Skepticism and fallibilism:
There are two common responses to skepticism, the claim that knowledge is non-existent and perhaps also unachievable: to succumb to it, or to dismiss it. Kvanvig shows how to avoid these responses by offering a theoretical development of skepticism, and arguing that epistemic reasoning may neverthel...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
2024
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| Zusammenfassung: | There are two common responses to skepticism, the claim that knowledge is non-existent and perhaps also unachievable: to succumb to it, or to dismiss it. Kvanvig shows how to avoid these responses by offering a theoretical development of skepticism, and arguing that epistemic reasoning may nevertheless approximate to the skeptical ideal. |
| Beschreibung: | 208 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780198924791 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1954- |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
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| spelling | Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1954- Verfasser (DE-588)1027500641 aut Skepticism and fallibilism Jonathan L. Kvanvig Oxford Oxford University Press 2024 208 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier There are two common responses to skepticism, the claim that knowledge is non-existent and perhaps also unachievable: to succumb to it, or to dismiss it. Kvanvig shows how to avoid these responses by offering a theoretical development of skepticism, and arguing that epistemic reasoning may nevertheless approximate to the skeptical ideal. Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-0-19-892482-1 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-0-19-892480-7 |
| spellingShingle | Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 1954- Skepticism and fallibilism |
| title | Skepticism and fallibilism |
| title_auth | Skepticism and fallibilism |
| title_exact_search | Skepticism and fallibilism |
| title_full | Skepticism and fallibilism Jonathan L. Kvanvig |
| title_fullStr | Skepticism and fallibilism Jonathan L. Kvanvig |
| title_full_unstemmed | Skepticism and fallibilism Jonathan L. Kvanvig |
| title_short | Skepticism and fallibilism |
| title_sort | skepticism and fallibilism |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kvanvigjonathanl skepticismandfallibilism |