 9781139343824 1139343823 9781107309081 1107309085 1107301793 9781107301795 1107302897 9781107302891 1107312434 9781107312432 9781107448681 1107448689 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Simpser, Alberto, |d 1971- |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2012060938 | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Why governments and parties manipulate elections : |b theory, practice, and implications / |c Alberto Simpser. |
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| 490 | 1 | |a Political economy of institutions and decisions | |
| 520 | |a "Why do parties and governments cheat in elections they cannot lose? This book documents the widespread use of blatant and excessive manipulation of elections and explains what drives this practice. Alberto Simpser shows that, in many instances, elections are about more than winning. Electoral manipulation is not only a tool used to gain votes, but also a means of transmitting or distorting information. This manipulation conveys an image of strength, shaping the behavior of citizens, bureaucrats, politicians, parties, unions and businesspeople to the benefit of the manipulators, increasing the scope for the manipulators to pursue their goals while in government and mitigating future challenges to their hold on power. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections provides a general theory about what drives electoral manipulation and empirically documents global patterns of manipulation"-- |c Provided by publisher | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a List of Figures; List of Tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction and Overview; 1.1 Overview of the Argument and Findings; The Argument in Brief: Electoral Manipulation and Information; Empirical Findings; 1.2 Ramifications of the Argument and Relation to Other Bodies of Work; The Logic of Electoral Manipulation in Authoritarian Systems; Regime Type and Electoral Manipulation; Single-Party Elections and Excessive/Blatant Manipulation; Electoral Manipulation and Popular Rebellion; Electoral Manipulation and the Choice to Hold Elections. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a The Variety of Tools of Electoral ManipulationAdditional Related Literatures; 1.3 Organization and Chapter-by-Chapter Overview; 2 Electoral Manipulation; 2.1 What Is Electoral Manipulation?; 2.2 Manipulated Elections; 2.3 A Cross-National Measure of Electoral Manipulation; Implementing a Cross-National Measure of Electoral Manipulation; Summary Measures of Electoral Manipulation; 2.4 A Snapshot of Electoral Manipulation Around the World, 1990-2007; Appendix; Additional Notes on the Data; 3 The Puzzle of Excessive and Blatant Manipulation; 3.1 Conventional Wisdoms on Electoral Manipulation. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 3.2 The First Conventional Wisdom3.3 The Empirical Record; Electoral Manipulation and the Margin of Victory; Tight Races and Electoral Manipulation; Blatant Electoral Manipulation; 3.4 Conclusion: Patterns of Electoral Manipulation; Appendix; 4 More than Winning; 4.1 The Direct and Indirect Effects of Electoral Manipulation; Example: Electoral Manipulation and Union Acquiescence; Example: Electoral Manipulation and Bureaucratic Support; 4.2 Causal Mechanisms Driving Indirect Effects; From Expectations to Political Behavior; From Political Context to Expectations. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a A Model of Political Action under Electoral ManipulationFrom Electoral Manipulation to the Political Context; Blatant Manipulation and Popularity; The Time Dimension in the Mechanisms; Indirect Effects and the Level of Government; 4.3 Conclusion; Appendix; Generalizing the Concept of Indirect Effects; 5 The Strategic Logic of Electoral Manipulation; A Model of Party Competition with Electoral Manipulation; 5.1 Equilibrium Electoral Manipulation When Only Winning Matters; Aside: Election-Night Fraud; 5.2 Equilibrium Electoral Manipulation When More than Winning Matters. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a An Example with Specific Functional Forms5.3 Background Conditions, Over-Time Feedbacks, and Patterns of Electoral Manipulation; Institutional Setting and Excessive/Blatant Manipulation; Regime Type and Excessive/Blatant Electoral Manipulation; Feedbacks, Over-Time Dynamics, and the Excessive/Blatant Electoral Manipulation Trap; 5.4 Alternative Explanations for Excessive Electoral Manipulation; Uncertainty; Cost; The Stakes of Office; Keeping the Machine Well Oiled; 6 The Theory at Work; 6.1 Overview: Empirical Implications of the more than winning Theory. | |
