The politics of authoritarian rule /:
"What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule -- the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule -- the problem of a...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
[2012]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule -- the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule -- the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008"-- |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (228 pages) |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 9781139554879 1139554875 9781139549912 113954991X 9781139176040 1139176048 9781139552424 1139552422 1316089967 9781316089965 1139564706 9781139564700 1139551167 9781139551168 9786613887634 6613887633 1139556126 9781139556125 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Svolik, Milan W., |d 1977- |e author. |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjD744VhQM9MPbqYDbC38K |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2012020158 | |
| 245 | 1 | 4 | |a The politics of authoritarian rule / |c Milan W. Svolik, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge : |b Cambridge University Press, |c [2012] | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2012 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (228 pages) | ||
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| 490 | 1 | |a Cambridge studies in comparative politics | |
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a 1. Introduction: the anatomy of dictatorship -- 2. The world of authoritarian politics -- Part I. The problem of authoritarian power-sharing. 3. And then there was one!: Authoritarian power-sharing and the path to personal dictatorship -- 4. When and why institutions contribute to authoritarian stability: commitment, monitoring, and collective action problems in authoritarian power-sharing -- Part II. The problem of authoritarian control. 5. Moral hazard in authoritarian repression and the origins of military dictatorships -- 6. Why authoritarian parties?: the regime party as an instrument of co-optation and control -- 7. Conclusion: incentives and institutions in authoritarian politics. | |
| 520 | |a "What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule -- the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule -- the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008"-- |c Provided by publisher | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 546 | |a English. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Authoritarianism. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85009788 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Authoritarianism |v Case studies. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Autoritarisme. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Autoritarisme |v Études de cas. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x Political Ideologies |x Fascism & Totalitarianism. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Authoritarianism |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Autoritärer Staat |2 gnd |0 http://d-nb.info/gnd/4256521-2 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Diktatur |2 gnd |0 http://d-nb.info/gnd/4149920-7 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Politische Stabilität |2 gnd | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Machtstruktur |2 gnd |0 http://d-nb.info/gnd/4246883-8 | |
| 655 | 7 | |a Case studies |2 fast | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Svolik, Milan W., 1977- |t Politics of authoritarian rule. |d Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, ©2012 |z 9781107024793 |w (DLC) 2012012615 |w (OCoLC)786002522 |
| 830 | 0 | |a Cambridge studies in comparative politics. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n91089840 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |l FWS01 |p ZDB-4-EBA |q FWS_PDA_EBA |u https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=473250 |3 Volltext |
| 880 | 8 | |6 505-00/(S |a 4.2 THE ALLIES' COLLECTIVE-ACTION PROBLEMAND CREDIBLE POWER-SHARING -- 4.3 A FORMAL MODEL -- 4.3.1 Allies' Rebellion as a Collective-Action Problem -- 4.3.2 Authoritarian Power-Sharing without Institutions -- 4.3.3 Authoritarian Power-Sharing with Institutions -- 4.4 POWER-SHARING INSTITUTIONS ANDAUTHORITARIAN STABILITY -- 4.5 CONCLUSION: THE DISTINCTLY AUTHORITARIAN PURPOSEOF NOMINALLY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN DICTATORSHIPS -- 4.6 APPENDIX: PROOFS -- The uniqueness of the equilibrium in Proposition 4.1. -- Comparative static results from Proposition 4.1. -- Forming a larger than minimum ruling coalition κ0. -- PART II THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL -- 5 Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and the Origins of Military Dictatorships -- 5.1 THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM IN AUTHORITARIAN REPRESSION -- 5.2 BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF MILITARY INTERVENTION -- 5.3 A FORMAL MODEL -- 5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS -- 5.5 CONCLUSION: THE POLITICAL PRICE OFAUTHORITARIAN REPRESSION -- 5.6 APPENDIX I: PROOFS -- Comparative statics on α∗ and β∗. -- The government's equilibrium choice of the military's resources r∗. -- 5.7 APPENDIX II: MULTIPLE IMPUTATION -- 6 Why Authoritarian PartiesThe Regime Party as an Instrument of Co-optation and Control -- 6.1 THE LOGIC OF PARTY-BASED AUTHORITARIAN CO-OPTATION -- 6.1.1 Hierarchical Assignment of Service and Benefits -- 6.1.2 Political Control over Appointments -- 6.1.3 Selective Recruitment, Promotion, and Repression -- 6.2 REGIME PARTIES AND AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE -- 6.3 CONCLUSION: WHY AUTHORITARIAN REGIME PARTIES-- 7 Conclusion: Incentives and Institutions in Authoritarian Politics -- 7.1 WHY DICTATORS PRESIDE OVER POLICY DISASTERS. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-FWS_katkey | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn808501315 |
