Crisis and escalation in cyberspace /:
"The chances are growing that the United States will find itself in a crisis in cyberspace, with the escalation of tensions associated with a major cyberattack, suspicions that one has taken place, or fears that it might do so soon. The genesis for this work was the broader issue of how the Air...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, CA :
RAND,
[2012]
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The chances are growing that the United States will find itself in a crisis in cyberspace, with the escalation of tensions associated with a major cyberattack, suspicions that one has taken place, or fears that it might do so soon. The genesis for this work was the broader issue of how the Air Force should integrate kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Central to this process was careful consideration of how escalation options and risks should be treated, which, in turn, demanded a broader consideration across the entire crisis-management spectrum. Such crises can be managed by taking steps to reduce the incentives for other states to step into crisis, by controlling the narrative, understanding the stability parameters of the crises, and trying to manage escalation if conflicts arise from crises."--Page 4 of cover. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 9780833076809 0833076809 9780833076816 0833076817 9780833076793 0833076795 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000cam a2200000 i 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn818866398 | ||
| 003 | OCoLC | ||
| 005 | 20241004212047.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
| 007 | cr ||||||||||| | ||
| 008 | 121119s2012 cau ob 000 0 eng | ||
| 010 | |a 2012046778 | ||
| 040 | |a DLC |b eng |e rda |c DLC |d OCLCF |d WSU |d OCLCO |d OCLCL |d UEJ |d OCLCO |d OCLCQ | ||
| 019 | |a 870962829 |a 889303188 |a 961658313 |a 1008953545 |a 1055355245 |a 1058069864 |a 1081246135 |a 1115102694 |a 1228593269 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780833076809 |q (epub) | ||
| 020 | |a 0833076809 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780833076816 |q (prc) | ||
| 020 | |a 0833076817 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780833076793 |q ( ebook/pdf) | ||
| 020 | |a 0833076795 | ||
| 020 | |z 9780833076786 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)818866398 |z (OCoLC)870962829 |z (OCoLC)889303188 |z (OCoLC)961658313 |z (OCoLC)1008953545 |z (OCoLC)1055355245 |z (OCoLC)1058069864 |z (OCoLC)1081246135 |z (OCoLC)1115102694 |z (OCoLC)1228593269 | ||
| 042 | |a pcc | ||
| 043 | |a n-us--- | ||
| 050 | 0 | 0 | |a U163 |
| 082 | 7 | |a 358.4/141 |2 23 | |
| 049 | |a MAIN | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Libicki, Martin C. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Crisis and escalation in cyberspace / |c Martin C. Libicki. |
| 264 | 1 | |a Santa Monica, CA : |b RAND, |c [2012] | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource | ||
| 336 | |a text |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references. | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses. | |
| 588 | |a Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher. | ||
| 520 | |a "The chances are growing that the United States will find itself in a crisis in cyberspace, with the escalation of tensions associated with a major cyberattack, suspicions that one has taken place, or fears that it might do so soon. The genesis for this work was the broader issue of how the Air Force should integrate kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Central to this process was careful consideration of how escalation options and risks should be treated, which, in turn, demanded a broader consideration across the entire crisis-management spectrum. Such crises can be managed by taking steps to reduce the incentives for other states to step into crisis, by controlling the narrative, understanding the stability parameters of the crises, and trying to manage escalation if conflicts arise from crises."--Page 4 of cover. | ||
| 610 | 1 | 0 | |a United States. |b Air Force |x Organization. |
| 610 | 1 | 0 | |a United States. |b Air Force |x Decision making. |
| 610 | 1 | 6 | |a États-Unis. |b Air Force |x Organisation. |
| 610 | 1 | 6 | |a États-Unis. |b Air Force |x Prise de décision. |
| 610 | 1 | 7 | |a United States. |b Air Force |2 fast |
| 650 | 0 | |a Information warfare |z United States. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Escalation (Military science) |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85044774 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Cyberspace |x Security measures. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2021002499 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Crisis management |x Government policy |z United States. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Cyberterrorism |x Prevention. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Conflict management. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85030958 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Guerre de l'information |z États-Unis. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Escalade (Science militaire) | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Gestion de crise |x Politique gouvernementale |z États-Unis. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Gestion des conflits. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Armed Forces |x Organization |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Conflict management |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Cyberspace |x Security measures |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Cyberterrorism |x Prevention |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Escalation (Military science) |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Information warfare |2 fast | |
| 651 | 7 | |a United States |2 fast |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Libicki, Martin C. |t Crisis and escalation in cyberspace |d Santa Monica, CA : RAND, [2012] |z 9780833076786 |w (DLC) 2012046227 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |l FWS01 |p ZDB-4-EBA |q FWS_PDA_EBA |u https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=674641 |3 Volltext |
| 938 | |a Books 24x7 |b B247 |n bkg00062868 | ||
| 938 | |a EBL - Ebook Library |b EBLB |n EBL1365190 | ||
| 938 | |a EBSCOhost |b EBSC |n 674641 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 11090604 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 11425108 | ||
| 994 | |a 92 |b GEBAY | ||
| 912 | |a ZDB-4-EBA | ||
