Responsibility for rationality: foundations of an ethics of mind
"This book argues that we are directly responsible for our attitudes by considering how we blame each other for being irrational. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot norm...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Routledge
2025
|
Schriftenreihe: | Routledge studies in epistemology
|
Schlagworte: | |
Zusammenfassung: | "This book argues that we are directly responsible for our attitudes by considering how we blame each other for being irrational. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It has five main goals. First, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other 'right-kind' reasons are genuine normative reasons. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that being irrational can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Responsibility for Rationality is an original and essential resource for scholars and advanced students interested in connecting strands of normative theory within epistemology, metaethics, and moral psychology"-- |
Beschreibung: | 203 Seiten |
ISBN: | 9781032467177 9781032467184 |
Internformat
MARC
LEADER | 00000nam a22000008c 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV050080832 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
007 | t| | ||
008 | 241212s2025 xx |||| 00||| eng d | ||
020 | |a 9781032467177 |c hbk |9 9781032467177 | ||
020 | |a 9781032467184 |c pbk |9 9781032467184 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV050080832 | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
049 | |a DE-12 | ||
100 | 1 | |a Schmidt, Sebastian |d 1981- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1214449883 |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Responsibility for rationality |b foundations of an ethics of mind |c Sebastian Schmidt |
264 | 1 | |a New York, NY |b Routledge |c 2025 | |
300 | |a 203 Seiten | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
490 | 0 | |a Routledge studies in epistemology | |
520 | 3 | |a "This book argues that we are directly responsible for our attitudes by considering how we blame each other for being irrational. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It has five main goals. First, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other 'right-kind' reasons are genuine normative reasons. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that being irrational can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Responsibility for Rationality is an original and essential resource for scholars and advanced students interested in connecting strands of normative theory within epistemology, metaethics, and moral psychology"-- | |
653 | 0 | |a Responsibility | |
653 | 0 | |a Reason | |
653 | 0 | |a Ethics | |
653 | 0 | |a Responsabilité | |
653 | 0 | |a Raison | |
653 | 0 | |a Morale | |
653 | 0 | |a reason | |
653 | 0 | |a ethics (philosophy) | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Online version |n Online-Ausgabe |z 9781003382973 |
943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-035418077 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1818224544418103296 |
---|---|
adam_text | |
any_adam_object | |
author | Schmidt, Sebastian 1981- |
author_GND | (DE-588)1214449883 |
author_facet | Schmidt, Sebastian 1981- |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Schmidt, Sebastian 1981- |
author_variant | s s ss |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV050080832 |
ctrlnum | (DE-599)BVBBV050080832 |
format | Book |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nam a22000008c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV050080832</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t|</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">241212s2025 xx |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781032467177</subfield><subfield code="c">hbk</subfield><subfield code="9">9781032467177</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781032467184</subfield><subfield code="c">pbk</subfield><subfield code="9">9781032467184</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV050080832</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Schmidt, Sebastian</subfield><subfield code="d">1981-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1214449883</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Responsibility for rationality</subfield><subfield code="b">foundations of an ethics of mind</subfield><subfield code="c">Sebastian Schmidt</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">New York, NY</subfield><subfield code="b">Routledge</subfield><subfield code="c">2025</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">203 Seiten</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Routledge studies in epistemology</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"This book argues that we are directly responsible for our attitudes by considering how we blame each other for being irrational. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It has five main goals. First, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other 'right-kind' reasons are genuine normative reasons. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that being irrational can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Responsibility for Rationality is an original and essential resource for scholars and advanced students interested in connecting strands of normative theory within epistemology, metaethics, and moral psychology"--</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Responsibility</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Reason</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Ethics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Responsabilité</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Raison</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Morale</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">reason</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">ethics (philosophy)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Online version</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">9781003382973</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-035418077</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
id | DE-604.BV050080832 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-12-12T09:00:49Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9781032467177 9781032467184 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-035418077 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-12 |
owner_facet | DE-12 |
physical | 203 Seiten |
publishDate | 2025 |
publishDateSearch | 2024 |
publishDateSort | 2024 |
publisher | Routledge |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Routledge studies in epistemology |
spelling | Schmidt, Sebastian 1981- Verfasser (DE-588)1214449883 aut Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind Sebastian Schmidt New York, NY Routledge 2025 203 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Routledge studies in epistemology "This book argues that we are directly responsible for our attitudes by considering how we blame each other for being irrational. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It has five main goals. First, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other 'right-kind' reasons are genuine normative reasons. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that being irrational can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Responsibility for Rationality is an original and essential resource for scholars and advanced students interested in connecting strands of normative theory within epistemology, metaethics, and moral psychology"-- Responsibility Reason Ethics Responsabilité Raison Morale reason ethics (philosophy) Online version Online-Ausgabe 9781003382973 |
spellingShingle | Schmidt, Sebastian 1981- Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind |
title | Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind |
title_auth | Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind |
title_exact_search | Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind |
title_full | Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind Sebastian Schmidt |
title_fullStr | Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind Sebastian Schmidt |
title_full_unstemmed | Responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind Sebastian Schmidt |
title_short | Responsibility for rationality |
title_sort | responsibility for rationality foundations of an ethics of mind |
title_sub | foundations of an ethics of mind |
work_keys_str_mv | AT schmidtsebastian responsibilityforrationalityfoundationsofanethicsofmind |