Communicating cartel intentions:
While the economic harm of cartels is caused by their price-increasing effect, sanctioning by courts rather targets at the underlying process of firms reaching a price-fixing agreement. This paper provides experimental evidence on the question whether such sanctioning meets the economic target, i.e....
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Potsdam
University of Potsdam
[2024]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | CEPA discussion papers
No. 77 (May 2024) |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | kostenfrei kostenfrei kostenfrei |
| Zusammenfassung: | While the economic harm of cartels is caused by their price-increasing effect, sanctioning by courts rather targets at the underlying process of firms reaching a price-fixing agreement. This paper provides experimental evidence on the question whether such sanctioning meets the economic target, i.e., whether evidence of a collusive meeting of the firms and of the content of their communication reliably predicts subsequent prices. We find that already the mere mutual agreement to meet predicts a strong increase in prices. Conversely, express distancing from communication completely nullifies its otherwise price-increasing effect. Using machine learning, we show that communication only increases prices if it is very explicit about how the cartel plans to behave. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten, 562 KB) Illustrationen, Tabellen |
| DOI: | 10.25932/publishup-63846 |
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| spelling | Andres, Maximilian Verfasser (DE-588)1297825675 aut Communicating cartel intentions Maximilian Andres, Lisa Bruttel Potsdam University of Potsdam [2024] 1 Online-Ressource (36 Seiten, 562 KB) Illustrationen, Tabellen txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier CEPA discussion papers No. 77 (May 2024) While the economic harm of cartels is caused by their price-increasing effect, sanctioning by courts rather targets at the underlying process of firms reaching a price-fixing agreement. This paper provides experimental evidence on the question whether such sanctioning meets the economic target, i.e., whether evidence of a collusive meeting of the firms and of the content of their communication reliably predicts subsequent prices. We find that already the mere mutual agreement to meet predicts a strong increase in prices. Conversely, express distancing from communication completely nullifies its otherwise price-increasing effect. Using machine learning, we show that communication only increases prices if it is very explicit about how the cartel plans to behave. Archivierung/Langzeitarchivierung gewährleistet DE-101 pdager cartel collusion communication experiment machine learning Graue Literatur Bruttel, Lisa Verena 1981- Verfasser (DE-588)134124545 aut Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe CEPA discussion papers No. 77 (May 2024) (DE-604)BV045561595 77 https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/files/63846/cepa77.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-63846 Resolving-System kostenfrei https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-638469 Resolving-System kostenfrei |
| spellingShingle | Andres, Maximilian Bruttel, Lisa Verena 1981- Communicating cartel intentions CEPA discussion papers |
| title | Communicating cartel intentions |
| title_auth | Communicating cartel intentions |
| title_exact_search | Communicating cartel intentions |
| title_full | Communicating cartel intentions Maximilian Andres, Lisa Bruttel |
| title_fullStr | Communicating cartel intentions Maximilian Andres, Lisa Bruttel |
| title_full_unstemmed | Communicating cartel intentions Maximilian Andres, Lisa Bruttel |
| title_short | Communicating cartel intentions |
| title_sort | communicating cartel intentions |
| url | https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/files/63846/cepa77.pdf https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-63846 https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-638469 |
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