New Perspectives on Type Identity :: the Mental and the Physical.
Argues that many mental states, including such conscious states as perceptual experiences and bodily sensations, are identical with brain states.
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Weitere Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2012.
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Argues that many mental states, including such conscious states as perceptual experiences and bodily sensations, are identical with brain states. |
| Beschreibung: | 8 conclusion. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (306 pages) |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| ISBN: | 9781139338349 113933834X 9781139336604 1139336606 9780511687068 0511687060 1139334107 9781139334105 1107226422 9781107226425 1280393890 9781280393891 9786613571816 6613571814 1139337475 9781139337472 1139339923 9781139339926 1139341502 9781139341509 9781107515420 1107515424 |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Gozzano, Simone. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a New Perspectives on Type Identity : |b the Mental and the Physical. |
| 260 | |a Cambridge : |b Cambridge University Press, |c 2012. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (306 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
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| 505 | 0 | |a Cover; NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TYPE IDENTITY; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Contributors; Acknowledgements; Introduction; I; II; III; IV; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 1: Acquaintance and the mind-body problem; 1 PHYSICALISM, DUALISM, AND THE ZOMBIE ARGUMENT; 2 DESIDERATA FOR AN ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 3 THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 4 THE QUOTATIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 5 CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 2: Identity, reduction, and conserved mechanisms: perspectives from circadian rhythm research; IDENTITY, REDUCTION, AND MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a THE MULTIPLE REALIZATION OBJECTION VIEWED FROM A MECHANISTIC PERSPECTIVEMODEL SYSTEMS, CONSERVED MECHANISMS, AND MULTIPLE REALIZATION; CONCLUSIONS; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 3: Property identity and reductive explanation; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 4: A brief history of neuroscience's actual influences on mind-brain reductionism; 1 TRANSLATIONAL REDUCTION; 2 INTERTHEORETIC REDUCTION; 3 FUNCTIONAL REDUCTION; 4 METASCIENTIFIC REDUCTION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 5: Type-identity conditions for phenomenal properties; KRIPKE'S SEMANTICS; THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ARGUMENT; OBJECTING TO KRIPKE'S ARGUMENT. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a THE IDENTITY OF PHENOMENAL PROPERTIESSTIPULATION AND GOD; STEPS TOWARD TYPE IDENTITY; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 6: Locating qualia: do they reside in the brain or in the body and the world?; I INTRODUCTION; II CORRELATIONS; III SIX STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING THEPERIPHERAL STATE THEORY; IV THE EXPERIENTIAL CHARACTER OF QUALITATIVE AWARENESS; V CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 7: In defence of the identity theory mark I; 1 PREAMBLE; 2 THE TYPE-TYPE IDENTITY THEORY: EARLY EXPOSITIONS; 3 REALISM ABOUT MENTAL STATES AND FUNCTIONALISM; 4 BACK TO OUR THREE QUESTIONS. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 5 MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY AND THE IDENTITY THEORY: FIRST PASS6 WHY FUNCTIONALISTS HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE A FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN M AND BEING IN M; 7 HOW TYPES CAN BE INSIDE US; 8 THE CAUSAL ROLE OF MENTAL PROPERTIES; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 8: The very idea of token physicalism; I; II; III; IV; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 9: About face: philosophical naturalism, the heuristic identity theory, and recent findings about prosopagnosia; 1 INTRODUCTION; 2 A NATURALISTIC TAKE ON ASSESSING THE IDENTITY THEORY; 3 HEURISTIC IDENTITY THEORY; 4 LOCALIZING HUMAN FACE PERCEPTION IN THE BRAIN; REFERENCES. | |
| 505 | 8 | |a CHAPTER 10: On justifying neurobiologicalism for consciousnessI PRELIMINARIES; II EXPLAINING AWAY THE APPEARANCE OF CONTINGENCY OF A K-IDENTITY STATEMENT; III JUSTIFICATION WITHOUT REDUCTIVEEXPLANATION VIA CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS; IV K-IDENTITY STATEMENTS AND EXPLANATION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 11: The causal contribution of mental events; 1 INTRODUCTION; 2 KIM'S ARGUMENT; 3 RESPONSES TO KIM'S ARGUMENT; 4 ARE THE PRODUCTION AND COUNTERFACTUAL ACCOUNTS OF CAUSATION COMPETITORS?; 5 WHICH PROJECT IS RELEVANT TO OUR DEBATE?; 6 NO CAUSATION IN PHYSICS?; 7 CAUSAL CLOSURE AND WHAT IT IS TO BE A PHYSICALIST. | |
