Mental reality /:
"In Mental reality, Galen Strawson argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind gives undue primacy of place to publicly observable phenomena, nonmental phenomena, and behavioral phenomena (understood as publicly observable phenomena) in its account of the nature of mind. It does so at the...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass. :
MIT Press,
©2010.
©2010 |
| Ausgabe: | 2nd ed., with a new appendix. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Representation and mind.
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "In Mental reality, Galen Strawson argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind gives undue primacy of place to publicly observable phenomena, nonmental phenomena, and behavioral phenomena (understood as publicly observable phenomena) in its account of the nature of mind. It does so at the expense of the phenomena of conscious experience. Strawson describes an alternative position, "naturalized Cartesianism," which couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with a fully realist account of the nature of conscious experience. Naturalized Cartesianism is an adductive (as opposed to reductive) form of materialism. Adductive materialists don't claim that conscious experience is anything less than we ordinarily conceive it to be, in being wholly physical. They claim instead that the physical is something more than we ordinarily conceive it to be, given that many of the wholly physical goings on in the brain constitute--literally are--conscious experiences as we ordinarily conceive them. Since naturalized Cartesianism downgrades the place of reference to nonmental and publicly observable phenomena in an adequate account of mental phenomena, Strawson considers in detail the question of what part such reference still has to play. He argues that it is a mistake to think that all behavioral phenomena are publicly observable phenomena. This revised and expanded edition of Mental Reality includes a new appendix, which thoroughly revises the account of intentionality given in chapter 7"--MIT CogNet |
| Beschreibung: | "A Bradford book." |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xx, 373 pages :) |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 359-366) and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780262259224 0262259222 9780262260053 0262260050 0262513102 9780262513104 0262193523 0262691833 9780262193528 9780262691833 |
| Zugangseinschränkungen: | Access restricted to Ryerson students, faculty and staff. |
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| 100 | 1 | |a Strawson, Galen, |e author. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n85334997 | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Mental reality / |c Galen Strawson. |
| 250 | |a 2nd ed., with a new appendix. | ||
| 260 | |a Cambridge, Mass. : |b MIT Press, |c ©2010. | ||
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2010 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (xx, 373 pages :) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
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| 490 | 1 | |a Representation and mind | |
| 500 | |a "A Bradford book." | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 359-366) and index. | ||
| 505 | 0 | 0 | |g 1 |t Introduction -- |g 1.1 |t Default position -- |g 1.2 |t Experience -- |g 1.3 |t The character of experience -- |g 1.4 |t Understanding-experience -- |g 1.5 |t Note about dispositional mental states -- |g 1.6 |t Purely experiential content -- |g 1.7 |t Account of four seconds of thought -- |g 2 |t Three questions -- |g 2.1 |t Introduction |g 2.2 |t Mental and the nonmental -- |g 2.3 |t Mental and the publicly observable -- |g 2.4 |t Mental and the behavioral -- |g 2.5 |t Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- |g 2.6 |t Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- |g 2.7 |t Conclusion: The three questions -- |g 3 |t Agnostic materialism, part 1 |g 3.1 |t Introduction -- |g 3.2 |t Monism -- |g 3.3 |t Linguistic argument -- |g 3.4 |t Materialism and M & P monism -- |g 3.5 |t Comment on reduction -- |g 3.6 |t Impossibility of an "objective phenomenology" -- |g 3.7 |t Asymmetry and reduction -- |g 3.8 |t Equal-status monism -- |g 3.9 |t Panpsychism -- |g 3.10 |t Inescapability of metaphysics -- |g 4 |t Agnostic materialism, part 2 -- |g 4.1 |t Ignorance -- |g 4.2 |t Sensory spaces -- |g 4.3 |t Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration -- |g 4.4 |t Hard part of the mind-body problem -- |g 4.5 |t Neutral monism and agnostic monism -- |g 4.6 |t Comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on |g 4.7 |t Conclusion-- |g 5 |t Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism -- |g 5.1 |t Introduction |g 5.2 |t Mentalism -- |g 5.3 |t Strict or pure process idealism -- |g 5.4 |t Active-principle idealism -- |g 5.5 |t Stuff idealism -- |g 5.6 |t Immaterialism -- |g 5.7 |t Positions restated -- |g 5.8 |t Dualist options -- |g 5.9 |t Summary |g 5.10 |t Frege's