The Macro-Prudential Authority: Powers, Scope and Accountability
Neither the achievement of price stability, via the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), nor the application of micro-prudential oversight, via the Financial Services Authority (FSA), led to overall financial stability. There is a gap that needs to be filled by a macro-prudential authority (M-PA), the F...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch Artikel |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Paris
OECD Publishing
2012
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Neither the achievement of price stability, via the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), nor the application of micro-prudential oversight, via the Financial Services Authority (FSA), led to overall financial stability. There is a gap that needs to be filled by a macro-prudential authority (M-PA), the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the United Kingdom. The only macro-prudential instrument used heretofore has been the publication of Financial Stability Reviews (FSR). While worthy, these have been ineffective. The M-PA should have the following powers: First, the power to alter the composition of Central Bank (CB) assets, by adding to (subtracting from) its holdings of claims on the private sector. The argument that such actions are 'quasi-fiscal', and should therefore not be undertaken, is not supported. Second, the power to adjust margins (Capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios, loan-to-value ratios, etc.) to influence the conduct of financial intermediation. The argument that the use of such powers puts the FPC in a difficult conflict with the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is not supported... |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (27 p.) 21 x 28cm. |
| DOI: | 10.1787/fmt-2011-5k9cswn0jrr1 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000caa a22000002 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | ZDB-13-SOC-061271152 | ||
| 003 | DE-627-1 | ||
| 005 | 20231204121023.0 | ||
| 007 | cr uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 210204s2012 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1787/fmt-2011-5k9cswn0jrr1 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (DE-627-1)061271152 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)KEP061271152 | ||
| 035 | |a (FR-PaOEC)fmt-2011-5k9cswn0jrr1 | ||
| 035 | |a (EBP)061271152 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rda | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Goodhart, Charles A.E... |e VerfasserIn |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 4 | |a The Macro-Prudential Authority |b Powers, Scope and Accountability |c Charles A.E., Goodhart |
| 264 | 1 | |a Paris |b OECD Publishing |c 2012 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (27 p.) |c 21 x 28cm. | ||
| 336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a Computermedien |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Online-Ressource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a Neither the achievement of price stability, via the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), nor the application of micro-prudential oversight, via the Financial Services Authority (FSA), led to overall financial stability. There is a gap that needs to be filled by a macro-prudential authority (M-PA), the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the United Kingdom. The only macro-prudential instrument used heretofore has been the publication of Financial Stability Reviews (FSR). While worthy, these have been ineffective. The M-PA should have the following powers: First, the power to alter the composition of Central Bank (CB) assets, by adding to (subtracting from) its holdings of claims on the private sector. The argument that such actions are 'quasi-fiscal', and should therefore not be undertaken, is not supported. Second, the power to adjust margins (Capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios, loan-to-value ratios, etc.) to influence the conduct of financial intermediation. The argument that the use of such powers puts the FPC in a difficult conflict with the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is not supported... | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Finance and Investment | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends |g Vol. 2011, no. 2, p. 97-123 |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:2011 |g year:2011 |g number:2 |g pages:97-123 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |l FWS01 |p ZDB-13-SOC |q FWS_PDA_SOC |u https://doi.org/10.1787/fmt-2011-5k9cswn0jrr1 |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-13-SOC | ||
| 912 | |a ZDB-13-SOC-article | ||
| 912 | |a ZDB-13-SOC | ||
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| 912 | |a ZDB-13-SOC | ||
| 049 | |a DE-863 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| DE-BY-FWS_katkey | ZDB-13-SOC-061271152 |
|---|---|
| _version_ | 1804748672437583873 |
| adam_text | |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Goodhart, Charles A.E.. |
| author_facet | Goodhart, Charles A.E.. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Goodhart, Charles A.E.. |
| author_variant | c a g ca cag |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | localFWS |
| collection | ZDB-13-SOC ZDB-13-SOC-article |
| ctrlnum | (DE-627-1)061271152 (DE-599)KEP061271152 (FR-PaOEC)fmt-2011-5k9cswn0jrr1 (EBP)061271152 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1787/fmt-2011-5k9cswn0jrr1 |