| 500 | |a 8 conclusion. | ||
| 520 | |a Argues that many mental states, including such conscious states as perceptual experiences and bodily sensations, are identical with brain states. | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
| 546 | |a English. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Dualism. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85039847 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Typology (Psychology) |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85139175 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Materialism. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85082063 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Dualisme. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Typologie (Psychologie) | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Matérialisme. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a dualism. |2 aat | |
| 650 | 7 | |a materialism (philosophical movement) |2 aat | |
| 650 | 7 | |a PHILOSOPHY |x Mind & Body. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Dualism |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Materialism |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Typology (Psychology) |2 fast | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Hill, Christopher S. | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Gozzano, Simone. |t New Perspectives on Type Identity : The Mental and the Physical. |d Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, ©2012 |z 9781107000148 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-FWS_katkey | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn792684343 |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1816881792995557377 |
| adam_text | |
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| author | Gozzano, Simone |
| author2 | Hill, Christopher S. |
| author2_role | |
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| author_facet | Gozzano, Simone Hill, Christopher S. |
| author_role | |
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| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | localFWS |
| callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
| callnumber-label | B812 |
| callnumber-raw | B812 .N49 2012 |
| callnumber-search | B812 .N49 2012 |
| callnumber-sort | B 3812 N49 42012 |
| callnumber-subject | B - Philosophy |
| collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
| contents | Cover; NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TYPE IDENTITY; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Contributors; Acknowledgements; Introduction; I; II; III; IV; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 1: Acquaintance and the mind-body problem; 1 PHYSICALISM, DUALISM, AND THE ZOMBIE ARGUMENT; 2 DESIDERATA FOR AN ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 3 THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 4 THE QUOTATIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 5 CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 2: Identity, reduction, and conserved mechanisms: perspectives from circadian rhythm research; IDENTITY, REDUCTION, AND MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION. THE MULTIPLE REALIZATION OBJECTION VIEWED FROM A MECHANISTIC PERSPECTIVEMODEL SYSTEMS, CONSERVED MECHANISMS, AND MULTIPLE REALIZATION; CONCLUSIONS; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 3: Property identity and reductive explanation; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 4: A brief history of neuroscience's actual influences on mind-brain reductionism; 1 TRANSLATIONAL REDUCTION; 2 INTERTHEORETIC REDUCTION; 3 FUNCTIONAL REDUCTION; 4 METASCIENTIFIC REDUCTION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 5: Type-identity conditions for phenomenal properties; KRIPKE'S SEMANTICS; THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ARGUMENT; OBJECTING TO KRIPKE'S ARGUMENT. THE IDENTITY OF PHENOMENAL PROPERTIESSTIPULATION AND GOD; STEPS TOWARD TYPE IDENTITY; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 6: Locating qualia: do they reside in the brain or in the body and the world?; I INTRODUCTION; II CORRELATIONS; III SIX STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING THEPERIPHERAL STATE THEORY; IV THE EXPERIENTIAL CHARACTER OF QUALITATIVE AWARENESS; V CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 7: In defence of the identity theory mark I; 1 PREAMBLE; 2 THE TYPE-TYPE IDENTITY THEORY: EARLY EXPOSITIONS; 3 REALISM ABOUT MENTAL STATES AND FUNCTIONALISM; 4 BACK TO OUR THREE QUESTIONS. 