| 546 | |a English. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Elections |x Corrupt practices. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85041558 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Political corruption. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033057 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Corruption électorale. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Corruption (Politique) | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a TRUE CRIME |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Elections |x Corrupt practices |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Political corruption |2 fast | |
| 655 | 4 | |a Electronic book. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Simpser, Alberto, 1971- |
| author_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2012060938 |
| author_facet | Simpser, Alberto, 1971- |
| author_role | |
| author_sort | Simpser, Alberto, 1971- |
| author_variant | a s as |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | localFWS |
| callnumber-first | J - Political Science |
| callnumber-label | JF1083 |
| callnumber-raw | JF1083 .S56 2013eb JF1083 |
| callnumber-search | JF1083 .S56 2013eb JF1083 |
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| contents | List of Figures; List of Tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction and Overview; 1.1 Overview of the Argument and Findings; The Argument in Brief: Electoral Manipulation and Information; Empirical Findings; 1.2 Ramifications of the Argument and Relation to Other Bodies of Work; The Logic of Electoral Manipulation in Authoritarian Systems; Regime Type and Electoral Manipulation; Single-Party Elections and Excessive/Blatant Manipulation; Electoral Manipulation and Popular Rebellion; Electoral Manipulation and the Choice to Hold Elections. The Variety of Tools of Electoral ManipulationAdditional Related Literatures; 1.3 Organization and Chapter-by-Chapter Overview; 2 Electoral Manipulation; 2.1 What Is Electoral Manipulation?; 2.2 Manipulated Elections; 2.3 A Cross-National Measure of Electoral Manipulation; Implementing a Cross-National Measure of Electoral Manipulation; Summary Measures of Electoral Manipulation; 2.4 A Snapshot of Electoral Manipulation Around the World, 1990-2007; Appendix; Additional Notes on the Data; 3 The Puzzle of Excessive and Blatant Manipulation; 3.1 Conventional Wisdoms on Electoral Manipulation. 3.2 The First Conventional Wisdom3.3 The Empirical Record; Electoral Manipulation and the Margin of Victory; Tight Races and Electoral Manipulation; Blatant Electoral Manipulation; 3.4 Conclusion: Patterns of Electoral Manipulation; Appendix; 4 More than Winning; 4.1 The Direct and Indirect Effects of Electoral Manipulation; Example: Electoral Manipulation and Union Acquiescence; Example: Electoral Manipulation and Bureaucratic Support; 4.2 Causal Mechanisms Driving Indirect Effects; From Expectations to Political Behavior; From Political Context to Expectations. A Model of Political Action under Electoral ManipulationFrom Electoral Manipulation to the Political Context; Blatant Manipulation and Popularity; The Time Dimension in the Mechanisms; Indirect Effects and the Level of Government; 4.3 Conclusion; Appendix; Generalizing the Concept of Indirect Effects; 5 The Strategic Logic of Electoral Manipulation; A Model of Party Competition with Electoral Manipulation; 5.1 Equilibrium Electoral Manipulation When Only Winning Matters; Aside: Election-Night Fraud; 5.2 Equilibrium Electoral Manipulation When More than Winning Matters. An Example with Specific Functional Forms5.3 Background Conditions, Over-Time Feedbacks, and Patterns of Electoral Manipulation; Institutional Setting and Excessive/Blatant Manipulation; Regime Type and Excessive/Blatant Electoral Manipulation; Feedbacks, Over-Time Dynamics, and the Excessive/Blatant Electoral Manipulation Trap; 5.4 Alternative Explanations for Excessive Electoral Manipulation; Uncertainty; Cost; The Stakes of Office; Keeping the Machine Well Oiled; 6 The Theory at Work; 6.1 Overview: Empirical Implications of the more than winning Theory. |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)826857655 |
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| dewey-ones | 364 - Criminology |
