Creating selective overmatch: an approach to developing cyberspace options to sustain U.S. primacy against revisionist powers
The 2022 National Defense Strategy calls for "integrated deterrence" in how the United States postures its cyberspace forces to address the strategic challenges posed by revisionist powers--in this case China. An integrated deterrence strategy entails combining cyber operations with other...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, Calif.
RAND Corporation
[2023]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Research report
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1943-1 |
| Zusammenfassung: | The 2022 National Defense Strategy calls for "integrated deterrence" in how the United States postures its cyberspace forces to address the strategic challenges posed by revisionist powers--in this case China. An integrated deterrence strategy entails combining cyber operations with other warfighting domains to reduce a competitor's perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraints. Such a strategy also represents a departure from the current U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) focus on technical operations in the cyber domain. The authors begin with an examination of various theories of international relations to highlight a variety of views on U.S.-China competition. They then apply the concept of selective overmatch to reevaluate current U.S. cyber operations in light of competition and possible conflict with China. Because the United States cannot maintain superiority in all aspects of cyber operations equally, it must selectively create advantage over China by targeting influence points--elements of the adversary's political, economic, or societal strength--that will most likely achieve U.S. objectives. By identifying the key influence points for China and the United States and the actions that might be taken against them, the authors explore selective overmatch as a framework for categorizing and assessing vulnerabilities in the Chinese and U.S. cyber domains, as well as for expanding the capabilities of cyber operations, integrating deterrence, and sustaining U.S. primacy. Selective overmatch, properly understood and applied, can provide a roadmap for CYBERCOM's future operations |
| Beschreibung: | xv, 105 Seiten Illustrationen 23 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781977411549 |
| DOI: | 10.7249/RRA1943-1 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Wingfield, Thomas C. 1962- |
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| author_facet | Wingfield, Thomas C. 1962- |
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| bvnumber | BV049880491 |
| contents | Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: The Application of International Relations Theory to Competition and Conflict in Cyberspace -- Chapter Three: Current U.S. Approach to Cyberspace Operations -- Chapter Four: Creating Selective Overmatch in Cyberspace -- Chapter Five: Identifying Chinese Influence Points and Actions to Affect Them -- Chapter Six: Defending U.S. Influence Points -- Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Recommendations |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1466914794 (DE-599)BVBBV049880491 |
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| id | DE-604.BV049880491 |
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| isbn | 9781977411549 |
| language | English |
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| physical | xv, 105 Seiten Illustrationen 23 cm |
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| spelling | Wingfield, Thomas C. 1962- Verfasser (DE-588)1146325258 aut Creating selective overmatch an approach to developing cyberspace options to sustain U.S. primacy against revisionist powers Tom Wingfield [und 11 weitere] Approach to developing cyberspace options to sustain U.S. primacy against revisionist powers Santa Monica, Calif. RAND Corporation [2023] © 2023 xv, 105 Seiten Illustrationen 23 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia c rdamedia nc rdacarrier cr rdacarrier Research report The 2022 National Defense Strategy calls for "integrated deterrence" in how the United States postures its cyberspace forces to address the strategic challenges posed by revisionist powers--in this case China. An integrated deterrence strategy entails combining cyber operations with other warfighting domains to reduce a competitor's perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraints. Such a strategy also represents a departure from the current U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) focus on technical operations in the cyber domain. The authors begin with an examination of various theories of international relations to highlight a variety of views on U.S.-China competition. They then apply the concept of selective overmatch to reevaluate current U.S. cyber operations in light of competition and possible conflict with China. Because the United States cannot maintain superiority in all aspects of cyber operations equally, it must selectively create advantage over China by targeting influence points--elements of the adversary's political, economic, or societal strength--that will most likely achieve U.S. objectives. By identifying the key influence points for China and the United States and the actions that might be taken against them, the authors explore selective overmatch as a framework for categorizing and assessing vulnerabilities in the Chinese and U.S. cyber domains, as well as for expanding the capabilities of cyber operations, integrating deterrence, and sustaining U.S. primacy. Selective overmatch, properly understood and applied, can provide a roadmap for CYBERCOM's future operations USA Department of Defense (DE-588)1019534-8 gnd rswk-swf Information warfare (DE-588)4461975-3 gnd rswk-swf Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 gnd rswk-swf China (DE-588)4009937-4 gnd rswk-swf United States / Department of Defense / Decision making Cyberspace operations (Military science) / United States Information warfare / United States Cyber Warfare Decisionmaking Military Force Planning Cyberguerre (Science militaire) / États-Unis Guerre de l'information / États-Unis United States / Department of Defense Cyberspace operations (Military science) Decision making Information warfare United States China (DE-588)4009937-4 g USA Department of Defense (DE-588)1019534-8 b Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 s Information warfare (DE-588)4461975-3 s DE-604 https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1943-1 |
| spellingShingle | Wingfield, Thomas C. 1962- Creating selective overmatch an approach to developing cyberspace options to sustain U.S. primacy against revisionist powers Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: The Application of International Relations Theory to Competition and Conflict in Cyberspace -- Chapter Three: Current U.S. Approach to Cyberspace Operations -- Chapter Four: Creating Selective Overmatch in Cyberspace -- Chapter Five: Identifying Chinese Influence Points and Actions to Affect Them -- Chapter Six: Defending U.S. Influence Points -- Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Recommendations USA Department of Defense (DE-588)1019534-8 gnd Information warfare (DE-588)4461975-3 gnd Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)1019534-8 (DE-588)4461975-3 (DE-588)4065004-2 (DE-588)4009937-4 |
| title | Creating selective overmatch an approach to developing cyberspace options to sustain U.S. primacy against revisionist powers |
| title_alt | Approach to developing cyberspace options to sustain U.S. primacy against revisionist powers |
| title_auth | Creating selective overmatch an approach to developing cyberspace options to sustain U.S. primacy against revisionist powers |
| title_exact_search | Creating selective overmatch an approach to developing cyberspace options to sustain U.S. primacy against revisionist powers |
| title_full | Creating selective overmatch an approach to developing cyberspace options to sustain U.S. primacy against revisionist powers Tom Wingfield [und 11 weitere] |
| title_fullStr | Creating selective overmatch an approach to developing cyberspace options to sustain U.S. primacy against revisionist powers Tom Wingfield [und 11 weitere] |
| title_full_unstemmed | Creating selective overmatch an approach to developing cyberspace options to sustain U.S. primacy against revisionist powers Tom Wingfield [und 11 weitere] |
| title_short | Creating selective overmatch |
| title_sort | creating selective overmatch an approach to developing cyberspace options to sustain u s primacy against revisionist powers |
| title_sub | an approach to developing cyberspace options to sustain U.S. primacy against revisionist powers |
| topic | USA Department of Defense (DE-588)1019534-8 gnd Information warfare (DE-588)4461975-3 gnd Militärpolitik (DE-588)4065004-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | USA Department of Defense Information warfare Militärpolitik China |
| url | https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1943-1 |
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