The limits of Leviathan :: contract theory and the enforcement of International Law /

"Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. The Limits of Leviathan identifies the...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Scott, Robert E., 1944- (VerfasserIn), Stephan, Paul B. (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, ©2006.
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Zusammenfassung:"Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. The Limits of Leviathan identifies the areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments."--Jacket.
Beschreibung:1 online resource (viii, 255 pages)
Bibliographie:Includes bibliographical references (pages 225-245) and index.
ISBN:0511249977
9780511249976
9780511250484
0511250487
0511247834
9780511247835
0511251319
9780511251313
9780511511370
051151137X
9780521858465
0521858461
9780521367974
0521367972

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