The logic of precedent: constraint, freedom, and common law reasoning
Unlike statutory law, which relies on the explicit formulation of rules, common law is thought to emerge from a complex doctrine of precedential constraint, according to which decisions in earlier cases constrain later courts while still allowing these courts the freedom to address new situations in...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY
Cambridge University Press
2025
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | DE-12 DE-473 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | Unlike statutory law, which relies on the explicit formulation of rules, common law is thought to emerge from a complex doctrine of precedential constraint, according to which decisions in earlier cases constrain later courts while still allowing these courts the freedom to address new situations in creative ways. Although this doctrine is applied by legal practitioners on a daily basis, it has proved to be considerably more difficult to develop an adequate theoretical account of the doctrine itself. Drawing on recent work in legal theory, as well as AI and law, this book develops a new account of precedential constraint and the balance achieved in the common law between constraint and freedom. This account, which involves construction of a group priority ordering among reasons, is then applied to other topics including the semantics of open-textured predicates and the practice of making exceptions to general rules |
Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 10 Jan 2025) The reason model -- Exploring the reason model -- Some alternative models -- Supporting the reason model -- Natural reasoning -- Constraining natural reasoning -- Dimensions and magnitudes |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 261 Seiten) |
ISBN: | 9781009356480 |
DOI: | 10.1017/9781009356480 |
Internformat
MARC
LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zc 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV050206991 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
008 | 250317s2025 xx o|||| 00||| eng d | ||
020 | |a 9781009356480 |9 978-1-009-35648-0 | ||
035 | |a (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9781009356480 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV050206991 | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-473 | ||
082 | 0 | |a 340.5/7 | |
100 | 1 | |a Horty, John |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a The logic of precedent |b constraint, freedom, and common law reasoning |c John Horty |
264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY |b Cambridge University Press |c 2025 | |
300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 261 Seiten) | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
500 | |a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 10 Jan 2025) | ||
500 | |a The reason model -- Exploring the reason model -- Some alternative models -- Supporting the reason model -- Natural reasoning -- Constraining natural reasoning -- Dimensions and magnitudes | ||
520 | |a Unlike statutory law, which relies on the explicit formulation of rules, common law is thought to emerge from a complex doctrine of precedential constraint, according to which decisions in earlier cases constrain later courts while still allowing these courts the freedom to address new situations in creative ways. Although this doctrine is applied by legal practitioners on a daily basis, it has proved to be considerably more difficult to develop an adequate theoretical account of the doctrine itself. Drawing on recent work in legal theory, as well as AI and law, this book develops a new account of precedential constraint and the balance achieved in the common law between constraint and freedom. This account, which involves construction of a group priority ordering among reasons, is then applied to other topics including the semantics of open-textured predicates and the practice of making exceptions to general rules | ||
650 | 4 | |a Stare decisis | |
650 | 4 | |a Law / Methodology | |
650 | 4 | |a Judicial process / Philosophy | |
650 | 4 | |a Common law / Philosophy | |
650 | 4 | |a Logic | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |z 9781009356503 |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |z 9781009356473 |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009356480?locatt=mode:legacy |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
912 | |a ZDB-20-CBO | ||
943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-035542227 | |
966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009356480?locatt=mode:legacy |l DE-12 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q BSB_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009356480?locatt=mode:legacy |l DE-473 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q UBG_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext |
Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1826861520282189824 |
---|---|
adam_text | |
any_adam_object | |
author | Horty, John |
author_facet | Horty, John |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Horty, John |
author_variant | j h jh |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV050206991 |
collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9781009356480 (DE-599)BVBBV050206991 |
dewey-full | 340.5/7 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 340 - Law |
dewey-raw | 340.5/7 |
dewey-search | 340.5/7 |
dewey-sort | 3340.5 17 |
dewey-tens | 340 - Law |
discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
doi_str_mv | 10.1017/9781009356480 |