thesis -- |g 5.11 |t Objections to pure process idealism -- |g 5.12 |t Problem of mental dispositions -- |g 6 |t 'Mental' -- |g 6.1 |t Introduction |g 6.2 |t Shared abilities? -- |g 6.3 |t Sorting ability -- |g 6.4 |t Definition of 'mental being' -- |g 6.6 |t Mental phenomena -- |g 6.7 |t View that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena -- |g 7 |t Natural intentionality |g 7.1 |t Introduction-- |g 7.2 |t E/C intentionality -- |g 7.3 |t Experienceless -- |g 7.4 |t Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects -- |g 7.5 |t Experience, purely experiential content, and N/C intentionality -- |g 7.6 |t Concepts in nature -- |g 7.7 |t Intentionality and experience -- |g 7.8 |t Summary with problem |g 7.9 |t Conclusion-- |g 8 |t Pain and 'pain' |g 8.1 |t Introduction-- |g 8.2 |t Neobehaviorist view -- |g 8.3 |t Linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior -- |g 8.4 |t Challenge -- |g 8.5 |t Sirians -- |g 8.6 |t N.N.'s novel -- |g 8.7 |t Objection to the Sirians -- |g 8.8 |t Betelgeuzians -- |g 8.9 |t Point of the Sirians -- |g 8.10 |t Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain -- |g 8.11 |t Unpleasantness and qualitative character -- |g 9 |t Weather watchers |g 9.1 |t Introduction-- |g 9.2 |t Rooting story -- |g 9.3 |t What is it like to be a weather watcher? -- |g 9.4 |t Aptitudes of mental states -- |g 9.5 |t Argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space -- |g 9.6 |t Argument from the conditions for language ability -- |g 9.7 |t Argument from the nature of desire -- |g 9.8 Desire and affect -- |g 9.9 |t Argument from the phenomenology of desire -- |g 10 |t Behavior |g 10.1 |t Introduction -- |g 10.2 |t Hopeless definition -- |g 10.3 |t Difficulties -- |g 10.4 |t Other-observability -- |g 10.5 |t Neo-neobehaviorism -- |g 11 |t Concept of mind. |
| 520 | |a "In Mental reality, Galen Strawson argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind gives undue primacy of place to publicly observable phenomena, nonmental phenomena, and behavioral phenomena (understood as publicly observable phenomena) in its account of the nature of mind. It does so at the expense of the phenomena of conscious experience. Strawson describes an alternative position, "naturalized Cartesianism," which couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with a fully realist account of the nature of conscious experience. Naturalized Cartesianism is an adductive (as opposed to reductive) form of materialism. Adductive materialists don't claim that conscious experience is anything less than we ordinarily conceive it to be, in being wholly physical. They claim instead that the physical is something more than we ordinarily conceive it to be, given that many of the wholly physical goings on in the brain constitute--literally are--conscious experiences as we ordinarily conceive them. Since naturalized Cartesianism downgrades the place of reference to nonmental and publicly observable phenomena in an adequate account of mental phenomena, Strawson considers in detail the question of what part such reference still has to play. He argues that it is a mistake to think that all behavioral phenomena are publicly observable phenomena. This revised and expanded edition of Mental Reality includes a new appendix, which thoroughly revises the account of intentionality given in chapter 7"--MIT CogNet | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 506 | |a Access restricted to Ryerson students, faculty and staff. |5 CaOTR | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Consciousness. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85031235 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Behaviorism (Psychology) |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85012905 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Mind and body. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085488 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Materialism. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85082063 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Philosophy of mind. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh89004340 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Conscience. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Béhaviorisme (Psychologie) | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Matérialisme. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Philosophie de l'esprit. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a materialism (philosophical movement) |2 aat | |
| 650 | 7 | |a PHILOSOPHY |x Mind & Body. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Behaviorism (Psychology) |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Consciousness |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Materialism |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Mind and body |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Philosophy of mind |2 fast | |
| 650 | 1 | 7 | |a Filosofie van de geest. |2 gtt |
| 650 | 1 | 7 | |a Bewustzijn. |2 gtt |
