Natural minds /:
In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain--that sensations are brain processes--and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advoca...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
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| Zusammenfassung: | In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain--that sensations are brain processes--and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties--a "tough-minded" account that maintains that minds are necessarily identical to brains, a position held by few current identity theorists. Polger's approach to what William James called the "great blooming buzzing confusion" of consciousness begins with the idea that we need to know more about brains in order to understand consciousness fully, but recognizes that biology alone cannot provide the entire explanation. Natural Minds takes on issues from philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and metaphysics, moving freely among them in its discussion. Polger begins by answering two major objections to identity theory--Hilary Putnam's argument from multiple realizability (which discounts identity theory because creatures with brains unlike ours could also have mental states) and Saul Kripke's modal argument against mind-brain identity (based on the apparent contingency of the identity statement). He then offers a detailed account of functionalism and functional realization, which offer the most serious obstacle to consideration of identity theory. Polger argues that identity theory can itself satisfy the kind of explanatory demands that are often believed to favor functionalism |
| Beschreibung: | "A Bradford book." |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xxvii, 294 pages) : illustrations |
| Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 271-287) and index. |
| ISBN: | 9780262281737 0262281732 1417560738 9781417560738 0262162210 9780262162210 0262661969 9780262661966 |
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| 520 | |a In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain--that sensations are brain processes--and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties--a "tough-minded" account that maintains that minds are necessarily identical to brains, a position held by few current identity theorists. Polger's approach to what William James called the "great blooming buzzing confusion" of consciousness begins with the idea that we need to know more about brains in order to understand consciousness fully, but recognizes that biology alone cannot provide the entire explanation. Natural Minds takes on issues from philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and metaphysics, moving freely among them in its discussion. Polger begins by answering two major objections to identity theory--Hilary Putnam's argument from multiple realizability (which discounts identity theory because creatures with brains unlike ours could also have mental states) and Saul Kripke's modal argument against mind-brain identity (based on the apparent contingency of the identity statement). He then offers a detailed account of functionalism and functional realization, which offer the most serious obstacle to consideration of identity theory. Polger argues that identity theory can itself satisfy the kind of explanatory demands that are often believed to favor functionalism | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a 1. Minds, Brains, and Multiple Realizability -- 2. The Illusion of Contingent Identity -- 3. Varieties of Functionalism -- 4. Realization and Generic Functionalism -- 5. Functional Realizations -- 6. Functional Properties and Mechanistic Explanations -- 7. Dennett's Challenge -- 8. Minds, Brains, and Persons. | |
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| 650 | 0 | |a Mind-brain identity theory. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085491 | |
| 650 | 6 | |a Théorie de l'identité de l'esprit et du cerveau. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a PHILOSOPHY |x Mind & Body. |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Mind-brain identity theory |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Philosophy. |2 hilcc | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Philosophy & Religion. |2 hilcc | |
| 653 | |a COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General | ||
| 653 | |a PHILOSOPHY/General | ||
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| author | Polger, Thomas W. |
| author_facet | Polger, Thomas W. |
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| contents | 1. Minds, Brains, and Multiple Realizability -- 2. The Illusion of Contingent Identity -- 3. Varieties of Functionalism -- 4. Realization and Generic Functionalism -- 5. Functional Realizations -- 6. Functional Properties and Mechanistic Explanations -- 7. Dennett's Challenge -- 8. Minds, Brains, and Persons. |
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| dewey-ones | 128 - Humankind |
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| dewey-search | 128/.2 |
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| indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:15:38Z |
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| spelling | Polger, Thomas W. Natural minds / Thomas W. Polger. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2004. 1 online resource (xxvii, 294 pages) : illustrations text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier "A Bradford book." Includes bibliographical references (pages 271-287) and index. Print version record. In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain--that sensations are brain processes--and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties--a "tough-minded" account that maintains that minds are necessarily identical to brains, a position held by few current identity theorists. Polger's approach to what William James called the "great blooming buzzing confusion" of consciousness begins with the idea that we need to know more about brains in order to understand consciousness fully, but recognizes that biology alone cannot provide the entire explanation. Natural Minds takes on issues from philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and metaphysics, moving freely among them in its discussion. Polger begins by answering two major objections to identity theory--Hilary Putnam's argument from multiple realizability (which discounts identity theory because creatures with brains unlike ours could also have mental states) and Saul Kripke's modal argument against mind-brain identity (based on the apparent contingency of the identity statement). He then offers a detailed account of functionalism and functional realization, which offer the most serious obstacle to consideration of identity theory. Polger argues that identity theory can itself satisfy the kind of explanatory demands that are often believed to favor functionalism 1. Minds, Brains, and Multiple Realizability -- 2. The Illusion of Contingent Identity -- 3. Varieties of Functionalism -- 4. Realization and Generic Functionalism -- 5. Functional Realizations -- 6. Functional Properties and Mechanistic Explanations -- 7. Dennett's Challenge -- 8. Minds, Brains, and Persons. English. Mind-brain identity theory. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085491 Théorie de l'identité de l'esprit et du cerveau. PHILOSOPHY Mind & Body. bisacsh Mind-brain identity theory fast Philosophy. hilcc Philosophy & Religion. hilcc COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General PHILOSOPHY/General Print version: Polger, Thomas W. Natural minds. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2004 0262162210 (DLC) 2003048826 (OCoLC)52134673 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=122541 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Polger, Thomas W. Natural minds / 1. Minds, Brains, and Multiple Realizability -- 2. The Illusion of Contingent Identity -- 3. Varieties of Functionalism -- 4. Realization and Generic Functionalism -- 5. Functional Realizations -- 6. Functional Properties and Mechanistic Explanations -- 7. Dennett's Challenge -- 8. Minds, Brains, and Persons. Mind-brain identity theory. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085491 Théorie de l'identité de l'esprit et du cerveau. PHILOSOPHY Mind & Body. bisacsh Mind-brain identity theory fast Philosophy. hilcc Philosophy & Religion. hilcc |
| subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085491 |
| title | Natural minds / |
| title_auth | Natural minds / |
| title_exact_search | Natural minds / |
| title_full | Natural minds / Thomas W. Polger. |
| title_fullStr | Natural minds / Thomas W. Polger. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Natural minds / Thomas W. Polger. |
| title_short | Natural minds / |
| title_sort | natural minds |
| topic | Mind-brain identity theory. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85085491 Théorie de l'identité de l'esprit et du cerveau. PHILOSOPHY Mind & Body. bisacsh Mind-brain identity theory fast Philosophy. hilcc Philosophy & Religion. hilcc |
| topic_facet | Mind-brain identity theory. Théorie de l'identité de l'esprit et du cerveau. PHILOSOPHY Mind & Body. Mind-brain identity theory Philosophy. Philosophy & Religion. |
| url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=122541 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT polgerthomasw naturalminds |