Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review /:
In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2007.
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (viii, 366 pages) |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 342-354) and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780511279195 0511279191 0511278594 9780511278594 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000cam a2200000 a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn271789872 | ||
| 003 | OCoLC | ||
| 005 | 20241004212047.0 | ||
| 006 | m o d | ||
| 007 | cr cnu---unuuu | ||
| 008 | 060622s2007 nyu ob 001 0 eng d | ||
| 040 | |a AU@ |b eng |e pn |c AU@ |d OCLCQ |d IDEBK |d N$T |d OCLCQ |d OCLCF |d NLGGC |d OCLCO |d OCLCQ |d E7B |d AZU |d YDXCP |d OCLCQ |d UAB |d OCLCQ |d K6U |d OCLCO |d OCLCQ |d OCLCO |d OCLCL | ||
| 019 | |a 519860540 |a 648212685 |a 848588050 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780511279195 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 0511279191 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 0511278594 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |a 9780511278594 |q (electronic bk.) | ||
| 020 | |z 0521867347 |q (Cloth) | ||
| 020 | |z 9780521867344 |q (Cloth) | ||
| 020 | |z 9786610850426 | ||
| 020 | |z 6610850429 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)271789872 |z (OCoLC)519860540 |z (OCoLC)648212685 |z (OCoLC)848588050 | ||
| 043 | |a n-us--- | ||
| 050 | 4 | |a KF4550.Z9 |b Z87 2007eb | |
| 072 | 7 | |a LAW |x 012000 |2 bisacsh | |
| 072 | 7 | |a LAW |x 062000 |2 bisacsh | |
| 072 | 7 | |a POL |x 040030 |2 bisacsh | |
| 082 | 7 | |a 347.73/12 |2 23 | |
| 049 | |a MAIN | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Zurn, Christopher F., |d 1966- |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJwmR6Jtthhytt3HkmP84q |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2006049130 | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review / |c Christopher F. Zurn. |
| 260 | |a New York : |b Cambridge University Press, |c 2007. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (viii, 366 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 342-354) and index. | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 505 | 0 | |a pt. I. Introduction. An old chestnut is actually two ; Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation ; Functions and institutions -- pt. II. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights ; Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy ; Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism -- pt. III. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis ; Constitutionalism: four central elements ; Constitutional democracy? -- pt. IV. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism ; Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle ; Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? -- pt. V. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman ; Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron ; Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism -- pt. VI. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? ; Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication ; Legal principles and moral-political reasoning -- pt. VII. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review ; Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas -- pt. VIII. The institutions of constitutional review I: design problems and judicial review. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review ; Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system -- pt. IX. The Institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies ; Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal ; Easing formal amendability requirements ; Establishing civic constitutional fora. | |
| 520 | |a In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Judicial review |z United States. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Constitutional courts |z United States. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Legislative power |z United States. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85075840 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Executive power |z United States. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85046287 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Contrôle juridictionnel des lois |z États-Unis. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Cours constitutionnelles |z États-Unis. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Pouvoir exécutif |z États-Unis. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a LAW |x Civil Procedure. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a LAW |x Legal Services. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x Government |x Judicial Branch. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Constitutional courts |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Executive power |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Judicial review |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Legislative power |2 fast | |
| 651 | 7 | |a United States |2 fast |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq | |
| 758 | |i has work: |a Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCFymJ8cfJTTWGRfj4wvrbd |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |l FWS01 |p ZDB-4-EBA |q FWS_PDA_EBA |u https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=194271 |3 Volltext |
| 938 | |a ebrary |b EBRY |n ebr10172446 | ||
| 938 | |a EBSCOhost |b EBSC |n 194271 | ||
| 938 | |a ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection |b IDEB |n 85042 | ||
| 938 | |a YBP Library Services |b YANK |n 9933530 | ||
| 994 | |a 92 |b GEBAY | ||
| 912 | |a ZDB-4-EBA | ||
| 049 | |a DE-863 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-FWS_katkey | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn271789872 |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1816881680188702720 |
| adam_text | |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Zurn, Christopher F., 1966- |
| author_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2006049130 |
| author_facet | Zurn, Christopher F., 1966- |
| author_role | |
| author_sort | Zurn, Christopher F., 1966- |
| author_variant | c f z cf cfz |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | localFWS |
| callnumber-first | K - Law |
| callnumber-label | KF4550 |
| callnumber-raw | KF4550.Z9 Z87 2007eb |
| callnumber-search | KF4550.Z9 Z87 2007eb |
| callnumber-sort | KF 44550 Z9 Z87 42007EB |
| callnumber-subject | KF - United States |
| collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
| contents | pt. I. Introduction. An old chestnut is actually two ; Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation ; Functions and institutions -- pt. II. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights ; Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy ; Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism -- pt. III. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis ; Constitutionalism: four central elements ; Constitutional democracy? -- pt. IV. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism ; Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle ; Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? -- pt. V. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman ; Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron ; Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism -- pt. VI. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? ; Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication ; Legal principles and moral-political reasoning -- pt. VII. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review ; Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas -- pt. VIII. The institutions of constitutional review I: design problems and judicial review. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review ; Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system -- pt. IX. The Institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies ; Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal ; Easing formal amendability requirements ; Establishing civic constitutional fora. |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)271789872 |
| dewey-full | 347.73/12 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 347 - Procedure and courts |
| dewey-raw | 347.73/12 |
| dewey-search | 347.73/12 |
| dewey-sort | 3347.73 212 |
