Why intelligence fails :: lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War /
The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the polit...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Ithaca, New York ; London :
Cornell University Press,
2010.
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Cornell studies in security affairs.
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations--analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind--were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (1 online resource.) |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 197-227) and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780801457616 0801457610 9780801458859 0801458854 0801478065 9780801478062 |
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| 505 | 0 | |a Acknowledgments -- Adventures in Intelligence -- Failing to See That the Shah Was in Danger -- Acronyms -- Analysis of NFAC's Performance on Iran's Domestic Crisis, Mid-1977-7 November 1978 -- CIA Comments on the Report -- The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure -- The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence and Intelligence Reform -- Notes -- Index. | |
| 520 | |a The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations--analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind--were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved. | ||
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| 650 | 0 | |a Iraq War, 2003-2011 |x Military intelligence |z United States |x Evaluation. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Weapons of mass destruction |z Iraq. | |
| 651 | 6 | |a Iran |x Histoire |y 1979 (Révolution) | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Guerre en Irak, 2003-2011 |x Service des renseignements militaires |z États-Unis |x Évaluation. | |
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| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |t Why intelligence fails |d Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2010 |z 9780801447853 (cloth : alk. paper) |w (DLC) 2009030372 |
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| adam_text | |
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| author | Jervis, Robert, 1940-2021 |
| author_facet | Jervis, Robert, 1940-2021 |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Jervis, Robert, 1940-2021 |
| author_variant | r j rj |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | localFWS |
| callnumber-first | J - Political Science |
| callnumber-label | JK468 |
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| contents | Acknowledgments -- Adventures in Intelligence -- Failing to See That the Shah Was in Danger -- Acronyms -- Analysis of NFAC's Performance on Iran's Domestic Crisis, Mid-1977-7 November 1978 -- CIA Comments on the Report -- The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure -- The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence and Intelligence Reform -- Notes -- Index. |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)726824226 |
| dewey-full | 955.05/3 |
| dewey-hundreds | 900 - History & geography |
| dewey-ones | 955 - Iran |
| dewey-raw | 955.05/3 |
| dewey-search | 955.05/3 |
| dewey-sort | 3955.05 13 |
| dewey-tens | 950 - History of Asia |
| discipline | Geschichte |
| era | 1979-2011 fast |
| era_facet | 1979-2011 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| genre | Case studies fast History fast |
| genre_facet | Case studies History |
| geographic | Iran History Revolution, 1979. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh86002666 Iran Histoire 1979 (Révolution) Iran fast Iraq fast United States fast |
| geographic_facet | Iran History Revolution, 1979. Iran Histoire 1979 (Révolution) Iran Iraq United States |
| id | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn726824226 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-10-25T16:18:06Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780801457616 0801457610 9780801458859 0801458854 0801478065 9780801478062 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2019725893 |
| oclc_num | 726824226 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | MAIN |
| owner_facet | MAIN |
| physical | 1 online resource (1 online resource.) |
| psigel | ZDB-4-EBA |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publishDateSearch | 2010 |
| publishDateSort | 2010 |
| publisher | Cornell University Press, |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Cornell studies in security affairs. |
| series2 | Cornell studies in security affairs |