| 049 | |a DE-863 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-FWS_katkey | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn818866398 |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1816882215510867968 |
| adam_text | |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Libicki, Martin C. |
| author_facet | Libicki, Martin C. |
| author_role | |
| author_sort | Libicki, Martin C. |
| author_variant | m c l mc mcl |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | localFWS |
| callnumber-first | U - Military Science |
| callnumber-label | U163 |
| callnumber-raw | U163 |
| callnumber-search | U163 |
| callnumber-sort | U 3163 |
| callnumber-subject | U - General Military Science |
| collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
| contents | Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses. |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)818866398 |
| dewey-full | 358.4/141 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 358 - Air & other specialized forces |
| dewey-raw | 358.4/141 |
| dewey-search | 358.4/141 |
| dewey-sort | 3358.4 3141 |
| dewey-tens | 350 - Public administration and military science |
| discipline | Militärwissenschaft |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>07602cam a2200781 i 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">ZDB-4-EBA-ocn818866398</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">OCoLC</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20241004212047.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="006">m o d </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr |||||||||||</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">121119s2012 cau ob 000 0 eng </controlfield><datafield tag="010" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a"> 2012046778</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DLC</subfield><subfield code="b">eng</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield><subfield code="c">DLC</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCF</subfield><subfield code="d">WSU</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCL</subfield><subfield code="d">UEJ</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="019" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">870962829</subfield><subfield code="a">889303188</subfield><subfield code="a">961658313</subfield><subfield code="a">1008953545</subfield><subfield code="a">1055355245</subfield><subfield code="a">1058069864</subfield><subfield code="a">1081246135</subfield><subfield code="a">1115102694</subfield><subfield code="a">1228593269</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780833076809</subfield><subfield code="q">(epub)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0833076809</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780833076816</subfield><subfield code="q">(prc)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0833076817</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780833076793</subfield><subfield code="q">( ebook/pdf)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0833076795</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="z">9780833076786 (pbk. : alk. paper)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)818866398</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)870962829</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)889303188</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)961658313</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)1008953545</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)1055355245</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)1058069864</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)1081246135</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)1115102694</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)1228593269</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="042" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">pcc</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="043" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">n-us---</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">U163</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">358.4/141</subfield><subfield code="2">23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MAIN</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Libicki, Martin C.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Crisis and escalation in cyberspace /</subfield><subfield code="c">Martin C. Libicki.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Santa Monica, CA :</subfield><subfield code="b">RAND,</subfield><subfield code="c">[2012]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">text</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">computer</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">online resource</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="504" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="588" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"The chances are growing that the United States will find itself in a crisis in cyberspace, with the escalation of tensions associated with a major cyberattack, suspicions that one has taken place, or fears that it might do so soon. The genesis for this work was the broader issue of how the Air Force should integrate kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Central to this process was careful consideration of how escalation options and risks should be treated, which, in turn, demanded a broader consideration across the entire crisis-management spectrum. Such crises can be managed by taking steps to reduce the incentives for other states to step into crisis, by controlling the narrative, understanding the stability parameters of the crises, and trying to manage escalation if conflicts arise from crises."--Page 4 of cover.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="610" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">United States.</subfield><subfield code="b">Air Force</subfield><subfield code="x">Organization.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="610" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">United States.</subfield><subfield code="b">Air Force</subfield><subfield code="x">Decision making.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="610" ind1="1" ind2="6"><subfield code="a">États-Unis.</subfield><subfield code="b">Air Force</subfield><subfield code="x">Organisation.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="610" ind1="1" ind2="6"><subfield code="a">États-Unis.</subfield><subfield code="b">Air Force</subfield><subfield code="x">Prise de décision.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="610" ind1="1" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">United States.