| format | Electronic Article |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02338caa a22003612 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">ZDB-13-SOC-061271152</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627-1</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20231204121023.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">210204s2012 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1787/fmt-2011-5k9cswn0jrr1</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627-1)061271152</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)KEP061271152</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(FR-PaOEC)fmt-2011-5k9cswn0jrr1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(EBP)061271152</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Goodhart, Charles A.E...</subfield><subfield code="e">VerfasserIn</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">The Macro-Prudential Authority</subfield><subfield code="b">Powers, Scope and Accountability</subfield><subfield code="c">Charles A.E., Goodhart</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Paris</subfield><subfield code="b">OECD Publishing</subfield><subfield code="c">2012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (27 p.)</subfield><subfield code="c">21 x 28cm.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Neither the achievement of price stability, via the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), nor the application of micro-prudential oversight, via the Financial Services Authority (FSA), led to overall financial stability. There is a gap that needs to be filled by a macro-prudential authority (M-PA), the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the United Kingdom. The only macro-prudential instrument used heretofore has been the publication of Financial Stability Reviews (FSR). While worthy, these have been ineffective. The M-PA should have the following powers: First, the power to alter the composition of Central Bank (CB) assets, by adding to (subtracting from) its holdings of claims on the private sector. The argument that such actions are 'quasi-fiscal', and should therefore not be undertaken, is not supported. Second, the power to adjust margins (Capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios, loan-to-value ratios, etc.) to influence the conduct of financial intermediation. The argument that the use of such powers puts the FPC in a difficult conflict with the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is not supported...</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Finance and Investment</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends</subfield><subfield code="g">Vol. 2011, no. 2, p. 97-123</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:2011</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2011</subfield><subfield code="g">number:2</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:97-123</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="l">FWS01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-13-SOC</subfield><subfield code="q">FWS_PDA_SOC</subfield><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1787/fmt-2011-5k9cswn0jrr1</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-13-SOC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-13-SOC-article</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-13-SOC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-13-SOC</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-863</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | ZDB-13-SOC-061271152 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-16T15:07:36Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| owner_facet | DE-863 DE-BY-FWS |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (27 p.) 21 x 28cm. |
| psigel | ZDB-13-SOC ZDB-13-SOC-article |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| publishDateSearch | 2012 |
| publishDateSort | 2012 |
| publisher | OECD Publishing |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Goodhart, Charles A.E... VerfasserIn aut The Macro-Prudential Authority Powers, Scope and Accountability Charles A.E., Goodhart Paris OECD Publishing 2012 1 Online-Ressource (27 p.) 21 x 28cm. Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Neither the achievement of price stability, via the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), nor the application of micro-prudential oversight, via the Financial Services Authority (FSA), led to overall financial stability. There is a gap that needs to be filled by a macro-prudential authority (M-PA), the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the United Kingdom. The only macro-prudential instrument used heretofore has been the publication of Financial Stability Reviews (FSR). While worthy, these have been ineffective. The M-PA should have the following powers: First, the power to alter the composition of Central Bank (CB) assets, by adding to (subtracting from) its holdings of claims on the private sector. The argument that such actions are 'quasi-fiscal', and should therefore not be undertaken, is not supported. Second, the power to adjust margins (Capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios, loan-to-value ratios, etc.) to influence the conduct of financial intermediation. The argument that the use of such powers puts the FPC in a difficult conflict with the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is not supported... Finance and Investment Enthalten in OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends Vol. 2011, no. 2, p. 97-123 volume:2011 year:2011 number:2 pages:97-123 FWS01 ZDB-13-SOC FWS_PDA_SOC https://doi.org/10.1787/fmt-2011-5k9cswn0jrr1 Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Goodhart, Charles A.E.. The Macro-Prudential Authority Powers, Scope and Accountability Finance and Investment |
| title | The Macro-Prudential Authority Powers, Scope and Accountability |
| title_auth | The Macro-Prudential Authority Powers, Scope and Accountability |
| title_exact_search | The Macro-Prudential Authority Powers, Scope and Accountability |
| title_full | The Macro-Prudential Authority Powers, Scope and Accountability Charles A.E., Goodhart |
| title_fullStr | The Macro-Prudential Authority Powers, Scope and Accountability Charles A.E., Goodhart |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Macro-Prudential Authority Powers, Scope and Accountability Charles A.E., Goodhart |
| title_short | The Macro-Prudential Authority |
| title_sort | macro prudential authority powers scope and accountability |
| title_sub | Powers, Scope and Accountability |
| topic | Finance and Investment |
| topic_facet | Finance and Investment |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1787/fmt-2011-5k9cswn0jrr1 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT goodhartcharlesae themacroprudentialauthoritypowersscopeandaccountability AT goodhartcharlesae macroprudentialauthoritypowersscopeandaccountability |