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| adam_text | |
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| author | Svolik, Milan W., 1977- |
| author_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2012020158 |
| author_facet | Svolik, Milan W., 1977- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Svolik, Milan W., 1977- |
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| contents | 1. Introduction: the anatomy of dictatorship -- 2. The world of authoritarian politics -- Part I. The problem of authoritarian power-sharing. 3. And then there was one!: Authoritarian power-sharing and the path to personal dictatorship -- 4. When and why institutions contribute to authoritarian stability: commitment, monitoring, and collective action problems in authoritarian power-sharing -- Part II. The problem of authoritarian control. 5. Moral hazard in authoritarian repression and the origins of military dictatorships -- 6. Why authoritarian parties?: the regime party as an instrument of co-optation and control -- 7. Conclusion: incentives and institutions in authoritarian politics. |
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| dewey-raw | 320.53 |
| dewey-search | 320.53 |
| dewey-sort | 3320.53 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
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-- Comparative static results from Proposition 4.1. -- Forming a larger than minimum ruling coalition κ0. -- PART II THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL -- 5 Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and the Origins of Military Dictatorships -- 5.1 THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM IN AUTHORITARIAN REPRESSION -- 5.2 BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF MILITARY INTERVENTION -- 5.3 A FORMAL MODEL -- 5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS -- 5.5 CONCLUSION: THE POLITICAL PRICE OFAUTHORITARIAN REPRESSION -- 5.6 APPENDIX I: PROOFS -- Comparative statics on α∗ and β∗. -- The government's equilibrium choice of the military's resources r∗. -- 5.7 APPENDIX II: MULTIPLE IMPUTATION -- 6 Why Authoritarian PartiesThe Regime Party as an Instrument of Co-optation and Control -- 6.1 THE LOGIC OF PARTY-BASED AUTHORITARIAN CO-OPTATION -- 6.1.1 Hierarchical Assignment of Service and Benefits -- 6.1.2 Political Control over Appointments -- 6.1.3 Selective Recruitment, Promotion, and Repression -- 6.2 REGIME PARTIES AND AUTHORITARIAN 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| genre | Case studies fast |
| genre_facet | Case studies |
| id | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn808501315 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:24:55Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781139554879 1139554875 9781139549912 113954991X 9781139176040 1139176048 9781139552424 1139552422 1316089967 9781316089965 1139564706 9781139564700 1139551167 9781139551168 9786613887634 6613887633 1139556126 9781139556125 |
| language | English |
| oclc_num | 808501315 |
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| physical | 1 online resource (228 pages) |
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| publishDate | 2012 |
| publishDateSearch | 2012 |
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| publisher | Cambridge University Press, |
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| series | Cambridge studies in comparative politics. |
| series2 | Cambridge studies in comparative politics |
| spelling | Svolik, Milan W., 1977- author. https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjD744VhQM9MPbqYDbC38K http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2012020158 The politics of authoritarian rule / Milan W. Svolik, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, [2012] ©2012 1 online resource (228 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier data file Cambridge studies in comparative politics Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Introduction: the anatomy of dictatorship -- 2. The world of authoritarian politics -- Part I. The problem of authoritarian power-sharing. 3. And then there was one!: Authoritarian power-sharing and the path to personal dictatorship -- 4. When and why institutions contribute to authoritarian stability: commitment, monitoring, and collective action problems in authoritarian power-sharing -- Part II. The problem of authoritarian control. 5. Moral hazard in authoritarian repression and the origins of military dictatorships -- 6. Why authoritarian parties?: the regime party as an instrument of co-optation and control -- 7. Conclusion: incentives and institutions in authoritarian politics. "What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule -- the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule -- the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008"-- Provided by publisher Print version record. English. Authoritarianism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85009788 Authoritarianism Case studies. Autoritarisme. Autoritarisme Études de cas. POLITICAL SCIENCE General. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Ideologies Fascism & Totalitarianism. bisacsh Authoritarianism fast Autoritärer Staat gnd http://d-nb.info/gnd/4256521-2 Diktatur gnd http://d-nb.info/gnd/4149920-7 Politische Stabilität gnd Machtstruktur gnd http://d-nb.info/gnd/4246883-8 Case studies fast Print version: Svolik, Milan W., 1977- Politics of authoritarian rule. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, ©2012 9781107024793 (DLC) 2012012615 (OCoLC)786002522 Cambridge studies in comparative politics. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n91089840 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=473250 Volltext 505-00/(S 4.2 THE ALLIES' COLLECTIVE-ACTION PROBLEMAND CREDIBLE POWER-SHARING -- 4.3 A FORMAL MODEL -- 4.3.1 Allies' Rebellion as a Collective-Action Problem -- 4.3.2 Authoritarian Power-Sharing without Institutions -- 4.3.3 Authoritarian Power-Sharing with Institutions -- 4.4 POWER-SHARING INSTITUTIONS ANDAUTHORITARIAN STABILITY -- 4.5 CONCLUSION: THE DISTINCTLY AUTHORITARIAN PURPOSEOF NOMINALLY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN DICTATORSHIPS -- 4.6 APPENDIX: PROOFS -- The uniqueness of the equilibrium in Proposition 4.1. -- Comparative static results from Proposition 4.1. -- Forming a larger than minimum ruling coalition κ0. -- PART II THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL -- 5 Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and the Origins of Military Dictatorships -- 5.1 THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM IN AUTHORITARIAN REPRESSION -- 5.2 BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF MILITARY INTERVENTION -- 5.3 A FORMAL MODEL -- 5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS -- 5.5 CONCLUSION: THE POLITICAL PRICE OFAUTHORITARIAN REPRESSION -- 5.6 APPENDIX I: PROOFS -- Comparative statics on α∗ and β∗. -- The government's equilibrium choice of the military's resources r∗. -- 5.7 APPENDIX II: MULTIPLE IMPUTATION -- 6 Why Authoritarian PartiesThe Regime Party as an Instrument of Co-optation and Control -- 6.1 THE LOGIC OF PARTY-BASED AUTHORITARIAN CO-OPTATION -- 6.1.1 Hierarchical Assignment of Service and Benefits -- 6.1.2 Political Control over Appointments -- 6.1.3 Selective Recruitment, Promotion, and Repression -- 6.2 REGIME PARTIES AND AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE -- 6.3 CONCLUSION: WHY AUTHORITARIAN REGIME PARTIES-- 7 Conclusion: Incentives and Institutions in Authoritarian Politics -- 7.1 WHY DICTATORS PRESIDE OVER POLICY DISASTERS. |
| spellingShingle | Svolik, Milan W., 1977- The politics of authoritarian rule / Cambridge studies in comparative politics. 1. Introduction: the anatomy of dictatorship -- 2. The world of authoritarian politics -- Part I. The problem of authoritarian power-sharing. 3. And then there was one!: Authoritarian power-sharing and the path to personal dictatorship -- 4. When and why institutions contribute to authoritarian stability: commitment, monitoring, and collective action problems in authoritarian power-sharing -- Part II. The problem of authoritarian control. 5. Moral hazard in authoritarian repression and the origins of military dictatorships -- 6. Why authoritarian parties?: the regime party as an instrument of co-optation and control -- 7. Conclusion: incentives and institutions in authoritarian politics. Authoritarianism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85009788 Authoritarianism Case studies. Autoritarisme. Autoritarisme Études de cas. POLITICAL SCIENCE General. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Ideologies Fascism & Totalitarianism. bisacsh Authoritarianism fast Autoritärer Staat gnd http://d-nb.info/gnd/4256521-2 Diktatur gnd http://d-nb.info/gnd/4149920-7 Politische Stabilität gnd Machtstruktur gnd http://d-nb.info/gnd/4246883-8 |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85009788 http://d-nb.info/gnd/4256521-2 http://d-nb.info/gnd/4149920-7 http://d-nb.info/gnd/4246883-8 |
| title | The politics of authoritarian rule / |
| title_auth | The politics of authoritarian rule / |
| title_exact_search | The politics of authoritarian rule / |
| title_full | The politics of authoritarian rule / Milan W. Svolik, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. |
| title_fullStr | The politics of authoritarian rule / Milan W. Svolik, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. |
| title_full_unstemmed | The politics of authoritarian rule / Milan W. Svolik, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. |
| title_short | The politics of authoritarian rule / |
| title_sort | politics of authoritarian rule |
| topic | Authoritarianism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85009788 Authoritarianism Case studies. Autoritarisme. Autoritarisme Études de cas. POLITICAL SCIENCE General. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Ideologies Fascism & Totalitarianism. bisacsh Authoritarianism fast Autoritärer Staat gnd http://d-nb.info/gnd/4256521-2 Diktatur gnd http://d-nb.info/gnd/4149920-7 Politische Stabilität gnd Machtstruktur gnd http://d-nb.info/gnd/4246883-8 |
| topic_facet | Authoritarianism. Authoritarianism Case studies. Autoritarisme. Autoritarisme Études de cas. POLITICAL SCIENCE General. POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Ideologies Fascism & Totalitarianism. Authoritarianism Autoritärer Staat Diktatur Politische Stabilität Machtstruktur Case studies |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=473250 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT svolikmilanw thepoliticsofauthoritarianrule AT svolikmilanw politicsofauthoritarianrule |