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| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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This book documents the widespread use of blatant and excessive manipulation of elections and explains what drives this practice. Alberto Simpser shows that, in many instances, elections are about more than winning. Electoral manipulation is not only a tool used to gain votes, but also a means of transmitting or distorting information. This manipulation conveys an image of strength, shaping the behavior of citizens, bureaucrats, politicians, parties, unions and businesspeople to the benefit of the manipulators, increasing the scope for the manipulators to pursue their goals while in government and mitigating future challenges to their hold on power. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections provides a general theory about what drives electoral manipulation and empirically documents global patterns of manipulation"--</subfield><subfield code="c">Provided by publisher</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="504" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references and index.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="588" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Print version record.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">List of Figures; List of Tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction and Overview; 1.1 Overview of the Argument and Findings; The Argument in Brief: Electoral Manipulation and Information; Empirical Findings; 1.2 Ramifications of the Argument and Relation to Other Bodies of Work; The Logic of Electoral Manipulation in Authoritarian Systems; Regime Type and Electoral Manipulation; Single-Party Elections and Excessive/Blatant Manipulation; Electoral 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Blatant Electoral Manipulation; 3.4 Conclusion: Patterns of Electoral Manipulation; Appendix; 4 More than Winning; 4.1 The Direct and Indirect Effects of Electoral Manipulation; Example: Electoral Manipulation and Union Acquiescence; Example: Electoral Manipulation and Bureaucratic Support; 4.2 Causal Mechanisms Driving Indirect Effects; From Expectations to Political Behavior; From Political Context to Expectations.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">A Model of Political Action under Electoral ManipulationFrom Electoral Manipulation to the Political Context; Blatant Manipulation and Popularity; The Time Dimension in the Mechanisms; Indirect Effects and the Level of Government; 4.3 Conclusion; Appendix; Generalizing the Concept of Indirect Effects; 5 The Strategic Logic of Electoral Manipulation; A Model of Party Competition with Electoral Manipulation; 5.1 Equilibrium Electoral Manipulation When Only Winning Matters; Aside: Election-Night 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| genre | Electronic book. |
| genre_facet | Electronic book. |
| id | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn826857655 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2025-03-18T14:21:03Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781107306882 1107306884 9781107314634 1107314631 9781139343824 1139343823 9781107309081 1107309085 1107301793 9781107301795 1107302897 9781107302891 1107312434 9781107312432 9781107448681 1107448689 |
| language | English |
| oclc_num | 826857655 |
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| physical | 1 online resource (304 pages) |
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| publishDate | 2013 |
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| series | Political economy of institutions and decisions. |
| series2 | Political economy of institutions and decisions |
| spelling | Simpser, Alberto, 1971- http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2012060938 Why governments and parties manipulate elections : theory, practice, and implications / Alberto Simpser. Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, ©2013. 1 online resource (304 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier data file Political economy of institutions and decisions "Why do parties and governments cheat in elections they cannot lose? This book documents the widespread use of blatant and excessive manipulation of elections and explains what drives this practice. Alberto Simpser shows that, in many instances, elections are about more than winning. Electoral manipulation is not only a tool used to gain votes, but also a means of transmitting or distorting information. This manipulation conveys an image of strength, shaping the behavior of citizens, bureaucrats, politicians, parties, unions and businesspeople to the benefit of the manipulators, increasing the scope for the manipulators to pursue their goals while in government and mitigating future challenges to their hold on power. