Monitoring democracy :: when international election observation works, and why it often fails /
In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessment...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Princeton :
Princeton University Press,
2012.
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monitoring Democracy argues that the practice of international election monitoring is broken, but still worth fixing. By analyzing the evolving interaction. |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (359 pages) |
Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
ISBN: | 9781400842520 1400842522 9780691152776 0691152772 9780691152783 0691152780 |
Internformat
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245 | 1 | 0 | |a Monitoring democracy : |b when international election observation works, and why it often fails / |c Judith G. Kelley. |
260 | |a Princeton : |b Princeton University Press, |c 2012. | ||
300 | |a 1 online resource (359 pages) | ||
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505 | 0 | |a Cover; Contents; Illustrations; Tables; Preface; Abbreviations; PART I; CHAPTER 1: Introduction; Two Questions; Methods of Analysis; CHAPTER 2: The Rise of a New Norm; The Changing Normative Environment; Contestation; Increased Supply and Demand; The Popularization of Monitoring; Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation; Summary; CHAPTER 3: The Shadow Market; Disagreements about Contested Elections; Who Invites Whom?; Discussion; CHAPTER 4: What Influences Monitors' Assessments?; Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments; Five Types of Bias; Discussion. | |
505 | 8 | |a CHAPTER 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism?What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor-Induced Shift?; What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating?; Data: The Varieties of Irregularities; The Record; Discussion; PART II; CHAPTER 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement; Altering Incentives to Cheat; Altering Domestic Conditions; If It Works, When Should It Work?; Summary; CHAPTER 7: Are Monitored Elections Better?; Measures of Election Quality; An Overview of the Record; Statistical Analysis; Discussion; CHAPTER 8: Long-Term Effects; Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis. | |
505 | 8 | |a Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time?When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors?; Discussion; CONCLUSION: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly; Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively?; Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections?; Closing Thoughts; Appendix A: Data Description; Two Datasets; Variables; Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3; Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4; Dependent Variable; Analysis; Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7; Additional Description of Matching Process. | |
505 | 8 | |a Appendix E: Case SummariesAlbania: The Importance of Leverage; Armenia: Paper Compliance; Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely?; Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow; El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad; Georgia: Not So Rosy; Guyana: Uphill Battle; Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth; Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back; Lesotho: Deadlock; Mexico: Constructive Engagement; Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making; Panama: Both a Will and a Way; Russia: Goliath Beats David; South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable; Notes; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P. | |
505 | 8 | |a Qr; s; t; u; v; w; y; z. | |
520 | |a In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monitoring Democracy argues that the practice of international election monitoring is broken, but still worth fixing. By analyzing the evolving interaction. | ||
588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
650 | 0 | |a Election monitoring. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh89002519 | |
650 | 0 | |a Election monitoring |v Case studies. | |
650 | 6 | |a Élections |x Observation. | |
650 | 6 | |a Élections |x Observation |v Études de cas. | |
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650 | 7 | |a Election monitoring |2 fast | |
655 | 7 | |a Case studies |2 fast | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Kelley, Judith G. |t Monitoring Democracy : When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails. |d Princeton : Princeton University Press, ©2012 |z 9780691152783 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text | |
any_adam_object | |
author | Kelley, Judith G. |
author_facet | Kelley, Judith G. |
author_role | |
author_sort | Kelley, Judith G. |
author_variant | j g k jg jgk |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | localFWS |
callnumber-first | J - Political Science |
callnumber-label | JF1001 |
callnumber-raw | JF1001 .K845 2012 |
callnumber-search | JF1001 .K845 2012 |
callnumber-sort | JF 41001 K845 42012 |
callnumber-subject | JF - Public Administration |
collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
contents | Cover; Contents; Illustrations; Tables; Preface; Abbreviations; PART I; CHAPTER 1: Introduction; Two Questions; Methods of Analysis; CHAPTER 2: The Rise of a New Norm; The Changing Normative Environment; Contestation; Increased Supply and Demand; The Popularization of Monitoring; Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation; Summary; CHAPTER 3: The Shadow Market; Disagreements about Contested Elections; Who Invites Whom?; Discussion; CHAPTER 4: What Influences Monitors' Assessments?; Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments; Five Types of Bias; Discussion. CHAPTER 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism?What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor-Induced Shift?; What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating?; Data: The Varieties of Irregularities; The Record; Discussion; PART II; CHAPTER 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement; Altering Incentives to Cheat; Altering Domestic Conditions; If It Works, When Should It Work?; Summary; CHAPTER 7: Are Monitored Elections Better?; Measures of Election Quality; An Overview of the Record; Statistical Analysis; Discussion; CHAPTER 8: Long-Term Effects; Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis. Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time?When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors?; Discussion; CONCLUSION: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly; Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively?; Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections?; Closing Thoughts; Appendix A: Data Description; Two Datasets; Variables; Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3; Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4; Dependent Variable; Analysis; Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7; Additional Description of Matching Process. Appendix E: Case SummariesAlbania: The Importance of Leverage; Armenia: Paper Compliance; Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely?; Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow; El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad; Georgia: Not So Rosy; Guyana: Uphill Battle; Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth; Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back; Lesotho: Deadlock; Mexico: Constructive Engagement; Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making; Panama: Both a Will and a Way; Russia: Goliath Beats David; South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable; Notes; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P. Qr; s; t; u; v; w; y; z. |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)779828034 |
dewey-full | 324.65 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 324 - The political process |
dewey-raw | 324.65 |
dewey-search | 324.65 |
dewey-sort | 3324.65 |
dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
discipline | Politologie |
format | Electronic eBook |
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Kelley.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Princeton :</subfield><subfield code="b">Princeton University Press,</subfield><subfield code="c">2012.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (359 pages)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">computer</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">online resource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Cover; Contents; Illustrations; Tables; Preface; Abbreviations; PART I; CHAPTER 1: Introduction; Two Questions; Methods of Analysis; CHAPTER 2: The Rise of a New Norm; The Changing Normative Environment; Contestation; Increased Supply and Demand; The Popularization of Monitoring; Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation; Summary; CHAPTER 3: The Shadow Market; Disagreements about Contested Elections; Who Invites Whom?; Discussion; CHAPTER 4: What Influences Monitors' Assessments?; Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments; Five Types of Bias; Discussion.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">CHAPTER 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism?What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor-Induced Shift?; What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating?; Data: The Varieties of Irregularities; The Record; Discussion; PART II; CHAPTER 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement; Altering Incentives to Cheat; Altering Domestic Conditions; If It Works, When Should It Work?; Summary; CHAPTER 7: Are Monitored Elections Better?; Measures of Election Quality; An Overview of the Record; Statistical Analysis; Discussion; CHAPTER 8: Long-Term Effects; Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time?When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors?; Discussion; CONCLUSION: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly; Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively?; Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections?; Closing Thoughts; Appendix A: Data Description; Two Datasets; Variables; Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3; Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4; Dependent Variable; Analysis; Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7; Additional Description of Matching Process.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Appendix E: Case SummariesAlbania: The Importance of Leverage; Armenia: Paper Compliance; Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely?; Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow; El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad; Georgia: Not So Rosy; Guyana: Uphill Battle; Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth; Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back; Lesotho: Deadlock; Mexico: Constructive Engagement; Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making; Panama: Both a Will and a Way; Russia: Goliath Beats David; South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable; Notes; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Qr; s; t; u; v; w; y; z.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monitoring Democracy argues that the practice of international election monitoring is broken, but still worth fixing. 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illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:18:17Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9781400842520 1400842522 9780691152776 0691152772 9780691152783 0691152780 |
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spelling | Kelley, Judith G. Monitoring democracy : when international election observation works, and why it often fails / Judith G. Kelley. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2012. 1 online resource (359 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Cover; Contents; Illustrations; Tables; Preface; Abbreviations; PART I; CHAPTER 1: Introduction; Two Questions; Methods of Analysis; CHAPTER 2: The Rise of a New Norm; The Changing Normative Environment; Contestation; Increased Supply and Demand; The Popularization of Monitoring; Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation; Summary; CHAPTER 3: The Shadow Market; Disagreements about Contested Elections; Who Invites Whom?; Discussion; CHAPTER 4: What Influences Monitors' Assessments?; Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments; Five Types of Bias; Discussion. CHAPTER 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism?What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor-Induced Shift?; What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating?; Data: The Varieties of Irregularities; The Record; Discussion; PART II; CHAPTER 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement; Altering Incentives to Cheat; Altering Domestic Conditions; If It Works, When Should It Work?; Summary; CHAPTER 7: Are Monitored Elections Better?; Measures of Election Quality; An Overview of the Record; Statistical Analysis; Discussion; CHAPTER 8: Long-Term Effects; Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis. Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time?When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors?; Discussion; CONCLUSION: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly; Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively?; Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections?; Closing Thoughts; Appendix A: Data Description; Two Datasets; Variables; Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3; Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4; Dependent Variable; Analysis; Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7; Additional Description of Matching Process. Appendix E: Case SummariesAlbania: The Importance of Leverage; Armenia: Paper Compliance; Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely?; Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow; El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad; Georgia: Not So Rosy; Guyana: Uphill Battle; Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth; Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back; Lesotho: Deadlock; Mexico: Constructive Engagement; Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making; Panama: Both a Will and a Way; Russia: Goliath Beats David; South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable; Notes; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P. Qr; s; t; u; v; w; y; z. In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monitoring Democracy argues that the practice of international election monitoring is broken, but still worth fixing. By analyzing the evolving interaction. Print version record. Includes bibliographical references and index. Election monitoring. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh89002519 Election monitoring Case studies. Élections Observation. Élections Observation Études de cas. POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Process Elections. bisacsh Election monitoring fast Case studies fast Print version: Kelley, Judith G. Monitoring Democracy : When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails. Princeton : Princeton University Press, ©2012 9780691152783 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=439322 Volltext |
spellingShingle | Kelley, Judith G. Monitoring democracy : when international election observation works, and why it often fails / Cover; Contents; Illustrations; Tables; Preface; Abbreviations; PART I; CHAPTER 1: Introduction; Two Questions; Methods of Analysis; CHAPTER 2: The Rise of a New Norm; The Changing Normative Environment; Contestation; Increased Supply and Demand; The Popularization of Monitoring; Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation; Summary; CHAPTER 3: The Shadow Market; Disagreements about Contested Elections; Who Invites Whom?; Discussion; CHAPTER 4: What Influences Monitors' Assessments?; Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments; Five Types of Bias; Discussion. CHAPTER 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism?What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor-Induced Shift?; What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating?; Data: The Varieties of Irregularities; The Record; Discussion; PART II; CHAPTER 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement; Altering Incentives to Cheat; Altering Domestic Conditions; If It Works, When Should It Work?; Summary; CHAPTER 7: Are Monitored Elections Better?; Measures of Election Quality; An Overview of the Record; Statistical Analysis; Discussion; CHAPTER 8: Long-Term Effects; Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis. Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time?When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors?; Discussion; CONCLUSION: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly; Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively?; Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections?; Closing Thoughts; Appendix A: Data Description; Two Datasets; Variables; Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3; Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4; Dependent Variable; Analysis; Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7; Additional Description of Matching Process. Appendix E: Case SummariesAlbania: The Importance of Leverage; Armenia: Paper Compliance; Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely?; Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow; El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad; Georgia: Not So Rosy; Guyana: Uphill Battle; Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth; Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back; Lesotho: Deadlock; Mexico: Constructive Engagement; Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making; Panama: Both a Will and a Way; Russia: Goliath Beats David; South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable; Notes; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P. Qr; s; t; u; v; w; y; z. Election monitoring. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh89002519 Election monitoring Case studies. Élections Observation. Élections Observation Études de cas. POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Process Elections. bisacsh Election monitoring fast |
subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh89002519 |
title | Monitoring democracy : when international election observation works, and why it often fails / |
title_auth | Monitoring democracy : when international election observation works, and why it often fails / |
title_exact_search | Monitoring democracy : when international election observation works, and why it often fails / |
title_full | Monitoring democracy : when international election observation works, and why it often fails / Judith G. Kelley. |
title_fullStr | Monitoring democracy : when international election observation works, and why it often fails / Judith G. Kelley. |
title_full_unstemmed | Monitoring democracy : when international election observation works, and why it often fails / Judith G. Kelley. |
title_short | Monitoring democracy : |
title_sort | monitoring democracy when international election observation works and why it often fails |
title_sub | when international election observation works, and why it often fails / |
topic | Election monitoring. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh89002519 Election monitoring Case studies. Élections Observation. Élections Observation Études de cas. POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Process Elections. bisacsh Election monitoring fast |
topic_facet | Election monitoring. Election monitoring Case studies. Élections Observation. Élections Observation Études de cas. POLITICAL SCIENCE Political Process Elections. Election monitoring Case studies |
url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=439322 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT kelleyjudithg monitoringdemocracywheninternationalelectionobservationworksandwhyitoftenfails |