| 650 | 1 | 7 | |a Behaviorisme. |2 gtt |
| 650 | 1 | 7 | |a Lichaam en geest. |2 gtt |
| 650 | 1 | 7 | |a Mentale representatie. |2 gtt |
| 653 | |a PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General | ||
| 653 | |a COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General | ||
| 758 | |i has work: |a Mental reality (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCG4HHFBpffK9VTxFFFb3DC |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | |
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| author | Strawson, Galen |
| author_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n85334997 |
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| contents | Introduction -- Default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- Note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- Account of four seconds of thought -- Three questions -- Introduction Mental and the nonmental -- Mental and the publicly observable -- Mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 Monism -- Linguistic argument -- Materialism and M & P monism -- Comment on reduction -- Impossibility of an "objective phenomenology" -- Asymmetry and reduction -- Equal-status monism -- Panpsychism -- Inescapability of metaphysics -- Agnostic materialism, part 2 -- Ignorance -- Sensory spaces -- Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration -- Hard part of the mind-body problem -- Neutral monism and agnostic monism -- Comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on Conclusion-- Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism -- Mentalism -- Strict or pure process idealism -- Active-principle idealism -- Stuff idealism -- Immaterialism -- Positions restated -- Dualist options -- Summary Frege's thesis -- Objections to pure process idealism -- Problem of mental dispositions -- 'Mental' -- Shared abilities? -- Sorting ability -- Definition of 'mental being' -- Mental phenomena -- View that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena -- Natural intentionality Introduction-- E/C intentionality -- Experienceless -- Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects -- Experience, purely experiential content, and N/C intentionality -- Concepts in nature -- Intentionality and experience -- Summary with problem Pain and 'pain' Neobehaviorist view -- Linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior -- Challenge -- Sirians -- N.N.'s novel -- Objection to the Sirians -- Betelgeuzians -- Point of the Sirians -- Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain -- Unpleasantness and qualitative character -- Weather watchers Rooting story -- What is it like to be a weather watcher? -- Aptitudes of mental states -- Argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space -- Argument from the conditions for language ability -- Argument from the nature of desire -- Argument from the phenomenology of desire -- Behavior Hopeless definition -- Difficulties -- Other-observability -- Neo-neobehaviorism -- Concept of mind. |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)503092562 |
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| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 128 - Humankind |
| dewey-raw | 128/.2 |
| dewey-search | 128/.2 |
| dewey-sort | 3128 12 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| edition | 2nd ed., with a new appendix. |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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"><subfield code="a">text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">computer</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">online resource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="347" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">text file</subfield><subfield code="2">rdaft</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Representation and mind</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"A Bradford book."</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="504" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references (pages 359-366) and index.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="g">1</subfield><subfield code="t">Introduction --</subfield><subfield code="g">1.1</subfield><subfield code="t">Default position --</subfield><subfield code="g">1.2</subfield><subfield code="t">Experience --</subfield><subfield code="g">1.3</subfield><subfield code="t">The character of experience --</subfield><subfield code="g">1.4</subfield><subfield code="t">Understanding-experience --</subfield><subfield code="g">1.5</subfield><subfield code="t">Note about dispositional mental states --</subfield><subfield code="g">1.6</subfield><subfield code="t">Purely experiential content --</subfield><subfield code="g">1.7</subfield><subfield code="t">Account of four seconds of thought --</subfield><subfield code="g">2</subfield><subfield code="t">Three questions --</subfield><subfield code="g">2.1</subfield><subfield code="t">Introduction</subfield><subfield