</subfield><subfield code="b">Air Force</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Information warfare</subfield><subfield code="z">United States.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Escalation (Military science)</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85044774</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Cyberspace</subfield><subfield code="x">Security measures.</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2021002499</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Crisis management</subfield><subfield code="x">Government policy</subfield><subfield code="z">United States.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Cyberterrorism</subfield><subfield code="x">Prevention.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Conflict management.</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85030958</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Guerre de l'information</subfield><subfield code="z">États-Unis.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Escalade (Science militaire)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Gestion de crise</subfield><subfield code="x">Politique gouvernementale</subfield><subfield code="z">États-Unis.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Gestion des conflits.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Armed Forces</subfield><subfield code="x">Organization</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Conflict management</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Cyberspace</subfield><subfield code="x">Security measures</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Cyberterrorism</subfield><subfield code="x">Prevention</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Escalation (Military science)</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Information warfare</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">United States</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield><subfield code="1">https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Print version:</subfield><subfield code="a">Libicki, Martin C.</subfield><subfield code="t">Crisis and escalation in cyberspace</subfield><subfield code="d">Santa Monica, CA : RAND, [2012]</subfield><subfield code="z">9780833076786</subfield><subfield code="w">(DLC) 2012046227</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="l">FWS01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-4-EBA</subfield><subfield code="q">FWS_PDA_EBA</subfield><subfield code="u">https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=674641</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Books 24x7</subfield><subfield code="b">B247</subfield><subfield code="n">bkg00062868</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBL - Ebook Library</subfield><subfield code="b">EBLB</subfield><subfield code="n">EBL1365190</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBSCOhost</subfield><subfield code="b">EBSC</subfield><subfield code="n">674641</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">YBP Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">YANK</subfield><subfield code="n">11090604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">YBP Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">YANK</subfield><subfield code="n">11425108</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="994" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">92</subfield><subfield code="b">GEBAY</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-4-EBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | United States fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq |
| geographic_facet | United States |
| id | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn818866398 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:25:04Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780833076809 0833076809 9780833076816 0833076817 9780833076793 0833076795 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2012046778 |
| oclc_num | 818866398 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 online resource |
| psigel | ZDB-4-EBA |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publishDateSearch | 2012 |
| publishDateSort | 2012 |
| publisher | RAND, |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Libicki, Martin C. Crisis and escalation in cyberspace / Martin C. Libicki. Santa Monica, CA : RAND, [2012] 1 online resource text rdacontent computer rdamedia online resource rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references. Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses. Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher. "The chances are growing that the United States will find itself in a crisis in cyberspace, with the escalation of tensions associated with a major cyberattack, suspicions that one has taken place, or fears that it might do so soon. The genesis for this work was the broader issue of how the Air Force should integrate kinetic and nonkinetic operations. Central to this process was careful consideration of how escalation options and risks should be treated, which, in turn, demanded a broader consideration across the entire crisis-management spectrum. Such crises can be managed by taking steps to reduce the incentives for other states to step into crisis, by controlling the narrative, understanding the stability parameters of the crises, and trying to manage escalation if conflicts arise from crises."--Page 4 of cover. United States. Air Force Organization. United States. Air Force Decision making. États-Unis. Air Force Organisation. États-Unis. Air Force Prise de décision. United States. Air Force fast Information warfare United States. Escalation (Military science) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85044774 Cyberspace Security measures. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2021002499 Crisis management Government policy United States. Cyberterrorism Prevention. Conflict management. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85030958 Guerre de l'information États-Unis. Escalade (Science militaire) Gestion de crise Politique gouvernementale États-Unis. Gestion des conflits. Armed Forces Organization fast Conflict management fast Cyberspace Security measures fast Cyberterrorism Prevention fast Escalation (Military science) fast Information warfare fast United States fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq Print version: Libicki, Martin C. Crisis and escalation in cyberspace Santa Monica, CA : RAND, [2012] 9780833076786 (DLC) 2012046227 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=674641 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Libicki, Martin C. Crisis and escalation in cyberspace / Avoiding crises by creating norms -- Narratives, dialogues, and signaling -- Escalation management -- Strategic stability -- Conclusions and recommendations for the Air Force -- Introduction -- Some hypothetical crises -- Mutual mistrust is likely to characterize a cyber crisis -- States may have room for maneuver in a cyber crisis -- A note on methodology -- Purpose and organization -- Avoiding crises by creating norms -- What kind of norms might be useful? -- Enforce laws against hacking -- Disassociate from freelance hackers -- Discourage commercial espionage -- Be careful about the obligation to suppress cyber traffic -- How do we enforce norms? -- Confidence-building measures -- Norms for victims of cyberattacks -- Norms for war? -- Deception -- Military necessity and collateral damage -- Proportionality -- Reversibility -- Conclusions -- Narratives, dialogue, and signals -- Narratives to promote control -- A narrative framework for cyberspace -- Victimization, attribution, retaliation, and aggression -- Victimization -- Attribution -- Retaliation -- Aggression -- Emollients: narratives to walk back a crisis -- We did nothing -- Well, at least not on our orders -- It was an accident -- This is nothing new -- At least it does not portend anything -- Broader considerations -- Signals -- Ambiguity in signaling -- Signaling resolve -- Signaling that cyber combat is not kinetic combat -- Conclusions -- Escalation management -- Motives for escalation -- Does escalation matter? -- Escalation risks -- Escalation risks in phase -- Escalation risks for contained local conflicts -- Escalation risks for uncontained conflicts -- Managing proxy cyberattacks -- What hidden combatants imply for horizontal escalation -- Managing overt proxy conflict -- The difficulties of tit-for-tat management -- The importance of pre-planning -- Disjunctions among effort, effect, and perception -- Inadvertent escalation -- Escalation into kinetic warfare -- Escalation into economic warfare -- Sub rosa escalation -- Managing the third-party problem -- The need for a clean shot -- Inference and narrative -- Command and control -- Commanders -- Those they command -- Conclusions -- Implications for strategic stability -- Translating sources of cold war instability to cyberspace -- What influence can cyberwar have if nuclear weapons exist? -- Can cyberwar disarm another state's nuclear capabilities? -- Can cyberwar disarm another states cyberwarriors? -- Does cyberwar lend itself to alert-reaction cycles? -- Are cyberdefenses inherently destabilizing? -- Would a cyberspace arms races be destabilizing? -- Misperception as a source of crisis -- Side takes great exception to cyberespionage -- Defenses are misinterpreted as preparations for war -- Too much confidence in attribution -- Too much confidence in or fear of pre-emption -- Supposedly risk-free cyberattacks -- Neutrality -- Conclusions -- Can cyber crises be managed? -- A. Distributed denial-of-service attacks -- B. Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses -- Can good cyberdefenses discourage attacks? -- Bibliography -- Figures -- Figure 1: Alternative postures for a master cyber narrative -- Figure 2: Sources of imprecision in tit for tat -- Figure 3: An inadvertent path to mutual escalation -- Figure A-1: Configuring networks to limit the damage of DDoS attacks -- Table -- Overt, obvious, and covert cyberattacks and responses. United States. Air Force Organization. United States. Air Force Decision making. États-Unis. Air Force Organisation. États-Unis. Air Force Prise de décision. United States. Air Force fast Information warfare United States. Escalation (Military science) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85044774 Cyberspace Security measures. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2021002499 Crisis management Government policy United States. Cyberterrorism Prevention. Conflict management. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85030958 Guerre de l'information États-Unis. Escalade (Science militaire) Gestion de crise Politique gouvernementale États-Unis. Gestion des conflits. Armed Forces Organization fast Conflict management fast Cyberspace Security measures fast Cyberterrorism Prevention fast Escalation (Military science) fast Information warfare fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85044774 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2021002499 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85030958 |
| title | Crisis and escalation in cyberspace / |
| title_auth | Crisis and escalation in cyberspace / |
| title_exact_search | Crisis and escalation in cyberspace / |
| title_full | Crisis and escalation in cyberspace / Martin C. Libicki. |
| title_fullStr | Crisis and escalation in cyberspace / Martin C. Libicki. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Crisis and escalation in cyberspace / Martin C. Libicki. |
| title_short | Crisis and escalation in cyberspace / |
| title_sort | crisis and escalation in cyberspace |
| topic | United States. Air Force Organization. United States. Air Force Decision making. États-Unis. Air Force Organisation. États-Unis. Air Force Prise de décision. United States. Air Force fast Information warfare United States. Escalation (Military science) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85044774 Cyberspace Security measures. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2021002499 Crisis management Government policy United States. Cyberterrorism Prevention. Conflict management. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85030958 Guerre de l'information États-Unis. Escalade (Science militaire) Gestion de crise Politique gouvernementale États-Unis. Gestion des conflits. Armed Forces Organization fast Conflict management fast Cyberspace Security measures fast Cyberterrorism Prevention fast Escalation (Military science) fast Information warfare fast |
| topic_facet | United States. Air Force Organization. United States. Air Force Decision making. États-Unis. Air Force Organisation. États-Unis. Air Force Prise de décision. United States. Air Force Information warfare United States. Escalation (Military science) Cyberspace Security measures. Crisis management Government policy United States. Cyberterrorism Prevention. Conflict management. Guerre de l'information États-Unis. Escalade (Science militaire) Gestion de crise Politique gouvernementale États-Unis. Gestion des conflits. Armed Forces Organization Conflict management Cyberspace Security measures Cyberterrorism Prevention Information warfare United States |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=674641 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT libickimartinc crisisandescalationincyberspace |