The Tet offensive :: intelligence failure in war /

"In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in American history, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing on Vietcong and recently...

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1. Verfasser: Wirtz, James J., 1958-
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1991.
Schriftenreihe:Cornell studies in security affairs.
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Zusammenfassung:"In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in American history, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing on Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response."--Back cover
Beschreibung:1 online resource (x, 290 p.)
Format:Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliographie:Includes bibliographical references (p. 277-283) and index.
ISBN:9781501713354
1501713353
9781501713361
1501713361

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