code="g">2.2</subfield><subfield code="t">Mental and the nonmental --</subfield><subfield code="g">2.3</subfield><subfield code="t">Mental and the publicly observable --</subfield><subfield code="g">2.4</subfield><subfield code="t">Mental and the behavioral --</subfield><subfield code="g">2.5</subfield><subfield code="t">Neobehaviorism and reductionism --</subfield><subfield code="g">2.6</subfield><subfield code="t">Naturalism in the philosophy of mind --</subfield><subfield code="g">2.7</subfield><subfield code="t">Conclusion: The three questions --</subfield><subfield code="g">3</subfield><subfield code="t">Agnostic materialism, part 1</subfield><subfield code="g">3.1</subfield><subfield code="t">Introduction --</subfield><subfield code="g">3.2</subfield><subfield code="t">Monism --</subfield><subfield code="g">3.3</subfield><subfield code="t">Linguistic argument --</subfield><subfield code="g">3.4</subfield><subfield code="t">Materialism and M & P monism --</subfield><subfield code="g">3.5</subfield><subfield code="t">Comment on reduction --</subfield><subfield code="g">3.6</subfield><subfield code="t">Impossibility of an "objective phenomenology" --</subfield><subfield code="g">3.7</subfield><subfield code="t">Asymmetry and reduction --</subfield><subfield code="g">3.8</subfield><subfield code="t">Equal-status monism --</subfield><subfield code="g">3.9</subfield><subfield code="t">Panpsychism --</subfield><subfield code="g">3.10</subfield><subfield code="t">Inescapability of metaphysics --</subfield><subfield code="g">4</subfield><subfield code="t">Agnostic materialism, part 2 --</subfield><subfield code="g">4.1</subfield><subfield code="t">Ignorance --</subfield><subfield code="g">4.2</subfield><subfield code="t">Sensory spaces --</subfield><subfield code="g">4.3</subfield><subfield code="t">Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration --</subfield><subfield code="g">4.4</subfield><subfield code="t">Hard part of the mind-body problem --</subfield><subfield code="g">4.5</subfield><subfield code="t">Neutral monism and agnostic monism --</subfield><subfield code="g">4.6</subfield><subfield code="t">Comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on</subfield><subfield code="g">4.7</subfield><subfield code="t">Conclusion--</subfield><subfield code="g">5</subfield><subfield code="t">Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism --</subfield><subfield code="g">5.1</subfield><subfield code="t">Introduction</subfield><subfield code="g">5.2</subfield><subfield code="t">Mentalism --</subfield><subfield code="g">5.3</subfield><subfield code="t">Strict or pure process idealism --</subfield><subfield code="g">5.4</subfield><subfield code="t">Active-principle idealism --</subfield><subfield code="g">5.5</subfield><subfield code="t">Stuff idealism --</subfield><subfield code="g">5.6</subfield><subfield code="t">Immaterialism --</subfield><subfield code="g">5.7</subfield><subfield code="t">Positions restated --</subfield><subfield code="g">5.8</subfield><subfield code="t">Dualist options --</subfield><subfield code="g">5.9</subfield><subfield code="t">Summary</subfield><subfield code="g">5.10</subfield><subfield code="t">Frege's thesis --</subfield><subfield code="g">5.11</subfield><subfield code="t">Objections to pure process idealism --</subfield><subfield code="g">5.12</subfield><subfield code="t">Problem of mental dispositions --</subfield><subfield code="g">6</subfield><subfield code="t">'Mental' --</subfield><subfield code="g">6.1</subfield><subfield code="t">Introduction</subfield><subfield code="g">6.2</subfield><subfield code="t">Shared abilities? --</subfield><subfield code="g">6.3</subfield><subfield code="t">Sorting ability --</subfield><subfield code="g">6.4</subfield><subfield code="t">Definition of 'mental being' --</subfield><subfield code="g">6.6</subfield><subfield code="t">Mental phenomena --</subfield><subfield code="g">6.7</subfield><subfield code="t">View that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena --</subfield><subfield code="g">7</subfield><subfield code="t">Natural intentionality</subfield><subfield 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It does so at the expense of the phenomena of conscious experience. Strawson describes an alternative position, "naturalized Cartesianism," which couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with a fully realist account of the nature of conscious experience. Naturalized Cartesianism is an adductive (as opposed to reductive) form of materialism. Adductive materialists don't claim that conscious experience is anything less than we ordinarily conceive it to be, in being wholly physical. They claim instead that the physical is something more than we ordinarily conceive it to be, given that many of the wholly physical goings on in the brain constitute--literally are--conscious experiences as we ordinarily conceive them. Since naturalized Cartesianism downgrades the place of reference to nonmental and publicly observable phenomena in an adequate account of mental phenomena, Strawson considers in detail the question of what part such reference still has to play. He argues that it is a mistake to think that all behavioral phenomena are publicly observable phenomena. 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| id | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn503092562 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-10-25T16:17:16Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780262259224 0262259222 9780262260053 0262260050 0262513102 9780262513104 0262193523 0262691833 9780262193528 9780262691833 |