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections provides a general theory about what drives electoral manipulation and empirically documents global patterns of manipulation"-- Provided by publisher Includes bibliographical references and index. Print version record. List of Figures; List of Tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction and Overview; 1.1 Overview of the Argument and Findings; The Argument in Brief: Electoral Manipulation and Information; Empirical Findings; 1.2 Ramifications of the Argument and Relation to Other Bodies of Work; The Logic of Electoral Manipulation in Authoritarian Systems; Regime Type and Electoral Manipulation; Single-Party Elections and Excessive/Blatant Manipulation; Electoral Manipulation and Popular Rebellion; Electoral Manipulation and the Choice to Hold Elections. The Variety of Tools of Electoral ManipulationAdditional Related Literatures; 1.3 Organization and Chapter-by-Chapter Overview; 2 Electoral Manipulation; 2.1 What Is Electoral Manipulation?; 2.2 Manipulated Elections; 2.3 A Cross-National Measure of Electoral Manipulation; Implementing a Cross-National Measure of Electoral Manipulation; Summary Measures of Electoral Manipulation; 2.4 A Snapshot of Electoral Manipulation Around the World, 1990-2007; Appendix; Additional Notes on the Data; 3 The Puzzle of Excessive and Blatant Manipulation; 3.1 Conventional Wisdoms on Electoral Manipulation. 3.2 The First Conventional Wisdom3.3 The Empirical Record; Electoral Manipulation and the Margin of Victory; Tight Races and Electoral Manipulation; Blatant Electoral Manipulation; 3.4 Conclusion: Patterns of Electoral Manipulation; Appendix; 4 More than Winning; 4.1 The Direct and Indirect Effects of Electoral Manipulation; Example: Electoral Manipulation and Union Acquiescence; Example: Electoral Manipulation and Bureaucratic Support; 4.2 Causal Mechanisms Driving Indirect Effects; From Expectations to Political Behavior; From Political Context to Expectations. A Model of Political Action under Electoral ManipulationFrom Electoral Manipulation to the Political Context; Blatant Manipulation and Popularity; The Time Dimension in the Mechanisms; Indirect Effects and the Level of Government; 4.3 Conclusion; Appendix; Generalizing the Concept of Indirect Effects; 5 The Strategic Logic of Electoral Manipulation; A Model of Party Competition with Electoral Manipulation; 5.1 Equilibrium Electoral Manipulation When Only Winning Matters; Aside: Election-Night Fraud; 5.2 Equilibrium Electoral Manipulation When More than Winning Matters. An Example with Specific Functional Forms5.3 Background Conditions, Over-Time Feedbacks, and Patterns of Electoral Manipulation; Institutional Setting and Excessive/Blatant Manipulation; Regime Type and Excessive/Blatant Electoral Manipulation; Feedbacks, Over-Time Dynamics, and the Excessive/Blatant Electoral Manipulation Trap; 5.4 Alternative Explanations for Excessive Electoral Manipulation; Uncertainty; Cost; The Stakes of Office; Keeping the Machine Well Oiled; 6 The Theory at Work; 6.1 Overview: Empirical Implications of the more than winning Theory. English. Elections Corrupt practices. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85041558 Political corruption. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033057 Corruption électorale. Corruption (Politique) POLITICAL SCIENCE General. bisacsh TRUE CRIME General. bisacsh Elections Corrupt practices fast Political corruption fast Electronic book. has work: Why governments and parties manipulate elections (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGRWqDFBq3QDmcCy6WRPKm https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Simpser, Alberto, 1971- Why governments and parties manipulate elections. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2013 9781107030541 (DLC) 2012036772 (OCoLC)798059516 Political economy of institutions and decisions. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n84729581 |
