Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability:
"The U.S.-Russia strategic stability paradigm rests on the shared confidence that one side's preemptive counterforce strike would fail to disarm the other side. Both sides are mutually vulnerable to retaliation, and thus have no incentive to strike first. Yet the United States has develope...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, Calif.
RAND Corporation
[2022]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Research reports
RR-A1094-1 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The U.S.-Russia strategic stability paradigm rests on the shared confidence that one side's preemptive counterforce strike would fail to disarm the other side. Both sides are mutually vulnerable to retaliation, and thus have no incentive to strike first. Yet the United States has developed significant prompt counterforce capabilities that Moscow fears could be used for a first strike. These threat perceptions have become a significant source of instability in recent years. The authors examine the historical origins of this dynamic and its impact on bilateral stability. They also evaluate possible policy changes that could mitigate that impact. The authors identify significant consequences for the United States that could arise from Russia's growing concerns about its ability to retaliate, such as Moscow's development of a suite of novel capabilities to address this issue and the potential crisis instability resulting from use-them-or-lose-them fears. Although these negative consequences are significant, they should be weighed against the benefits provided by current U.S. posture that are documented by the authors. The report outlines self-restraint measures--that the United States and Russia could take either together or unilaterally but in coordination--that would provide a degree of reassurance about the parties' lack of intention to execute a preemptive counterforce strike by complicating the ability to carry out such a strike on short notice. These modest steps could mitigate the negative consequences of current approaches without any dramatic changes in force structure, posture, or even employment policy. The stabilizing effect of these steps, however, could be significant."--Publisher's description |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
| ISBN: | 9781977407054 |
| DOI: | 10.7249/RRA1094-1 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Charap, Samuel 1980- |
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| author_sort | Charap, Samuel 1980- |
| author_variant | s c sc |
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| bvnumber | BV049867972 |
| collection | ZDB-334-RRR |
| contents | Introduction -- A brief history -- Defining the problem -- U.S. policy considerations -- Possible policy changes -- Conclusion |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-334-RRR)9781977407054 (OCoLC)1456136207 (DE-599)BVBBV049867972 |
| doi_str_mv | 10.7249/RRA1094-1 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| spelling | Charap, Samuel 1980- Verfasser (DE-588)1140057758 aut Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability Samuel Charap, John J. Drennan, Luke Griffith, Edward Geist, Brian G. Carlson Mitigating challenges to US-Russia strategic stability Mitigating challenges to United States-Russia strategic stability Santa Monica, Calif. RAND Corporation [2022] 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Research reports RR-A1094-1 Introduction -- A brief history -- Defining the problem -- U.S. policy considerations -- Possible policy changes -- Conclusion "The U.S.-Russia strategic stability paradigm rests on the shared confidence that one side's preemptive counterforce strike would fail to disarm the other side. Both sides are mutually vulnerable to retaliation, and thus have no incentive to strike first. Yet the United States has developed significant prompt counterforce capabilities that Moscow fears could be used for a first strike. These threat perceptions have become a significant source of instability in recent years. The authors examine the historical origins of this dynamic and its impact on bilateral stability. They also evaluate possible policy changes that could mitigate that impact. The authors identify significant consequences for the United States that could arise from Russia's growing concerns about its ability to retaliate, such as Moscow's development of a suite of novel capabilities to address this issue and the potential crisis instability resulting from use-them-or-lose-them fears. Although these negative consequences are significant, they should be weighed against the benefits provided by current U.S. posture that are documented by the authors. The report outlines self-restraint measures--that the United States and Russia could take either together or unilaterally but in coordination--that would provide a degree of reassurance about the parties' lack of intention to execute a preemptive counterforce strike by complicating the ability to carry out such a strike on short notice. These modest steps could mitigate the negative consequences of current approaches without any dramatic changes in force structure, posture, or even employment policy. The stabilizing effect of these steps, however, could be significant."--Publisher's description Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd rswk-swf Bedrohungsvorstellung (DE-588)7668529-9 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd rswk-swf Deterrence (Strategy) Strategic planning / Russia (Federation) Strategic planning / United States United States / Foreign relations / Russia (Federation) Russia (Federation) / Foreign relations / United States Dissuasion (Stratégie) Planification stratégique / Russie Planification stratégique / États-Unis États-Unis / Relations extérieures / Russie Diplomatic relations Strategic planning Russia (Federation) United States USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 g Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 s Bedrohungsvorstellung (DE-588)7668529-9 s DE-604 Drennan, John Sonstige (DE-588)1203094132 oth Griffith, Luke Sonstige oth Geist, Edward Sonstige (DE-588)1152015281 oth Carlson, Brian G. Sonstige (DE-588)117037025X oth International Security and Defense Policy Center (DE-588)1209307138 isb Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 978-1-977407-05-4 https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1094-1 Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Charap, Samuel 1980- Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability Introduction -- A brief history -- Defining the problem -- U.S. policy considerations -- Possible policy changes -- Conclusion Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Bedrohungsvorstellung (DE-588)7668529-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4000230-5 (DE-588)7668529-9 (DE-588)4078704-7 (DE-588)4076899-5 |
| title | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability |
| title_alt | Mitigating challenges to US-Russia strategic stability Mitigating challenges to United States-Russia strategic stability |
| title_auth | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability |
| title_exact_search | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability |
| title_full | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability Samuel Charap, John J. Drennan, Luke Griffith, Edward Geist, Brian G. Carlson |
| title_fullStr | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability Samuel Charap, John J. Drennan, Luke Griffith, Edward Geist, Brian G. Carlson |
| title_full_unstemmed | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability Samuel Charap, John J. Drennan, Luke Griffith, Edward Geist, Brian G. Carlson |
| title_short | Mitigating challenges to U.S.-Russia strategic stability |
| title_sort | mitigating challenges to u s russia strategic stability |
| topic | Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Bedrohungsvorstellung (DE-588)7668529-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Abschreckung Bedrohungsvorstellung USA Russland |
| url | https://doi.org/10.7249/RRA1094-1 |
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