Modal naturalism: science and the modal facts
How do we know what is possible or impossible, what is inevitable or unattainable, or what would happen under which circumstances? Since modal facts seem distinctively mysterious and difficult to know, the epistemology of modality has historically been fraught with uncertainty and disagreement. The...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA
Cambridge University Press
2024
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| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge elements
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | How do we know what is possible or impossible, what is inevitable or unattainable, or what would happen under which circumstances? Since modal facts seem distinctively mysterious and difficult to know, the epistemology of modality has historically been fraught with uncertainty and disagreement. The recent literature has been dominated by rationalist approaches that emphasise a priori reasoning (sometimes including direct intuition of possibility). Only recently have alternative approaches emerged which recognize a broader range of sources of modal knowledge. Yet even emerging non-rationalist views have tended to assign scientific investigation at best a supporting role. Our project in this book is to develop and defend a new approach to the epistemology of modal facts which assigns a central role to scientific investigation. According to modal naturalism, science (construed broadly) is our primary source of evidence concerning the modal facts |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 29 Nov 2024) |
| Beschreibung: | 76 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9781009462563 |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2025-01-24T15:00:45Z |
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| isbn | 9781009462563 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Bryant, Amanda aut Modal naturalism science and the modal facts Amanda Bryant, Alastair Wilson Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA Cambridge University Press 2024 76 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Cambridge elements Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 29 Nov 2024) How do we know what is possible or impossible, what is inevitable or unattainable, or what would happen under which circumstances? Since modal facts seem distinctively mysterious and difficult to know, the epistemology of modality has historically been fraught with uncertainty and disagreement. The recent literature has been dominated by rationalist approaches that emphasise a priori reasoning (sometimes including direct intuition of possibility). Only recently have alternative approaches emerged which recognize a broader range of sources of modal knowledge. Yet even emerging non-rationalist views have tended to assign scientific investigation at best a supporting role. Our project in this book is to develop and defend a new approach to the epistemology of modal facts which assigns a central role to scientific investigation. According to modal naturalism, science (construed broadly) is our primary source of evidence concerning the modal facts Naturalism Science / Philosophy Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781009351638 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-1-009-35164-5 |
| spellingShingle | Bryant, Amanda Modal naturalism science and the modal facts Naturalism Science / Philosophy |
| title | Modal naturalism science and the modal facts |
| title_auth | Modal naturalism science and the modal facts |
| title_exact_search | Modal naturalism science and the modal facts |
| title_full | Modal naturalism science and the modal facts Amanda Bryant, Alastair Wilson |
| title_fullStr | Modal naturalism science and the modal facts Amanda Bryant, Alastair Wilson |
| title_full_unstemmed | Modal naturalism science and the modal facts Amanda Bryant, Alastair Wilson |
| title_short | Modal naturalism |
| title_sort | modal naturalism science and the modal facts |
| title_sub | science and the modal facts |
| topic | Naturalism Science / Philosophy |
| topic_facet | Naturalism Science / Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bryantamanda modalnaturalismscienceandthemodalfacts |