Toward a comparative institutional analysis /:
A conceptual and analytical framework for understanding economic institutions and institutional change. Markets are one of the most salient institutions produced by humans, and economists have traditionally analyzed the workings of the market mechanism. Recently, however, economists and others have...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass. :
MIT Press,
©2001.
|
Schriftenreihe: | Comparative institutional analysis ;
2. |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | A conceptual and analytical framework for understanding economic institutions and institutional change. Markets are one of the most salient institutions produced by humans, and economists have traditionally analyzed the workings of the market mechanism. Recently, however, economists and others have begun to appreciate the many institution-related events and phenomena that have a significant impact on economic performance. Examples include the demise of the communist states, the emergence of Silicon Valley and e-commerce, the European currency unification, and the East Asian financial crises. In this book Masahiko Aoki uses modern game theory to develop a conceptual and analytical framework for understanding issues related to economic institutions. The wide-ranging discussion considers how institutions evolve, why their overall arrangements are robust and diverse across economies, and why they do or do not change in response to environmental factors such as technological progress, global market integration, and demographic change. |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xi, 467 pages) : illustrations |
Bibliographie: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 433-456) and index. |
ISBN: | 9780262267212 0262267217 0585475482 9780585475486 |
Internformat
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100 | 1 | |a Aoki, Masahiko, |d 1938-2015. |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJvMFppmjGHBrWcVVpBkjC | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Toward a comparative institutional analysis / |c Masahiko Aoki. |
260 | |a Cambridge, Mass. : |b MIT Press, |c ©2001. | ||
300 | |a 1 online resource (xi, 467 pages) : |b illustrations | ||
336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
490 | 1 | |a Comparative institutional analysis ; |v 2 | |
504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 433-456) and index. | ||
588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
520 | |a A conceptual and analytical framework for understanding economic institutions and institutional change. Markets are one of the most salient institutions produced by humans, and economists have traditionally analyzed the workings of the market mechanism. Recently, however, economists and others have begun to appreciate the many institution-related events and phenomena that have a significant impact on economic performance. Examples include the demise of the communist states, the emergence of Silicon Valley and e-commerce, the European currency unification, and the East Asian financial crises. In this book Masahiko Aoki uses modern game theory to develop a conceptual and analytical framework for understanding issues related to economic institutions. The wide-ranging discussion considers how institutions evolve, why their overall arrangements are robust and diverse across economies, and why they do or do not change in response to environmental factors such as technological progress, global market integration, and demographic change. | ||
546 | |a English. | ||
505 | 0 | 0 | |g 1. |t What Are Institutions? How Should We Approach Them? -- |g 1.1. |t Three Views of Institutions in a Game-Theoretic Perspective. -- |g 1.2. |t Aspects of Institutions: Shared Beliefs, Summary Representations of Equilibrium, and Endogenous Rules of the Game. -- |g 1.3. |t Organization of the Book -- |g 2. |t Customary Property Rights and Community Norms. -- |g 2.1. |t Customary Property Rights as a Self-organizing System. -- |g 2.2. |t Community Norms as a Self-enforcing Solution to the Commons Problem. -- |g App. |t History versus Ecology as a Determinant of a Norm: The Case of Yi Korea -- |g 3. |t Private-Ordered Governance of Trade, Contracts, and Markets. -- |g 3.1. |t Traders' Norms. -- |g 3.2. |t Cultural Beliefs and Self-enforcing Employment Contracts. -- |g 3.3. |t Private Third-Party Governance: The Law Merchant. |
650 | 0 | |a Institutional economics. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85066745 | |
650 | 0 | |a Game theory. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 | |
650 | 2 | |a Game Theory |0 https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D005716 | |
650 | 6 | |a Institutionnalisme. | |
650 | 6 | |a Théorie des jeux. | |
650 | 7 | |a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS |x Real Estate |x General. |2 bisacsh | |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Game theory. |2 cct |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Institutional economics. |2 cct |
650 | 7 | |a Game theory |2 fast | |
650 | 7 | |a Institutional economics |2 fast | |