5 MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY AND THE IDENTITY THEORY: FIRST PASS6 WHY FUNCTIONALISTS HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE A FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN M AND BEING IN M; 7 HOW TYPES CAN BE INSIDE US; 8 THE CAUSAL ROLE OF MENTAL PROPERTIES; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 8: The very idea of token physicalism; I; II; III; IV; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 9: About face: philosophical naturalism, the heuristic identity theory, and recent findings about prosopagnosia; 1 INTRODUCTION; 2 A NATURALISTIC TAKE ON ASSESSING THE IDENTITY THEORY; 3 HEURISTIC IDENTITY THEORY; 4 LOCALIZING HUMAN FACE PERCEPTION IN THE BRAIN; REFERENCES. CHAPTER 10: On justifying neurobiologicalism for consciousnessI PRELIMINARIES; II EXPLAINING AWAY THE APPEARANCE OF CONTINGENCY OF A K-IDENTITY STATEMENT; III JUSTIFICATION WITHOUT REDUCTIVEEXPLANATION VIA CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS; IV K-IDENTITY STATEMENTS AND EXPLANATION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 11: The causal contribution of mental events; 1 INTRODUCTION; 2 KIM'S ARGUMENT; 3 RESPONSES TO KIM'S ARGUMENT; 4 ARE THE PRODUCTION AND COUNTERFACTUAL ACCOUNTS OF CAUSATION COMPETITORS?; 5 WHICH PROJECT IS RELEVANT TO OUR DEBATE?; 6 NO CAUSATION IN PHYSICS?; 7 CAUSAL CLOSURE AND WHAT IT IS TO BE A PHYSICALIST. |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)792684343 |
| dewey-full | 128.2 128/.2 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 128 - Humankind |
| dewey-raw | 128.2 128/.2 |
| dewey-search | 128.2 128/.2 |
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| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
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ARGUMENT.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">THE IDENTITY OF PHENOMENAL PROPERTIESSTIPULATION AND GOD; STEPS TOWARD TYPE IDENTITY; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 6: Locating qualia: do they reside in the brain or in the body and the world?; I INTRODUCTION; II CORRELATIONS; III SIX STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING THEPERIPHERAL STATE THEORY; IV THE EXPERIENTIAL CHARACTER OF QUALITATIVE AWARENESS; V CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 7: In defence of the identity theory mark I; 1 PREAMBLE; 2 THE TYPE-TYPE IDENTITY THEORY: EARLY EXPOSITIONS; 3 REALISM ABOUT MENTAL STATES AND FUNCTIONALISM; 4 BACK TO OUR THREE QUESTIONS.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">5 MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY AND THE IDENTITY THEORY: FIRST PASS6 WHY FUNCTIONALISTS HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE A FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN M AND BEING IN M; 7 HOW TYPES CAN BE INSIDE US; 8 THE CAUSAL ROLE OF MENTAL PROPERTIES; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 8: The very idea of token physicalism; I; II; III; IV; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 9: About face: philosophical naturalism, the heuristic identity theory, and recent findings about prosopagnosia; 1 INTRODUCTION; 2 A NATURALISTIC TAKE ON ASSESSING THE IDENTITY THEORY; 3 HEURISTIC IDENTITY THEORY; 4 LOCALIZING HUMAN FACE PERCEPTION IN THE BRAIN; REFERENCES.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">CHAPTER 10: On justifying neurobiologicalism for consciousnessI PRELIMINARIES; II EXPLAINING AWAY THE APPEARANCE OF CONTINGENCY OF A K-IDENTITY STATEMENT; III JUSTIFICATION WITHOUT REDUCTIVEEXPLANATION VIA CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS; IV K-IDENTITY STATEMENTS AND EXPLANATION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 11: The causal contribution of mental events; 1 INTRODUCTION; 2 KIM'S ARGUMENT; 3 RESPONSES TO KIM'S ARGUMENT; 4 ARE THE PRODUCTION AND COUNTERFACTUAL ACCOUNTS OF CAUSATION COMPETITORS?; 5 WHICH PROJECT IS RELEVANT TO OUR DEBATE?; 6 NO CAUSATION IN PHYSICS?; 7 CAUSAL CLOSURE AND WHAT IT IS TO BE A 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| id | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn792684343 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:18:21Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781139338349 113933834X 9781139336604 1139336606 9780511687068 0511687060 1139334107 9781139334105 1107226422 9781107226425 1280393890 9781280393891 9786613571816 6613571814 1139337475 9781139337472 1139339923 9781139339926 1139341502 9781139341509 9781107515420 1107515424 |
| language | English |
| oclc_num | 792684343 |
| open_access_boolean | |
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| owner_facet | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 online resource (306 pages) |
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| publishDate | 2012 |
| publishDateSearch | 2012 |
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| publisher | Cambridge University Press, |
