Understanding proto-insurgencies /:
To gain the size and capabilities of an insurgency, a would-be insurgent movement must create a politically relevant identity; it must espouse a cause that is popular beyond the group; it must gain dominance over rival organizations; and it must find a sanctuary that provides respite from police, in...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Körperschaft: | |
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, CA :
Rand Corp.,
2007.
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Rand counterinsurgency study ;
paper 3. Occasional paper (Rand Corporation) ; OP-178. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | To gain the size and capabilities of an insurgency, a would-be insurgent movement must create a politically relevant identity; it must espouse a cause that is popular beyond the group; it must gain dominance over rival organizations; and it must find a sanctuary that provides respite from police, intelligence, and military services. Violence is instrumental in all the tasks proto-insurgencies seek to accomplish. However, violence can also backfire on them, since few people support it. Support from outside states offers numerous advantages to groups seeking to become insurgencies. It can provide safe haven, money, training, and help with political mobilization. It can also help groups overcome logistical difficulties, hinder intelligence-gathering against them, and legitimize them, making government delegitimization efforts almost impossible. Outside states, however, often deliberately try to control or even weaken the group and at times can reduce its political popularity. The reaction of the state is often the most important factor in a movement's overall success. Perhaps the best and most efficient way to prevent proto-insurgents from gaining ground is through in-group policing, since groups know their own members and can enable arrests or other forms of pressure. The government can also promote rival identities. Governments must, however, recognize the proto-insurgents' weaknesses and avoid overreaction that may inadvertently strengthen them. The most obvious action for the United States is to anticipate the possibility of an insurgency developing before it materializes. It can also provide behind-the-scenes training and advisory programs and can help inhibit outside support. |
| Beschreibung: | "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense." "RAND National Defense Research Institute." |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xiii, 60 pages) |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| ISBN: | 9780833042828 0833042823 1281181226 9781281181220 9786611181222 6611181229 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Understanding proto-insurgencies / |c Daniel Byman. |
| 260 | |a Santa Monica, CA : |b Rand Corp., |c 2007. | ||
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (xiii, 60 pages) | ||
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| 490 | 1 | |a Rand counterinsurgency study ; |v paper 3 | |
| 490 | 1 | |a Occasional paper (Rand Corporation) ; |v OP-178 | |
| 500 | |a "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense." | ||
| 500 | |a "RAND National Defense Research Institute." | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references. | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Introduction -- Terrorism, insurgency, and proto-insurgency -- The role of violence -- The proto-insurgent's tasks -- The role of the state -- Defeating proto-insurgencies -- Appendix A: Three cases of proto-insurgent success and failure -- Appendix B: Applying the proto-insurgency concept to Saudi Arabia today -- Appendix C: Proto-insurgency indicators. | |
| 520 | |a To gain the size and capabilities of an insurgency, a would-be insurgent movement must create a politically relevant identity; it must espouse a cause that is popular beyond the group; it must gain dominance over rival organizations; and it must find a sanctuary that provides respite from police, intelligence, and military services. Violence is instrumental in all the tasks proto-insurgencies seek to accomplish. However, violence can also backfire on them, since few people support it. Support from outside states offers numerous advantages to groups seeking to become insurgencies. It can provide safe haven, money, training, and help with political mobilization. It can also help groups overcome logistical difficulties, hinder intelligence-gathering against them, and legitimize them, making government delegitimization efforts almost impossible. Outside states, however, often deliberately try to control or even weaken the group and at times can reduce its political popularity. The reaction of the state is often the most important factor in a movement's overall success. Perhaps the best and most efficient way to prevent proto-insurgents from gaining ground is through in-group policing, since groups know their own members and can enable arrests or other forms of pressure. The government can also promote rival identities. Governments must, however, recognize the proto-insurgents' weaknesses and avoid overreaction that may inadvertently strengthen them. The most obvious action for the United States is to anticipate the possibility of an insurgency developing before it materializes. It can also provide behind-the-scenes training and advisory programs and can help inhibit outside support. | ||
| 546 | |a English. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Counterinsurgency. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033442 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Insurgency. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85067073 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Terrorism |x Prevention. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh00007517 | |
| 651 | 0 | |a United States |x Foreign relations. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85140058 | |
| 651 | 0 | |a United States |x Influence. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Contre-rébellion. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Révoltes. | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Terrorisme |x Prévention. | |