650 | 1 | 7 | |a Instituties. |2 gtt |
650 | 1 | 7 | |a Economie. |2 gtt |
650 | 1 | 7 | |a Speltheorie. |2 gtt |
653 | |a ECONOMICS/Game Theory | ||
653 | |a ECONOMICS/Political Economy | ||
758 | |i has work: |a Toward a comparative institutional analysis (Text) |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGw4dqrGDTC8jQ8bpQdDG3 |4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork | ||
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Aoki, Masahiko, 1938- |t Toward a comparative institutional analysis. |d Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2001 |z 0262011875 |w (DLC) 2001032633 |w (OCoLC)46929292 |
830 | 0 | |a Comparative institutional analysis ; |v 2. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/nr2001017026 | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
DE-BY-FWS_katkey | ZDB-4-EBA-ocm53196470 |
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adam_text | |
any_adam_object | |
author | Aoki, Masahiko, 1938-2015 |
author_facet | Aoki, Masahiko, 1938-2015 |
author_role | |
author_sort | Aoki, Masahiko, 1938-2015 |
author_variant | m a ma |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | localFWS |
callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
callnumber-label | HB99 |
callnumber-raw | HB99.5 .A63 2001eb |
callnumber-search | HB99.5 .A63 2001eb |
callnumber-sort | HB 299.5 A63 42001EB |
callnumber-subject | HB - Economic Theory and Demography |
collection | ZDB-4-EBA |
contents | What Are Institutions? How Should We Approach Them? -- Three Views of Institutions in a Game-Theoretic Perspective. -- Aspects of Institutions: Shared Beliefs, Summary Representations of Equilibrium, and Endogenous Rules of the Game. -- Organization of the Book -- Customary Property Rights and Community Norms. -- Customary Property Rights as a Self-organizing System. -- Community Norms as a Self-enforcing Solution to the Commons Problem. -- History versus Ecology as a Determinant of a Norm: The Case of Yi Korea -- Private-Ordered Governance of Trade, Contracts, and Markets. -- Traders' Norms. -- Cultural Beliefs and Self-enforcing Employment Contracts. -- Private Third-Party Governance: The Law Merchant. |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)53196470 |
dewey-full | 333 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 333 - Economics of land and energy |
dewey-raw | 333 |
dewey-search | 333 |
dewey-sort | 3333 |
dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Electronic eBook |
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id | ZDB-4-EBA-ocm53196470 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-11-27T13:15:29Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780262267212 0262267217 0585475482 9780585475486 |
language | English |
oclc_num | 53196470 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
owner_facet | MAIN DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
physical | 1 online resource (xi, 467 pages) : illustrations |
psigel | ZDB-4-EBA |
publishDate | 2001 |
publishDateSearch | 2001 |
publishDateSort | 2001 |
publisher | MIT Press, |
record_format | marc |
series | Comparative institutional analysis ; |
series2 | Comparative institutional analysis ; |
spelling | Aoki, Masahiko, 1938-2015. https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJvMFppmjGHBrWcVVpBkjC Toward a comparative institutional analysis / Masahiko Aoki. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2001. 1 online resource (xi, 467 pages) : illustrations text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Comparative institutional analysis ; 2 Includes bibliographical references (pages 433-456) and index. Print version record. A conceptual and analytical framework for understanding economic institutions and institutional change. Markets are one of the most salient institutions produced by humans, and economists have traditionally analyzed the workings of the market mechanism. Recently, however, economists and others have begun to appreciate the many institution-related events and phenomena that have a significant impact on economic performance. Examples include the demise of the communist states, the emergence of Silicon Valley and e-commerce, the European currency unification, and the East Asian financial crises. In this book Masahiko Aoki uses modern game theory to develop a conceptual and analytical framework for understanding issues related to economic institutions. The wide-ranging discussion considers how institutions evolve, why their overall arrangements are robust and diverse across economies, and why they do or do not change in response to environmental factors such as technological progress, global market integration, and demographic change. English. 