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| spelling | Gozzano, Simone. New Perspectives on Type Identity : the Mental and the Physical. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2012. 1 online resource (306 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Cover; NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TYPE IDENTITY; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Contributors; Acknowledgements; Introduction; I; II; III; IV; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 1: Acquaintance and the mind-body problem; 1 PHYSICALISM, DUALISM, AND THE ZOMBIE ARGUMENT; 2 DESIDERATA FOR AN ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 3 THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 4 THE QUOTATIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 5 CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 2: Identity, reduction, and conserved mechanisms: perspectives from circadian rhythm research; IDENTITY, REDUCTION, AND MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION. THE MULTIPLE REALIZATION OBJECTION VIEWED FROM A MECHANISTIC PERSPECTIVEMODEL SYSTEMS, CONSERVED MECHANISMS, AND MULTIPLE REALIZATION; CONCLUSIONS; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 3: Property identity and reductive explanation; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 4: A brief history of neuroscience's actual influences on mind-brain reductionism; 1 TRANSLATIONAL REDUCTION; 2 INTERTHEORETIC REDUCTION; 3 FUNCTIONAL REDUCTION; 4 METASCIENTIFIC REDUCTION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 5: Type-identity conditions for phenomenal properties; KRIPKE'S SEMANTICS; THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ARGUMENT; OBJECTING TO KRIPKE'S ARGUMENT. THE IDENTITY OF PHENOMENAL PROPERTIESSTIPULATION AND GOD; STEPS TOWARD TYPE IDENTITY; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 6: Locating qualia: do they reside in the brain or in the body and the world?; I INTRODUCTION; II CORRELATIONS; III SIX STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING THEPERIPHERAL STATE THEORY; IV THE EXPERIENTIAL CHARACTER OF QUALITATIVE AWARENESS; V CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 7: In defence of the identity theory mark I; 1 PREAMBLE; 2 THE TYPE-TYPE IDENTITY THEORY: EARLY EXPOSITIONS; 3 REALISM ABOUT MENTAL STATES AND FUNCTIONALISM; 4 BACK TO OUR THREE QUESTIONS. 5 MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY AND THE IDENTITY THEORY: FIRST PASS6 WHY FUNCTIONALISTS HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE A FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN M AND BEING IN M; 7 HOW TYPES CAN BE INSIDE US; 8 THE CAUSAL ROLE OF MENTAL PROPERTIES; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 8: The very idea of token physicalism; I; II; III; IV; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 9: About face: philosophical naturalism, the heuristic identity theory, and recent findings about prosopagnosia; 1 INTRODUCTION; 2 A NATURALISTIC TAKE ON ASSESSING THE IDENTITY THEORY; 3 HEURISTIC IDENTITY THEORY; 4 LOCALIZING HUMAN FACE PERCEPTION IN THE BRAIN; REFERENCES. CHAPTER 10: On justifying neurobiologicalism for consciousnessI PRELIMINARIES; II EXPLAINING AWAY THE APPEARANCE OF CONTINGENCY OF A K-IDENTITY STATEMENT; III JUSTIFICATION WITHOUT REDUCTIVEEXPLANATION VIA CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS; IV K-IDENTITY STATEMENTS AND EXPLANATION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 11: The causal contribution of mental events; 1 INTRODUCTION; 2 KIM'S ARGUMENT; 3 RESPONSES TO KIM'S ARGUMENT; 4 ARE THE PRODUCTION AND COUNTERFACTUAL ACCOUNTS OF CAUSATION COMPETITORS?; 5 WHICH PROJECT IS RELEVANT TO OUR DEBATE?; 6 NO CAUSATION IN PHYSICS?; 7 CAUSAL CLOSURE AND WHAT IT IS TO BE A PHYSICALIST. 8 conclusion. Argues that many mental states, including such conscious states as perceptual experiences and bodily sensations, are identical with brain states. Print version record. Includes bibliographical references and index. English. Dualism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85039847 Typology (Psychology) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85139175 Materialism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85082063 Dualisme. Typologie (Psychologie) Matérialisme. dualism. aat materialism (philosophical movement) aat PHILOSOPHY Mind & Body. bisacsh Dualism fast Materialism fast Typology (Psychology) fast Hill, Christopher S. Print version: Gozzano, Simone. New Perspectives on Type Identity : The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, ©2012 9781107000148 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=438985 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Gozzano, Simone New Perspectives on Type Identity : the Mental and the Physical. Cover; NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TYPE IDENTITY; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Contributors; Acknowledgements; Introduction; I; II; III; IV; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 1: Acquaintance and the mind-body problem; 1 PHYSICALISM, DUALISM, AND THE ZOMBIE ARGUMENT; 2 DESIDERATA FOR AN ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 3 THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 4 THE QUOTATIONAL ACCOUNT OF PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS; 5 CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 2: Identity, reduction, and conserved mechanisms: perspectives from circadian rhythm research; IDENTITY, REDUCTION, AND MECHANISTIC EXPLANATION. THE MULTIPLE REALIZATION OBJECTION VIEWED FROM A MECHANISTIC PERSPECTIVEMODEL SYSTEMS, CONSERVED MECHANISMS, AND MULTIPLE REALIZATION; CONCLUSIONS; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 3: Property identity and reductive explanation; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 4: A brief history of neuroscience's actual influences on mind-brain reductionism; 1 TRANSLATIONAL REDUCTION; 2 INTERTHEORETIC REDUCTION; 3 FUNCTIONAL REDUCTION; 4 METASCIENTIFIC REDUCTION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 5: Type-identity conditions for phenomenal properties; KRIPKE'S SEMANTICS; THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ARGUMENT; OBJECTING TO KRIPKE'S ARGUMENT. THE IDENTITY OF PHENOMENAL PROPERTIESSTIPULATION AND GOD; STEPS TOWARD TYPE IDENTITY; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 6: Locating qualia: do they reside in the brain or in the body and the world?; I INTRODUCTION; II CORRELATIONS; III SIX STRATEGIES FOR DEFENDING THEPERIPHERAL STATE THEORY; IV THE EXPERIENTIAL CHARACTER OF QUALITATIVE AWARENESS; V CONCLUSION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 7: In defence of the identity theory mark I; 1 PREAMBLE; 2 THE TYPE-TYPE IDENTITY THEORY: EARLY EXPOSITIONS; 3 REALISM ABOUT MENTAL STATES AND FUNCTIONALISM; 4 BACK TO OUR THREE QUESTIONS. 5 MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY AND THE IDENTITY THEORY: FIRST PASS6 WHY FUNCTIONALISTS HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE A FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN M AND BEING IN M; 7 HOW TYPES CAN BE INSIDE US; 8 THE CAUSAL ROLE OF MENTAL PROPERTIES; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 8: The very idea of token physicalism; I; II; III; IV; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 9: About face: philosophical naturalism, the heuristic identity theory, and recent findings about prosopagnosia; 1 INTRODUCTION; 2 A NATURALISTIC TAKE ON ASSESSING THE IDENTITY THEORY; 3 HEURISTIC IDENTITY THEORY; 4 LOCALIZING HUMAN FACE PERCEPTION IN THE BRAIN; REFERENCES. CHAPTER 10: On justifying neurobiologicalism for consciousnessI PRELIMINARIES; II EXPLAINING AWAY THE APPEARANCE OF CONTINGENCY OF A K-IDENTITY STATEMENT; III JUSTIFICATION WITHOUT REDUCTIVEEXPLANATION VIA CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS; IV K-IDENTITY STATEMENTS AND EXPLANATION; REFERENCES; CHAPTER 11: The causal contribution of mental events; 1 INTRODUCTION; 2 KIM'S ARGUMENT; 3 RESPONSES TO KIM'S ARGUMENT; 4 ARE THE PRODUCTION AND COUNTERFACTUAL ACCOUNTS OF CAUSATION COMPETITORS?; 5 WHICH PROJECT IS RELEVANT TO OUR DEBATE?; 6 NO CAUSATION IN PHYSICS?; 7 CAUSAL CLOSURE AND WHAT IT IS TO BE A PHYSICALIST. Dualism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85039847 Typology (Psychology) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85139175 Materialism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85082063 Dualisme. Typologie (Psychologie) Matérialisme. dualism. aat materialism (philosophical movement) aat PHILOSOPHY Mind & Body. bisacsh Dualism fast Materialism fast Typology (Psychology) fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85039847 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85139175 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85082063 |
| title | New Perspectives on Type Identity : the Mental and the Physical. |
| title_auth | New Perspectives on Type Identity : the Mental and the Physical. |
| title_exact_search | New Perspectives on Type Identity : the Mental and the Physical. |
| title_full | New Perspectives on Type Identity : the Mental and the Physical. |
| title_fullStr | New Perspectives on Type Identity : the Mental and the Physical. |
| title_full_unstemmed | New Perspectives on Type Identity : the Mental and the Physical. |
| title_short | New Perspectives on Type Identity : |
| title_sort | new perspectives on type identity the mental and the physical |
| title_sub | the Mental and the Physical. |
| topic | Dualism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85039847 Typology (Psychology) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85139175 Materialism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85082063 Dualisme. Typologie (Psychologie) Matérialisme. dualism. aat materialism (philosophical movement) aat PHILOSOPHY Mind & Body. bisacsh Dualism fast Materialism fast Typology (Psychology) fast |
| topic_facet | Dualism. Typology (Psychology) Materialism. Dualisme. Typologie (Psychologie) Matérialisme. dualism. materialism (philosophical movement) PHILOSOPHY Mind & Body. Dualism Materialism |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=438985 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gozzanosimone newperspectivesontypeidentitythementalandthephysical AT hillchristophers newperspectivesontypeidentitythementalandthephysical |