Fiscal constitutions: An empirical assessment:
Fiscal constitutions comprise the set of rules and frameworks guiding fiscal policy that are enshrined in a country's fundamental laws. This paper compares the fiscal constitutions of 15 federal countries by empirically assessing five building blocks: 1) the power of sub-national governments to...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
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Paris
OECD Publishing
2015
|
| Schriftenreihe: | OECD Economics Department Working Papers
no.1248 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Fiscal constitutions comprise the set of rules and frameworks guiding fiscal policy that are enshrined in a country's fundamental laws. This paper compares the fiscal constitutions of 15 federal countries by empirically assessing five building blocks: 1) the power of sub-national governments to conduct their own fiscal policy; 2) the degree to which sub-national governments are held responsible for fiscal policy outcomes; 3) the extent to which sub-national governments can shape fiscal policy of the federal level; 4) the strength of intergovernmental budget rules; and 5) the stability of fiscal policy arrangements. The results can be summarised as follows: Countries can be ranked along a single indicator, namely the degree of constitutionally guaranteed decentralisation. They can also be ranked along an indicator of institutional coherence which measures the extent to which building blocks "fit together". From 1917 to 2013, fiscal autonomy and responsibility declined - except in the 80s and 90s of the 20th century - while co-determination and budget frameworks were strengthened, and institutional coherence rose. Simple correlations suggest that the extent of decentralisation hardly affects fiscal outcomes such as deficits, debt or vulnerability to crises, while institutional coherence (or incoherence for that purpose) does. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (45 p.) 21 x 29.7cm. |
| DOI: | 10.1787/5jrxjctrxp8r-en |
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| 520 | |a Fiscal constitutions comprise the set of rules and frameworks guiding fiscal policy that are enshrined in a country's fundamental laws. This paper compares the fiscal constitutions of 15 federal countries by empirically assessing five building blocks: 1) the power of sub-national governments to conduct their own fiscal policy; 2) the degree to which sub-national governments are held responsible for fiscal policy outcomes; 3) the extent to which sub-national governments can shape fiscal policy of the federal level; 4) the strength of intergovernmental budget rules; and 5) the stability of fiscal policy arrangements. The results can be summarised as follows: Countries can be ranked along a single indicator, namely the degree of constitutionally guaranteed decentralisation. They can also be ranked along an indicator of institutional coherence which measures the extent to which building blocks "fit together". From 1917 to 2013, fiscal autonomy and responsibility declined - except in the 80s and 90s of the 20th century - while co-determination and budget frameworks were strengthened, and institutional coherence rose. Simple correlations suggest that the extent of decentralisation hardly affects fiscal outcomes such as deficits, debt or vulnerability to crises, while institutional coherence (or incoherence for that purpose) does. | ||
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| spelling | Blöchliger, Hansjörg VerfasserIn aut Fiscal constitutions: An empirical assessment Hansjörg, Blöchliger and Jaroslaw, Kantorowicz = Une évaluation empirique des constitutions budgétaires / Hansjörg, Blöchliger et Jaroslaw, Kantorowicz Une évaluation empirique des constitutions budgétaires Paris OECD Publishing 2015 1 Online-Ressource (45 p.) 21 x 29.7cm. Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier OECD Economics Department Working Papers no.1248 Fiscal constitutions comprise the set of rules and frameworks guiding fiscal policy that are enshrined in a country's fundamental laws. This paper compares the fiscal constitutions of 15 federal countries by empirically assessing five building blocks: 1) the power of sub-national governments to conduct their own fiscal policy; 2) the degree to which sub-national governments are held responsible for fiscal policy outcomes; 3) the extent to which sub-national governments can shape fiscal policy of the federal level; 4) the strength of intergovernmental budget rules; and 5) the stability of fiscal policy arrangements. The results can be summarised as follows: Countries can be ranked along a single indicator, namely the degree of constitutionally guaranteed decentralisation. They can also be ranked along an indicator of institutional coherence which measures the extent to which building blocks "fit together". From 1917 to 2013, fiscal autonomy and responsibility declined - except in the 80s and 90s of the 20th century - while co-determination and budget frameworks were strengthened, and institutional coherence rose. Simple correlations suggest that the extent of decentralisation hardly affects fiscal outcomes such as deficits, debt or vulnerability to crises, while institutional coherence (or incoherence for that purpose) does. Economics Kantorowicz, Jaroslaw MitwirkendeR ctb FWS01 ZDB-13-SOC FWS_PDA_SOC https://doi.org/10.1787/5jrxjctrxp8r-en Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Blöchliger, Hansjörg Fiscal constitutions: An empirical assessment Economics |
| title | Fiscal constitutions: An empirical assessment |
| title_alt | Une évaluation empirique des constitutions budgétaires |
| title_auth | Fiscal constitutions: An empirical assessment |
| title_exact_search | Fiscal constitutions: An empirical assessment |
| title_full | Fiscal constitutions: An empirical assessment Hansjörg, Blöchliger and Jaroslaw, Kantorowicz = Une évaluation empirique des constitutions budgétaires / Hansjörg, Blöchliger et Jaroslaw, Kantorowicz |
| title_fullStr | Fiscal constitutions: An empirical assessment Hansjörg, Blöchliger and Jaroslaw, Kantorowicz = Une évaluation empirique des constitutions budgétaires / Hansjörg, Blöchliger et Jaroslaw, Kantorowicz |
| title_full_unstemmed | Fiscal constitutions: An empirical assessment Hansjörg, Blöchliger and Jaroslaw, Kantorowicz = Une évaluation empirique des constitutions budgétaires / Hansjörg, Blöchliger et Jaroslaw, Kantorowicz |
| title_short | Fiscal constitutions: An empirical assessment |
| title_sort | fiscal constitutions an empirical assessment |
| topic | Economics |
| topic_facet | Economics |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1787/5jrxjctrxp8r-en |
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