Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to explain rationality by viewing the mind as a kind of machine--the only alternative, it has seemed, to a ghostly supernatural explanation. Marcus rejects this choice as false and defends a third way--via rational causation, which draws on the theoretical and...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Marcus, Eric, 1968-
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2012.
Schlagworte:	Causation. Agent (Philosophy) Act (Philosophy) Action (Philosophie) PHILOSOPHY > Epistemology. PHILOSOPHY > Metaphysics. Causation
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to explain rationality by viewing the mind as a kind of machine--the only alternative, it has seemed, to a ghostly supernatural explanation. Marcus rejects this choice as false and defends a third way--via rational causation, which draws on the theoretical and practical inferential abilities of human beings. We explain what people think and do by citing their reasons, but how do such explanations work, and what do they tell us about the nature of reality? Contemporary efforts to address these questions are often motivated by the worry that our ordinary conception of rationality contains a kernel of supernaturalism--a ghostly presence that meditates on sensory messages and orchestrates behavior on the basis of its ethereal calculations. In shunning this otherworldly conception, contemporary philosophers have focused on the project of "naturalizing" the mind, viewing it as a kind of machine that converts sensory input and bodily impulse into thought and action. Eric Marcus rejects this choice between physicalism and supernaturalism as false and defends a third way. He argues that philosophers have failed to take seriously the idea that rational explanations postulate a distinctive sort of causation--rational causation. Rational explanations do not reveal the same sorts of causal connections that explanations in the natural sciences do. Rather, rational causation draws on the theoretical and practical inferential abilities of human beings. Marcus defends this position against a wide array of physicalist arguments that have captivated philosophers of mind for decades. Along the way he provides novel views on, for example, the difference between rational and nonrational animals and the distinction between states and events
Beschreibung:	1 online resource (ix, 266 pages)
Bibliographie:	Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:	9780674068742 0674068742 9780674065338 0674065336