Seeing through self-deception /:

What is it to deceive someone? And how is it possible to deceive oneself? Does self-deception require that people be taken in by a deceitful strategy that they know is deceitful? The literature is divided between those who argue that self-deception is intentional and those who argue that it is non-i...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Barnes, Annette
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Schriftenreihe:Cambridge studies in philosophy.
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Zusammenfassung:What is it to deceive someone? And how is it possible to deceive oneself? Does self-deception require that people be taken in by a deceitful strategy that they know is deceitful? The literature is divided between those who argue that self-deception is intentional and those who argue that it is non-intentional. In this study, Annette Barnes offers a challenge to both the standard characterization of other-deception and characterizations of self-deception, examining the available explanations and exploring such questions as the self-deceiver's false consciousness, bias and the irrationality and objectionability of self-deception. She arrives at a non-intentional account of self-deception that is deeper and more complete than alternative non-intentional accounts and avoids the reduction of self-deceptive belief to wishful belief.
Beschreibung:1 online resource (x, 182 pages)
Bibliographie:Includes bibliographical references (pages 176-179) and index.
ISBN:0511001894
9780511001895

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