1. What Are Institutions? How Should We Approach Them? -- 1.1. Three Views of Institutions in a Game-Theoretic Perspective. -- 1.2. Aspects of Institutions: Shared Beliefs, Summary Representations of Equilibrium, and Endogenous Rules of the Game. -- 1.3. Organization of the Book -- 2. Customary Property Rights and Community Norms. -- 2.1. Customary Property Rights as a Self-organizing System. -- 2.2. Community Norms as a Self-enforcing Solution to the Commons Problem. -- App. History versus Ecology as a Determinant of a Norm: The Case of Yi Korea -- 3. Private-Ordered Governance of Trade, Contracts, and Markets. -- 3.1. Traders' Norms. -- 3.2. Cultural Beliefs and Self-enforcing Employment Contracts. -- 3.3. Private Third-Party Governance: The Law Merchant. Institutional economics. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85066745 Game theory. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 Game Theory https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D005716 Institutionnalisme. Théorie des jeux. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Real Estate General. bisacsh Game theory. cct Institutional economics. cct Game theory fast Institutional economics fast Instituties. gtt Economie. gtt Speltheorie. gtt ECONOMICS/Game Theory ECONOMICS/Political Economy has work: Toward a comparative institutional analysis (Text) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCGw4dqrGDTC8jQ8bpQdDG3 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork Print version: Aoki, Masahiko, 1938- Toward a comparative institutional analysis. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2001 0262011875 (DLC) 2001032633 (OCoLC)46929292 Comparative institutional analysis ; 2. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/nr2001017026 FWS01 ZDB-4-EBA FWS_PDA_EBA https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=78220 Volltext |
spellingShingle | Aoki, Masahiko, 1938-2015 Toward a comparative institutional analysis / Comparative institutional analysis ; What Are Institutions? How Should We Approach Them? -- Three Views of Institutions in a Game-Theoretic Perspective. -- Aspects of Institutions: Shared Beliefs, Summary Representations of Equilibrium, and Endogenous Rules of the Game. -- Organization of the Book -- Customary Property Rights and Community Norms. -- Customary Property Rights as a Self-organizing System. -- Community Norms as a Self-enforcing Solution to the Commons Problem. -- History versus Ecology as a Determinant of a Norm: The Case of Yi Korea -- Private-Ordered Governance of Trade, Contracts, and Markets. -- Traders' Norms. -- Cultural Beliefs and Self-enforcing Employment Contracts. -- Private Third-Party Governance: The Law Merchant. Institutional economics. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85066745 Game theory. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 Game Theory https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D005716 Institutionnalisme. Théorie des jeux. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Real Estate General. bisacsh Game theory. cct Institutional economics. cct Game theory fast Institutional economics fast Instituties. gtt Economie. gtt Speltheorie. gtt |
subject_GND | http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85066745 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D005716 |
title | Toward a comparative institutional analysis / |
title_alt | What Are Institutions? How Should We Approach Them? -- Three Views of Institutions in a Game-Theoretic Perspective. -- Aspects of Institutions: Shared Beliefs, Summary Representations of Equilibrium, and Endogenous Rules of the Game. -- Organization of the Book -- Customary Property Rights and Community Norms. -- Customary Property Rights as a Self-organizing System. -- Community Norms as a Self-enforcing Solution to the Commons Problem. -- History versus Ecology as a Determinant of a Norm: The Case of Yi Korea -- Private-Ordered Governance of Trade, Contracts, and Markets. -- Traders' Norms. -- Cultural Beliefs and Self-enforcing Employment Contracts. -- Private Third-Party Governance: The Law Merchant. |
title_auth | Toward a comparative institutional analysis / |
title_exact_search | Toward a comparative institutional analysis / |
title_full | Toward a comparative institutional analysis / Masahiko Aoki. |
title_fullStr | Toward a comparative institutional analysis / Masahiko Aoki. |
title_full_unstemmed | Toward a comparative institutional analysis / Masahiko Aoki. |
title_short | Toward a comparative institutional analysis / |
title_sort | toward a comparative institutional analysis |
topic | Institutional economics. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85066745 Game theory. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 Game Theory https://id.nlm.nih.gov/mesh/D005716 Institutionnalisme. Théorie des jeux. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Real Estate General. bisacsh Game theory. cct Institutional economics. cct Game theory fast Institutional economics fast Instituties. gtt Economie. gtt Speltheorie. gtt |
topic_facet | Institutional economics. Game theory. Game Theory Institutionnalisme. Théorie des jeux. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS Real Estate General. Game theory Institutional economics Instituties. Economie. Speltheorie. |
url | https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=78220 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT aokimasahiko towardacomparativeinstitutionalanalysis |