| dewey-tens | 340 - Law |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>06445cam a2200709 a 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">ZDB-4-EBA-ocn271789872</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">OCoLC</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20241004212047.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="006">m o d </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr cnu---unuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">060622s2007 nyu ob 001 0 eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AU@</subfield><subfield code="b">eng</subfield><subfield code="e">pn</subfield><subfield code="c">AU@</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">IDEBK</subfield><subfield code="d">N$T</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCF</subfield><subfield code="d">NLGGC</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">E7B</subfield><subfield code="d">AZU</subfield><subfield code="d">YDXCP</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">UAB</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">K6U</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCQ</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCO</subfield><subfield code="d">OCLCL</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="019" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">519860540</subfield><subfield code="a">648212685</subfield><subfield code="a">848588050</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780511279195</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0511279191</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0511278594</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780511278594</subfield><subfield code="q">(electronic bk.)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="z">0521867347</subfield><subfield code="q">(Cloth)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="z">9780521867344</subfield><subfield code="q">(Cloth)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="z">9786610850426</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="z">6610850429</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)271789872</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)519860540</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)648212685</subfield><subfield code="z">(OCoLC)848588050</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="043" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">n-us---</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">KF4550.Z9</subfield><subfield code="b">Z87 2007eb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="072" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">LAW</subfield><subfield code="x">012000</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="072" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">LAW</subfield><subfield code="x">062000</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="072" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">POL</subfield><subfield code="x">040030</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">347.73/12</subfield><subfield code="2">23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MAIN</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zurn, Christopher F.,</subfield><subfield code="d">1966-</subfield><subfield code="1">https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJwmR6Jtthhytt3HkmP84q</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2006049130</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review /</subfield><subfield code="c">Christopher F. Zurn.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="260" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">New York :</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge University Press,</subfield><subfield code="c">2007.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (viii, 366 pages)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">computer</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">online resource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="504" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references (pages 342-354) and index.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="588" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Print version record.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">pt. I. Introduction. An old chestnut is actually two ; Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation ; Functions and institutions -- pt. II. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights ; Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy ; Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism -- pt. III. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis ; Constitutionalism: four central elements ; Constitutional democracy? -- pt. IV. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism ; Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle ; Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? -- pt. V. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman ; Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron ; Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism -- pt. VI. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? ; Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication ; Legal principles and moral-political reasoning -- pt. VII. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review ; Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas -- pt. VIII. The institutions of constitutional review I: design problems and judicial review. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review ; Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system -- pt. IX. The Institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies ; Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal ; Easing formal amendability requirements ; Establishing civic constitutional fora.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Judicial review</subfield><subfield code="z">United States.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Constitutional courts</subfield><subfield code="z">United States.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Legislative power</subfield><subfield code="z">United States.</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85075840</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Executive power</subfield><subfield code="z">United States.</subfield><subfield code="0">http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85046287</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Contrôle juridictionnel des lois</subfield><subfield code="z">États-Unis.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Cours constitutionnelles</subfield><subfield code="z">États-Unis.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="6"><subfield code="a">Pouvoir exécutif</subfield><subfield code="z">États-Unis.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">LAW</subfield><subfield code="x">Civil Procedure.</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">LAW</subfield><subfield code="x">Legal Services.</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">POLITICAL SCIENCE</subfield><subfield code="x">Government</subfield><subfield code="x">Judicial Branch.</subfield><subfield code="2">bisacsh</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Constitutional courts</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Executive power</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Judicial review</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Legislative power</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">United States</subfield><subfield code="2">fast</subfield><subfield code="1">https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="758" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="i">has work:</subfield><subfield code="a">Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review (Text)</subfield><subfield code="1">https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCFymJ8cfJTTWGRfj4wvrbd</subfield><subfield code="4">https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="l">FWS01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-4-EBA</subfield><subfield code="q">FWS_PDA_EBA</subfield><subfield code="u">https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=194271</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ebrary</subfield><subfield code="b">EBRY</subfield><subfield code="n">ebr10172446</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">EBSCOhost</subfield><subfield code="b">EBSC</subfield><subfield code="n">194271</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection</subfield><subfield code="b">IDEB</subfield><subfield code="n">85042</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="938" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">YBP Library Services</subfield><subfield code="b">YANK</subfield><subfield code="n">9933530</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="994" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">92</subfield><subfield code="b">GEBAY</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-4-EBA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | United States fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq |
| geographic_facet | United States |
| id | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn271789872 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:16:34Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780511279195 0511279191 0511278594 9780511278594 |
| language | English |
| oclc_num | 271789872 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 online resource (viii, 366 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-4-EBA |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press, |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Zurn, Christopher F., 1966- https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJwmR6Jtthhytt3HkmP84q http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n2006049130 Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review / Christopher F. Zurn. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2007. 1 online resource (viii, 366 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references (pages 342-354) and index. Print version record. pt. I. Introduction. An old chestnut is actually two ; Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation ; Functions and institutions -- pt. II. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights ; Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy ; Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism -- pt. III. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis ; Constitutionalism: four central elements ; Constitutional democracy? -- pt. IV. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism ; Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle ; Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? -- pt. V. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman ; Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron ; Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism -- pt. VI. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? ; Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication ; Legal principles and moral-political reasoning -- pt. VII. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review ; Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas -- pt. VIII. The institutions of constitutional review I: design problems and judicial review. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review ; Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system -- pt. IX. The Institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies ; Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal ; Easing formal amendability requirements ; Establishing civic constitutional fora. In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision. Judicial review United States. Constitutional courts United States. Legislative power United States. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85075840 Executive power United States. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85046287 Contrôle juridictionnel des lois États-Unis. Cours constitutionnelles États-Unis. Pouvoir exécutif États-Unis. LAW Civil Procedure. bisacsh LAW Legal Services. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Government Judicial Branch. bisacsh Constitutional courts fast Executive power fast Judicial review fast Legislative power fast United States fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq has work: Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCFymJ8cfJTTWGRfj4wvrbd https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=194271 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Zurn, Christopher F., 1966- Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review / pt. I. Introduction. An old chestnut is actually two ; Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation ; Functions and institutions -- pt. II. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights ; Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy ; Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism -- pt. III. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis ; Constitutionalism: four central elements ; Constitutional democracy? -- pt. IV. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism ; Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle ; Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? -- pt. V. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman ; Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron ; Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism -- pt. VI. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? ; Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication ; Legal principles and moral-political reasoning -- pt. VII. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review ; Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas -- pt. VIII. The institutions of constitutional review I: design problems and judicial review. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review ; Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system -- pt. IX. The Institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies ; Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal ; Easing formal amendability requirements ; Establishing civic constitutional fora. Judicial review United States. Constitutional courts United States. Legislative power United States. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85075840 Executive power United States. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85046287 Contrôle juridictionnel des lois États-Unis. Cours constitutionnelles États-Unis. Pouvoir exécutif États-Unis. LAW Civil Procedure. bisacsh LAW Legal Services. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Government Judicial Branch. bisacsh Constitutional courts fast Executive power fast Judicial review fast Legislative power fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85075840 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85046287 |
| title | Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review / |
| title_auth | Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review / |
| title_exact_search | Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review / |
| title_full | Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review / Christopher F. Zurn. |
| title_fullStr | Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review / Christopher F. Zurn. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review / Christopher F. Zurn. |
| title_short | Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review / |
| title_sort | deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review |
| topic | Judicial review United States. Constitutional courts United States. Legislative power United States. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85075840 Executive power United States. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85046287 Contrôle juridictionnel des lois États-Unis. Cours constitutionnelles États-Unis. Pouvoir exécutif États-Unis. LAW Civil Procedure. bisacsh LAW Legal Services. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Government Judicial Branch. bisacsh Constitutional courts fast Executive power fast Judicial review fast Legislative power fast |
| topic_facet | Judicial review United States. Constitutional courts United States. Legislative power United States. Executive power United States. Contrôle juridictionnel des lois États-Unis. Cours constitutionnelles États-Unis. Pouvoir exécutif États-Unis. LAW Civil Procedure. LAW Legal Services. POLITICAL SCIENCE Government Judicial Branch. Constitutional courts Executive power Judicial review Legislative power United States |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=194271 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT zurnchristopherf deliberativedemocracyandtheinstitutionsofjudicialreview |