| language | English |
| oclc_num | 503092562 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | MAIN |
| owner_facet | MAIN |
| physical | 1 online resource (xx, 373 pages :) |
| psigel | ZDB-4-EBA |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publishDateSearch | 2010 |
| publishDateSort | 2010 |
| publisher | MIT Press, |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Representation and mind. |
| series2 | Representation and mind |
| spelling | Strawson, Galen, author. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n85334997 Mental reality / Galen Strawson. 2nd ed., with a new appendix. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2010. ©2010 1 online resource (xx, 373 pages :) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file rdaft Representation and mind "A Bradford book." Includes bibliographical references (pages 359-366) and index. 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Default position -- 1.2 Experience -- 1.3 The character of experience -- 1.4 Understanding-experience -- 1.5 Note about dispositional mental states -- 1.6 Purely experiential content -- 1.7 Account of four seconds of thought -- 2 Three questions -- 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Mental and the nonmental -- 2.3 Mental and the publicly observable -- 2.4 Mental and the behavioral -- 2.5 Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- 2.6 Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- 2.7 Conclusion: The three questions -- 3 Agnostic materialism, part 1 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Monism -- 3.3 Linguistic argument -- 3.4 Materialism and M & P monism -- 3.5 Comment on reduction -- 3.6 Impossibility of an "objective phenomenology" -- 3.7 Asymmetry and reduction -- 3.8 Equal-status monism -- 3.9 Panpsychism -- 3.10 Inescapability of metaphysics -- 4 Agnostic materialism, part 2 -- 4.1 Ignorance -- 4.2 Sensory spaces -- 4.3 Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration -- 4.4 Hard part of the mind-body problem -- 4.5 Neutral monism and agnostic monism -- 4.6 Comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on 4.7 Conclusion-- 5 Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism -- 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Mentalism -- 5.3 Strict or pure process idealism -- 5.4 Active-principle idealism -- 5.5 Stuff idealism -- 5.6 Immaterialism -- 5.7 Positions restated -- 5.8 Dualist options -- 5.9 Summary 5.10 Frege's thesis -- 5.11 Objections to pure process idealism -- 5.12 Problem of mental dispositions -- 6 'Mental' -- 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Shared abilities? -- 6.3 Sorting ability -- 6.4 Definition of 'mental being' -- 6.6 Mental phenomena -- 6.7 View that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena -- 7 Natural intentionality 7.1 Introduction-- 7.2 E/C intentionality -- 7.3 Experienceless -- 7.4 Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects -- 7.5 Experience, purely experiential content, and N/C intentionality -- 7.6 Concepts in nature -- 7.7 Intentionality and experience -- 7.8 Summary with problem 7.9 Conclusion-- 8 Pain and 'pain' 8.1 Introduction-- 8.2 Neobehaviorist view -- 8.3 Linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior -- 8.4 Challenge -- 8.5 Sirians -- 8.6 N.N.'s novel -- 8.7 Objection to the Sirians -- 8.8 Betelgeuzians -- 8.9 Point of the Sirians -- 8.10 Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain -- 8.11 Unpleasantness and qualitative character -- 9 Weather watchers 9.1 Introduction-- 9.2 Rooting story -- 9.3 What is it like to be a weather watcher? -- 9.4 Aptitudes of mental states -- 9.5 Argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space -- 9.6 Argument from the conditions for language ability -- 9.7 Argument from the nature of desire -- 9.8 Desire and affect -- 9.9 Argument from the phenomenology of desire -- 10 Behavior 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Hopeless definition -- 10.3 Difficulties -- 10.4 Other-observability -- 10.5 Neo-neobehaviorism -- 11 Concept of mind. "In Mental reality, Galen Strawson argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind gives undue primacy of place to publicly observable phenomena, nonmental phenomena, and behavioral phenomena (understood as publicly observable phenomena) in its account of the nature of mind. It does so at the expense of the phenomena of conscious experience. Strawson describes an alternative