| 651 | 6 | |a États-Unis |x Relations extérieures. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING |x Military Science. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a HISTORY |x Military |x Other. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE |x Security (National & International) |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Counterinsurgency |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Influence (Literary, artistic, etc.) |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Insurgency |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Diplomatic relations |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Terrorism |x Prevention |2 fast | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-FWS_katkey | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn174124015 |
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| _version_ | 1816881654463987713 |
| adam_text | |
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| author | Byman, Daniel, 1967- |
| author_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n96104689 |
| author_corporate | National Defense Research Institute (U.S.) |
| author_corporate_role | |
| author_facet | Byman, Daniel, 1967- National Defense Research Institute (U.S.) |
| author_role | |
| author_sort | Byman, Daniel, 1967- |
| author_variant | d b db |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | localFWS |
| callnumber-first | U - Military Science |
| callnumber-label | U241 |
| callnumber-raw | U241 .B95 2007 |
| callnumber-search | U241 .B95 2007 |
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| callnumber-subject | U - General Military Science |
| collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
| contents | Introduction -- Terrorism, insurgency, and proto-insurgency -- The role of violence -- The proto-insurgent's tasks -- The role of the state -- Defeating proto-insurgencies -- Appendix A: Three cases of proto-insurgent success and failure -- Appendix B: Applying the proto-insurgency concept to Saudi Arabia today -- Appendix C: Proto-insurgency indicators. |
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| dewey-search | 355.02/18 |
| dewey-sort | 3355.02 218 |
| dewey-tens | 350 - Public administration and military science |
| discipline | Militärwissenschaft |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense."</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"RAND National Defense Research Institute."</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="504" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Introduction -- Terrorism, insurgency, and proto-insurgency -- The role of violence -- The proto-insurgent's tasks -- The role of the state -- Defeating proto-insurgencies -- Appendix A: Three cases of proto-insurgent success and failure -- Appendix B: Applying the proto-insurgency concept to Saudi Arabia today -- Appendix C: Proto-insurgency indicators.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">To gain the size and capabilities of an insurgency, a would-be insurgent movement must create a politically relevant identity; it must espouse a cause that is popular beyond the group; it must gain dominance over rival organizations; and it must find a sanctuary that provides respite from police, intelligence, and military services. Violence is instrumental in all the tasks proto-insurgencies seek to accomplish. However, violence can also backfire on them, since few people support it. Support from outside states offers numerous advantages to groups seeking to become insurgencies. It can provide safe haven, money, training, and help with political mobilization. It can also help groups overcome logistical difficulties, hinder intelligence-gathering against them, and legitimize them, making government delegitimization efforts almost impossible. Outside states, however, often deliberately try to control or even weaken the group and at times can reduce its political popularity. The reaction of the state is often the most important factor in a movement's overall success. Perhaps the best and most efficient way to prevent proto-insurgents from gaining ground is through in-group policing, since groups know their own members and can enable arrests or other forms of pressure. The government can also promote rival identities. Governments must, however, recognize the proto-insurgents' weaknesses and avoid overreaction that may inadvertently strengthen them. The most obvious action for the United States is to anticipate the possibility of an insurgency developing before it materializes. 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| geographic | United States Foreign relations. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85140058 United States Influence. États-Unis Relations extérieures. United States fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq |
| geographic_facet | United States Foreign relations. United States Influence. États-Unis Relations extérieures. United States |
| id | ZDB-4-EBA-ocn174124015 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:16:09Z |
| institution | BVB |
| institution_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n91060525 |
| isbn | 9780833042828 0833042823 1281181226 9781281181220 9786611181222 6611181229 |
| language | English |
| oclc_num | 174124015 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 online resource (xiii, 60 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-4-EBA |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | Rand Corp., |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Rand counterinsurgency study ; Occasional paper (Rand Corporation) ; |
| series2 | Rand counterinsurgency study ; Occasional paper (Rand Corporation) ; |