format | Electronic eBook |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nam a2200000zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV050206991</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">250317s2025 xx o|||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781009356480</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-009-35648-0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-20-CBO)CR9781009356480</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV050206991</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">340.5/7</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Horty, John</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The logic of precedent</subfield><subfield code="b">constraint, freedom, and common law reasoning</subfield><subfield code="c">John Horty</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2025</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 261 Seiten)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 10 Jan 2025)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">The reason model -- Exploring the reason model -- Some alternative models -- Supporting the reason model -- Natural reasoning -- Constraining natural reasoning -- Dimensions and magnitudes</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Unlike statutory law, which relies on the explicit formulation of rules, common law is thought to emerge from a complex doctrine of precedential constraint, according to which decisions in earlier cases constrain later courts while still allowing these courts the freedom to address new situations in creative ways. Although this doctrine is applied by legal practitioners on a daily basis, it has proved to be considerably more difficult to develop an adequate theoretical account of the doctrine itself. Drawing on recent work in legal theory, as well as AI and law, this book develops a new account of precedential constraint and the balance achieved in the common law between constraint and freedom. This account, which involves construction of a group priority ordering among reasons, is then applied to other topics including the semantics of open-textured predicates and the practice of making exceptions to general rules</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Stare decisis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Law / Methodology</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Judicial process / Philosophy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Common law / Philosophy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Logic</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">9781009356503</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">9781009356473</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009356480?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-035542227</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009356480?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="l">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">BSB_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009356480?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="l">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">UBG_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
id | DE-604.BV050206991 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2025-03-17T17:01:51Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9781009356480 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-035542227 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
physical | 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 261 Seiten) |
psigel | ZDB-20-CBO ZDB-20-CBO BSB_PDA_CBO ZDB-20-CBO UBG_PDA_CBO |
publishDate | 2025 |
publishDateSearch | 2025 |
publishDateSort | 2025 |
publisher | Cambridge University Press |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Horty, John Verfasser aut The logic of precedent constraint, freedom, and common law reasoning John Horty Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY Cambridge University Press 2025 1 Online-Ressource (xiv, 261 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 10 Jan 2025) The reason model -- Exploring the reason model -- Some alternative models -- Supporting the reason model -- Natural reasoning -- Constraining natural reasoning -- Dimensions and magnitudes Unlike statutory law, which relies on the explicit formulation of rules, common law is thought to emerge from a complex doctrine of precedential constraint, according to which decisions in earlier cases constrain later courts while still allowing these courts the freedom to address new situations in creative ways. Although this doctrine is applied by legal practitioners on a daily basis, it has proved to be considerably more difficult to develop an adequate theoretical account of the doctrine itself. Drawing on recent work in legal theory, as well as AI and law, this book develops a new account of precedential constraint and the balance achieved in the common law between constraint and freedom. This account, which involves construction of a group priority ordering among reasons, is then applied to other topics including the semantics of open-textured predicates and the practice of making exceptions to general rules Stare decisis Law / Methodology Judicial process / Philosophy Common law / Philosophy Logic Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781009356503 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781009356473 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009356480?locatt=mode:legacy Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Horty, John The logic of precedent constraint, freedom, and common law reasoning Stare decisis Law / Methodology Judicial process / Philosophy Common law / Philosophy Logic |
title | The logic of precedent constraint, freedom, and common law reasoning |
title_auth | The logic of precedent constraint, freedom, and common law reasoning |
title_exact_search | The logic of precedent constraint, freedom, and common law reasoning |
title_full | The logic of precedent constraint, freedom, and common law reasoning John Horty |
title_fullStr | The logic of precedent constraint, freedom, and common law reasoning John Horty |
title_full_unstemmed | The logic of precedent constraint, freedom, and common law reasoning John Horty |
title_short | The logic of precedent |
title_sort | the logic of precedent constraint freedom and common law reasoning |
title_sub | constraint, freedom, and common law reasoning |
topic | Stare decisis Law / Methodology Judicial process / Philosophy Common law / Philosophy Logic |
topic_facet | Stare decisis Law / Methodology Judicial process / Philosophy Common law / Philosophy Logic |
url | https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009356480?locatt=mode:legacy |
work_keys_str_mv | AT hortyjohn thelogicofprecedentconstraintfreedomandcommonlawreasoning |