position, "naturalized Cartesianism," which couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with a fully realist account of the nature of conscious experience. Naturalized Cartesianism is an adductive (as opposed to reductive) form of materialism. Adductive materialists don't claim that conscious experience is anything less than we ordinarily conceive it to be, in being wholly physical. They claim instead that the physical is something more than we ordinarily conceive it to be, given that many of the wholly physical goings on in the brain constitute--literally are--conscious experiences as we ordinarily conceive them. Since naturalized Cartesianism downgrades the place of reference to nonmental and publicly observable phenomena in an adequate account of mental phenomena, Strawson considers in detail the question of what part such reference still has to play. He argues that it is a mistake to think that all behavioral phenomena are publicly observable phenomena. This revised and expanded edition of Mental Reality includes a new appendix, which thoroughly revises the account of intentionality given in chapter 7"--MIT CogNet Print version record. Access restricted to Ryerson students, faculty and staff. CaOTR Consciousness. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85031235 Behaviorism (Psychology) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85012905 Mind and body. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085488 Materialism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85082063 Philosophy of mind. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh89004340 Conscience. Béhaviorisme (Psychologie) Matérialisme. Philosophie de l'esprit. materialism (philosophical movement) aat PHILOSOPHY Mind & Body. bisacsh Behaviorism (Psychology) fast Consciousness fast Materialism fast Mind and body fast Philosophy of mind fast Filosofie van de geest. gtt Bewustzijn. gtt Behaviorisme. gtt Lichaam en geest. gtt Mentale representatie. gtt PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General has work: Mental reality (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCG4HHFBpffK9VTxFFFb3DC https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Strawson, Galen. Mental reality. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2010 9780262513104 (DLC) 2009011301 (OCoLC)316736943 Representation and mind. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n90642950 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=291856 Volltext CBO01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=291856 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Strawson, Galen Mental reality / Representation and mind. Introduction -- Default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- Note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- Account of four seconds of thought -- Three questions -- Introduction Mental and the nonmental -- Mental and the publicly observable -- Mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 Monism -- Linguistic argument -- Materialism and M & P monism -- Comment on reduction -- Impossibility of an "objective phenomenology" -- Asymmetry and reduction -- Equal-status monism -- Panpsychism -- Inescapability of metaphysics -- Agnostic materialism, part 2 -- Ignorance -- Sensory spaces -- Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration -- Hard part of the mind-body problem -- Neutral monism and agnostic monism -- Comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on Conclusion-- Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism -- Mentalism -- Strict or pure process idealism -- Active-principle idealism -- Stuff idealism -- Immaterialism -- Positions restated -- Dualist options -- Summary Frege's thesis -- Objections to pure process idealism -- Problem of mental dispositions -- 'Mental' -- Shared abilities? -- Sorting ability -- Definition of 'mental being' -- Mental phenomena -- View that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena -- Natural intentionality Introduction-- E/C intentionality -- Experienceless -- Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects -- Experience, purely experiential content, and N/C intentionality -- Concepts in nature -- Intentionality and experience -- Summary with problem Pain and 'pain' Neobehaviorist view -- Linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior -- Challenge -- Sirians -- N.N.'s novel -- Objection to the Sirians -- Betelgeuzians -- Point of the Sirians -- Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain -- Unpleasantness and qualitative character -- Weather watchers Rooting story -- What is it like to be a weather watcher? -- Aptitudes of mental states -- Argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space -- Argument from the conditions for language ability -- Argument from the nature of desire -- Argument from the phenomenology of desire -- Behavior Hopeless definition -- Difficulties -- Other-observability -- Neo-neobehaviorism -- Concept of mind. Consciousness. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85031235 Behaviorism (Psychology) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85012905 Mind and body. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085488 Materialism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85082063 Philosophy of mind. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh89004340 Conscience. Béhaviorisme (Psychologie) Matérialisme. Philosophie de l'esprit. materialism (philosophical movement) aat PHILOSOPHY Mind & Body. bisacsh Behaviorism (Psychology) fast Consciousness fast Materialism fast Mind and body fast Philosophy of mind fast Filosofie van de geest. gtt Bewustzijn. gtt Behaviorisme. gtt Lichaam en geest. gtt Mentale representatie. gtt |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85031235 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85012905 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085488 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85082063 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh89004340 |
| title | Mental reality / |
| title_alt | Introduction -- Default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- Note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- Account of four seconds of thought -- Three questions -- Introduction Mental and the nonmental -- Mental and the publicly observable -- Mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 Monism -- Linguistic argument -- Materialism and M & P monism -- Comment on reduction -- Impossibility of an "objective phenomenology" -- Asymmetry and reduction -- Equal-status monism -- Panpsychism -- Inescapability of metaphysics -- Agnostic materialism, part 2 -- Ignorance -- Sensory spaces -- Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration -- Hard part of the mind-body problem -- Neutral monism and agnostic monism -- Comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on Conclusion-- Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism -- Mentalism -- Strict or pure process idealism -- Active-principle idealism -- Stuff idealism -- Immaterialism -- Positions restated -- Dualist options -- Summary Frege's thesis -- Objections to pure process idealism -- Problem of mental dispositions -- 'Mental' -- Shared abilities? -- Sorting ability -- Definition of 'mental being' -- Mental phenomena -- View that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena -- Natural intentionality Introduction-- E/C intentionality -- Experienceless -- Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects -- Experience, purely experiential content, and N/C intentionality -- Concepts in nature -- Intentionality and experience -- Summary with problem Pain and 'pain' Neobehaviorist view -- Linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior -- Challenge -- Sirians -- N.N.'s novel -- Objection to the Sirians -- Betelgeuzians -- Point of the Sirians -- Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain -- Unpleasantness and qualitative character -- Weather watchers Rooting story -- What is it like to be a weather watcher? -- Aptitudes of mental states -- Argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space -- Argument from the conditions for language ability -- Argument from the nature of desire -- Argument from the phenomenology of desire -- Behavior Hopeless definition -- Difficulties -- Other-observability -- Neo-neobehaviorism -- Concept of mind. |
| title_auth | Mental reality / |
| title_exact_search | Mental reality / |
| title_full | Mental reality / Galen Strawson. |
| title_fullStr | Mental reality / Galen Strawson. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Mental reality / Galen Strawson. |
| title_short | Mental reality / |
| title_sort | mental reality |
| topic | Consciousness. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85031235 Behaviorism (Psychology) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85012905 Mind and body. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085488 Materialism. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85082063 Philosophy of mind. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh89004340 Conscience. Béhaviorisme (Psychologie) Matérialisme. Philosophie de l'esprit. materialism (philosophical movement) aat PHILOSOPHY Mind & Body. bisacsh Behaviorism (Psychology) fast Consciousness fast Materialism fast Mind and body fast Philosophy of mind fast Filosofie van de geest. gtt Bewustzijn. gtt Behaviorisme. gtt Lichaam en geest. gtt Mentale representatie. gtt |
| topic_facet | Consciousness. Behaviorism (Psychology) Mind and body. Materialism. Philosophy of mind. Conscience. Béhaviorisme (Psychologie) Matérialisme. Philosophie de l'esprit. materialism (philosophical movement) PHILOSOPHY Mind & Body. Consciousness Materialism Mind and body Philosophy of mind Filosofie van de geest. Bewustzijn. Behaviorisme. Lichaam en geest. Mentale representatie. |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=291856 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT strawsongalen mentalreality |