| spelling | Jervis, Robert, 1940-2021, author. Why intelligence fails : lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War / Robert Jervis. Ithaca, New York ; London : Cornell University Press, 2010. 1 online resource (1 online resource.) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier data file rda Cornell studies in security affairs Includes bibliographical references (pages 197-227) and index. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (Site, viewed (05/28/21). Acknowledgments -- Adventures in Intelligence -- Failing to See That the Shah Was in Danger -- Acronyms -- Analysis of NFAC's Performance on Iran's Domestic Crisis, Mid-1977-7 November 1978 -- CIA Comments on the Report -- The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure -- The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence and Intelligence Reform -- Notes -- Index. The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations--analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind--were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved. English. United States. Central Intelligence Agency Evaluation Case studies. United States. Central Intelligence Agency fast Intelligence service United States Evaluation Case studies. Iran History Revolution, 1979. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh86002666 Iraq War, 2003-2011 Military intelligence United States Evaluation. Weapons of mass destruction Iraq. Iran Histoire 1979 (Révolution) Guerre en Irak, 2003-2011 Service des renseignements militaires États-Unis Évaluation. Armes de destruction massive Irak. POLITICAL SCIENCE Intelligence & Espionage. bisacsh Evaluation fast Intelligence service Evaluation fast Military intelligence Evaluation fast Weapons of mass destruction fast Iran fast Iraq fast United States fast Revolution (Iran : 1979) fast (OCoLC)fst01354530 Iraq War (2003-2011) fast (OCoLC)fst01802311 1979-2011 fast Case studies fast History fast has work: Why intelligence fails (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGCMwky9DK8G6QCdY4XQVP https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Why intelligence fails Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2010 9780801447853 (cloth : alk. paper) (DLC) 2009030372 Cornell studies in security affairs. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n83745343 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=673724 Volltext CBO01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=673724 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Jervis, Robert, 1940-2021 Why intelligence fails : lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War / Cornell studies in security affairs. Acknowledgments -- Adventures in Intelligence -- Failing to See That the Shah Was in Danger -- Acronyms -- Analysis of NFAC's Performance on Iran's Domestic Crisis, Mid-1977-7 November 1978 -- CIA Comments on the Report -- The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure -- The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence and Intelligence Reform -- Notes -- Index. United States. Central Intelligence Agency Evaluation Case studies. United States. Central Intelligence Agency fast Intelligence service United States Evaluation Case studies. Iraq War, 2003-2011 Military intelligence United States Evaluation. Weapons of mass destruction Iraq. Guerre en Irak, 2003-2011 Service des renseignements militaires États-Unis Évaluation. Armes de destruction massive Irak. POLITICAL SCIENCE Intelligence & Espionage. bisacsh Evaluation fast Intelligence service Evaluation fast Military intelligence Evaluation fast Weapons of mass destruction fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh86002666 (OCoLC)fst01354530 (OCoLC)fst01802311 |
| title | Why intelligence fails : lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War / |
| title_auth | Why intelligence fails : lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War / |
| title_exact_search | Why intelligence fails : lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War / |
| title_full | Why intelligence fails : lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War / Robert Jervis. |
| title_fullStr | Why intelligence fails : lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War / Robert Jervis. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Why intelligence fails : lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War / Robert Jervis. |
| title_short | Why intelligence fails : |
| title_sort | why intelligence fails lessons from the iranian revolution and the iraq war |
| title_sub | lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War / |
| topic | United States. Central Intelligence Agency Evaluation Case studies. United States. Central Intelligence Agency fast Intelligence service United States Evaluation Case studies. Iraq War, 2003-2011 Military intelligence United States Evaluation. Weapons of mass destruction Iraq. Guerre en Irak, 2003-2011 Service des renseignements militaires États-Unis Évaluation. Armes de destruction massive Irak. POLITICAL SCIENCE Intelligence & Espionage. bisacsh Evaluation fast Intelligence service Evaluation fast Military intelligence Evaluation fast Weapons of mass destruction fast |
| topic_facet | United States. Central Intelligence Agency Evaluation Case studies. United States. Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence service United States Evaluation Case studies. Iran History Revolution, 1979. Iraq War, 2003-2011 Military intelligence United States Evaluation. Weapons of mass destruction Iraq. Iran Histoire 1979 (Révolution) Guerre en Irak, 2003-2011 Service des renseignements militaires États-Unis Évaluation. Armes de destruction massive Irak. POLITICAL SCIENCE Intelligence & Espionage. Evaluation Intelligence service Evaluation Military intelligence Evaluation Weapons of mass destruction Iran Iraq United States Case studies History |
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