| spelling | Byman, Daniel, 1967- https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjt4g4pjBqk4HDKrYdWCcP http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n96104689 Understanding proto-insurgencies / Daniel Byman. Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corp., 2007. 1 online resource (xiii, 60 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file Rand counterinsurgency study ; paper 3 Occasional paper (Rand Corporation) ; OP-178 "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense." "RAND National Defense Research Institute." Includes bibliographical references. Introduction -- Terrorism, insurgency, and proto-insurgency -- The role of violence -- The proto-insurgent's tasks -- The role of the state -- Defeating proto-insurgencies -- Appendix A: Three cases of proto-insurgent success and failure -- Appendix B: Applying the proto-insurgency concept to Saudi Arabia today -- Appendix C: Proto-insurgency indicators. To gain the size and capabilities of an insurgency, a would-be insurgent movement must create a politically relevant identity; it must espouse a cause that is popular beyond the group; it must gain dominance over rival organizations; and it must find a sanctuary that provides respite from police, intelligence, and military services. Violence is instrumental in all the tasks proto-insurgencies seek to accomplish. However, violence can also backfire on them, since few people support it. Support from outside states offers numerous advantages to groups seeking to become insurgencies. It can provide safe haven, money, training, and help with political mobilization. It can also help groups overcome logistical difficulties, hinder intelligence-gathering against them, and legitimize them, making government delegitimization efforts almost impossible. Outside states, however, often deliberately try to control or even weaken the group and at times can reduce its political popularity. The reaction of the state is often the most important factor in a movement's overall success. Perhaps the best and most efficient way to prevent proto-insurgents from gaining ground is through in-group policing, since groups know their own members and can enable arrests or other forms of pressure. The government can also promote rival identities. Governments must, however, recognize the proto-insurgents' weaknesses and avoid overreaction that may inadvertently strengthen them. The most obvious action for the United States is to anticipate the possibility of an insurgency developing before it materializes. It can also provide behind-the-scenes training and advisory programs and can help inhibit outside support. English. Counterinsurgency. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033442 Insurgency. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85067073 Terrorism Prevention. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh00007517 United States Foreign relations. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85140058 United States Influence. Contre-rébellion. Révoltes. Terrorisme Prévention. États-Unis Relations extérieures. TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING Military Science. bisacsh HISTORY Military Other. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Security (National & International) bisacsh Counterinsurgency fast Influence (Literary, artistic, etc.) fast Insurgency fast Diplomatic relations fast Terrorism Prevention fast United States fast https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJtxgQXMWqmjMjjwXRHgrq National Defense Research Institute (U.S.) http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n91060525 RAND (Online publications) Print version: Byman, Daniel, 1967- Understanding proto-insurgencies. Santa Monica, CA : Rand Corp., 2007 9780833041364 0833041363 (DLC) 2007034546 (OCoLC)166290714 Rand counterinsurgency study ; paper 3. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2007129944 Occasional paper (Rand Corporation) ; OP-178. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2004031492 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=213943 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Byman, Daniel, 1967- Understanding proto-insurgencies / Rand counterinsurgency study ; Occasional paper (Rand Corporation) ; Introduction -- Terrorism, insurgency, and proto-insurgency -- The role of violence -- The proto-insurgent's tasks -- The role of the state -- Defeating proto-insurgencies -- Appendix A: Three cases of proto-insurgent success and failure -- Appendix B: Applying the proto-insurgency concept to Saudi Arabia today -- Appendix C: Proto-insurgency indicators. Counterinsurgency. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033442 Insurgency. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85067073 Terrorism Prevention. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh00007517 Contre-rébellion. Révoltes. Terrorisme Prévention. TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING Military Science. bisacsh HISTORY Military Other. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Security (National & International) bisacsh Counterinsurgency fast Influence (Literary, artistic, etc.) fast Insurgency fast Diplomatic relations fast Terrorism Prevention fast |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033442 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85067073 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh00007517 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85140058 |
| title | Understanding proto-insurgencies / |
| title_alt | RAND (Online publications) |
| title_auth | Understanding proto-insurgencies / |
| title_exact_search | Understanding proto-insurgencies / |
| title_full | Understanding proto-insurgencies / Daniel Byman. |
| title_fullStr | Understanding proto-insurgencies / Daniel Byman. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Understanding proto-insurgencies / Daniel Byman. |
| title_short | Understanding proto-insurgencies / |
| title_sort | understanding proto insurgencies |
| topic | Counterinsurgency. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85033442 Insurgency. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85067073 Terrorism Prevention. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh00007517 Contre-rébellion. Révoltes. Terrorisme Prévention. TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING Military Science. bisacsh HISTORY Military Other. bisacsh POLITICAL SCIENCE Security (National & International) bisacsh Counterinsurgency fast Influence (Literary, artistic, etc.) fast Insurgency fast Diplomatic relations fast Terrorism Prevention fast |
| topic_facet | Counterinsurgency. Insurgency. Terrorism Prevention. United States Foreign relations. United States Influence. Contre-rébellion. Révoltes. Terrorisme Prévention. États-Unis Relations extérieures. TECHNOLOGY & ENGINEERING Military Science. HISTORY Military Other. POLITICAL SCIENCE Security (National & International) Counterinsurgency Influence (Literary, artistic, etc.) Insurgency Diplomatic relations Terrorism Prevention United States |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=213943 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bymandaniel understandingprotoinsurgencies AT nationaldefenseresearchinstituteus understandingprotoinsurgencies |