| spellingShingle | Simpser, Alberto, 1971- Why governments and parties manipulate elections : theory, practice, and implications / Political economy of institutions and decisions. List of Figures; List of Tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction and Overview; 1.1 Overview of the Argument and Findings; The Argument in Brief: Electoral Manipulation and Information; Empirical Findings; 1.2 Ramifications of the Argument and Relation to Other Bodies of Work; The Logic of Electoral Manipulation in Authoritarian Systems; Regime Type and Electoral Manipulation; Single-Party Elections and Excessive/Blatant Manipulation; Electoral Manipulation and Popular Rebellion; Electoral Manipulation and the Choice to Hold Elections. The Variety of Tools of Electoral ManipulationAdditional Related Literatures; 1.3 Organization and Chapter-by-Chapter Overview; 2 Electoral Manipulation; 2.1 What Is Electoral Manipulation?; 2.2 Manipulated Elections; 2.3 A Cross-National Measure of Electoral Manipulation; Implementing a Cross-National Measure of Electoral Manipulation; Summary Measures of Electoral Manipulation; 2.4 A Snapshot of Electoral Manipulation Around the World, 1990-2007; Appendix; Additional Notes on the Data; 3 The Puzzle of Excessive and Blatant Manipulation; 3.1 Conventional Wisdoms on Electoral Manipulation. 3.2 The First Conventional Wisdom3.3 The Empirical Record; Electoral Manipulation and the Margin of Victory; Tight Races and Electoral Manipulation; Blatant Electoral Manipulation; 3.4 Conclusion: Patterns of Electoral Manipulation; Appendix; 4 More than Winning; 4.1 The Direct and Indirect Effects of Electoral Manipulation; Example: Electoral Manipulation and Union Acquiescence; Example: Electoral Manipulation and Bureaucratic Support; 4.2 Causal Mechanisms Driving Indirect Effects; From Expectations to Political Behavior; From Political Context to Expectations. A Model of Political Action under Electoral ManipulationFrom Electoral Manipulation to the Political Context; Blatant Manipulation and Popularity; The Time Dimension in the Mechanisms; Indirect Effects and the Level of Government; 4.3 Conclusion; Appendix; Generalizing the Concept of Indirect Effects; 5 The Strategic Logic of Electoral Manipulation; A Model of Party Competition with Electoral Manipulation; 5.1 Equilibrium Electoral Manipulation When Only Winning Matters; Aside: Election-Night Fraud; 5.2 Equilibrium Electoral Manipulation When More than Winning Matters. An Example with Specific Functional Forms5.3 Background Conditions, Over-Time Feedbacks, and Patterns of Electoral Manipulation; Institutional Setting and Excessive/Blatant Manipulation; Regime Type and Excessive/Blatant Electoral Manipulation; Feedbacks, Over-Time Dynamics, and the Excessive/Blatant Electoral Manipulation Trap; 5.4 Alternative Explanations for Excessive Electoral Manipulation; Uncertainty; Cost; The Stakes of Office; Keeping the Machine Well Oiled; 6 The Theory at Work; 6.1 Overview: Empirical Implications of the more than winning Theory. Elections Corrupt practices. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85041558 Political corruption. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033057 Corruption électorale. Corruption (Politique) POLITICAL SCIENCE General. bisacsh TRUE CRIME General. bisacsh Elections Corrupt practices fast Political corruption fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85041558 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033057 |
| title | Why governments and parties manipulate elections : theory, practice, and implications / |
| title_auth | Why governments and parties manipulate elections : theory, practice, and implications / |
| title_exact_search | Why governments and parties manipulate elections : theory, practice, and implications / |
| title_full | Why governments and parties manipulate elections : theory, practice, and implications / Alberto Simpser. |
| title_fullStr | Why governments and parties manipulate elections : theory, practice, and implications / Alberto Simpser. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Why governments and parties manipulate elections : theory, practice, and implications / Alberto Simpser. |
| title_short | Why governments and parties manipulate elections : |
| title_sort | why governments and parties manipulate elections theory practice and implications |
| title_sub | theory, practice, and implications / |
| topic | Elections Corrupt practices. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85041558 Political corruption. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033057 Corruption électorale. Corruption (Politique) POLITICAL SCIENCE General. bisacsh TRUE CRIME General. bisacsh Elections Corrupt practices fast Political corruption fast |
| topic_facet | Elections Corrupt practices. Political corruption. Corruption électorale. Corruption (Politique) POLITICAL SCIENCE General. TRUE CRIME General. Elections Corrupt practices Political corruption Electronic book. |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT simpseralberto whygovernmentsandpartiesmanipulateelectionstheorypracticeandimplications |