The measurement of subjective probability:
Beliefs come in degrees, and we often represent those degrees with numbers. We might say, for example, that we are 90% confident in the truth of some scientific hypothesis, or only 30% confident in the success of some risky endeavour. But what do these numbers mean? What, in other words, is the unde...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, United Kingdom
Cambridge University Press
2024
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge elements
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | DE-12 DE-473 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Beliefs come in degrees, and we often represent those degrees with numbers. We might say, for example, that we are 90% confident in the truth of some scientific hypothesis, or only 30% confident in the success of some risky endeavour. But what do these numbers mean? What, in other words, is the underlying psychological reality to which the numbers correspond? And what constitutes a meaningful difference between numerically distinct representations of belief? In this Element, we discuss the main approaches to the measurement of belief. These fall into two broad categories-epistemic and decision-theoretic-with divergent foundations in the theory of measurement. Epistemic approaches explain the measurement of belief by appeal to relations between belief states themselves, whereas decision-theoretic approaches appeal to relations between beliefs and desires in the production of choice and preferences |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 15 Apr 2024) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (81 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9781009401319 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/9781009401319 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV049829265 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 240822s2024 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781009401319 |c Online |9 978-1-009-40131-9 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1017/9781009401319 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9781009401319 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1454756419 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV049829265 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-473 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 121.63 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Elliott, Edward J. R. |0 (DE-588)1335740678 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The measurement of subjective probability |c Edward J.R. Elliott, University of Leeds |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, United Kingdom |b Cambridge University Press |c 2024 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (81 Seiten) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Cambridge elements | |
| 500 | |a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 15 Apr 2024) | ||
| 520 | |a Beliefs come in degrees, and we often represent those degrees with numbers. We might say, for example, that we are 90% confident in the truth of some scientific hypothesis, or only 30% confident in the success of some risky endeavour. But what do these numbers mean? What, in other words, is the underlying psychological reality to which the numbers correspond? And what constitutes a meaningful difference between numerically distinct representations of belief? In this Element, we discuss the main approaches to the measurement of belief. These fall into two broad categories-epistemic and decision-theoretic-with divergent foundations in the theory of measurement. Epistemic approaches explain the measurement of belief by appeal to relations between belief states themselves, whereas decision-theoretic approaches appeal to relations between beliefs and desires in the production of choice and preferences | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Probabilities | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Measurement | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Decision making | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Error analysis (Mathematics) | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Erkenntnistheorie |0 (DE-588)4070914-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Entscheidungstheorie |0 (DE-588)4138606-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Überzeugung |0 (DE-588)4186657-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Überzeugung |0 (DE-588)4186657-5 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Erkenntnistheorie |0 (DE-588)4070914-0 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Entscheidungstheorie |0 (DE-588)4138606-1 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |z 9781009486965 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |z 9781009401326 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009401319?locatt=mode:legacy |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-20-CBO | ||
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-035169248 | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009401319?locatt=mode:legacy |l DE-12 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q BSB_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009401319?locatt=mode:legacy |l DE-473 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q UBG_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1814902768890019840 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Elliott, Edward J. R. |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1335740678 |
| author_facet | Elliott, Edward J. R. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Elliott, Edward J. R. |
| author_variant | e j r e ejr ejre |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV049829265 |
| collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9781009401319 (OCoLC)1454756419 (DE-599)BVBBV049829265 |
| dewey-full | 121.63 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 121 - Epistemology (Theory of knowledge) |
| dewey-raw | 121.63 |
| dewey-search | 121.63 |
| dewey-sort | 3121.63 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/9781009401319 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nmm a2200000zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV049829265</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">240822s2024 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781009401319</subfield><subfield code="c">Online</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-009-40131-9</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1017/9781009401319</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-20-CBO)CR9781009401319</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1454756419</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV049829265</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">121.63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Elliott, Edward J. R.</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1335740678</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The measurement of subjective probability</subfield><subfield code="c">Edward J.R. Elliott, University of Leeds</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, United Kingdom</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2024</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (81 Seiten)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Cambridge elements</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 15 Apr 2024)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Beliefs come in degrees, and we often represent those degrees with numbers. We might say, for example, that we are 90% confident in the truth of some scientific hypothesis, or only 30% confident in the success of some risky endeavour. But what do these numbers mean? What, in other words, is the underlying psychological reality to which the numbers correspond? And what constitutes a meaningful difference between numerically distinct representations of belief? In this Element, we discuss the main approaches to the measurement of belief. These fall into two broad categories-epistemic and decision-theoretic-with divergent foundations in the theory of measurement. Epistemic approaches explain the measurement of belief by appeal to relations between belief states themselves, whereas decision-theoretic approaches appeal to relations between beliefs and desires in the production of choice and preferences</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Probabilities</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Measurement</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Decision making</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Error analysis (Mathematics)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Erkenntnistheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4070914-0</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Entscheidungstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4138606-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Überzeugung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4186657-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Überzeugung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4186657-5</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Erkenntnistheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4070914-0</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Entscheidungstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4138606-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">9781009486965</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">9781009401326</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009401319?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-035169248</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009401319?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="l">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">BSB_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009401319?locatt=mode:legacy</subfield><subfield code="l">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">UBG_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV049829265 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-11-05T17:02:37Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781009401319 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-035169248 |
| oclc_num | 1454756419 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (81 Seiten) |
| psigel | ZDB-20-CBO ZDB-20-CBO BSB_PDA_CBO ZDB-20-CBO UBG_PDA_CBO |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| publishDateSearch | 2024 |
| publishDateSort | 2024 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Cambridge elements |
| spelling | Elliott, Edward J. R. (DE-588)1335740678 aut The measurement of subjective probability Edward J.R. Elliott, University of Leeds Cambridge, United Kingdom Cambridge University Press 2024 1 Online-Ressource (81 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cambridge elements Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 15 Apr 2024) Beliefs come in degrees, and we often represent those degrees with numbers. We might say, for example, that we are 90% confident in the truth of some scientific hypothesis, or only 30% confident in the success of some risky endeavour. But what do these numbers mean? What, in other words, is the underlying psychological reality to which the numbers correspond? And what constitutes a meaningful difference between numerically distinct representations of belief? In this Element, we discuss the main approaches to the measurement of belief. These fall into two broad categories-epistemic and decision-theoretic-with divergent foundations in the theory of measurement. Epistemic approaches explain the measurement of belief by appeal to relations between belief states themselves, whereas decision-theoretic approaches appeal to relations between beliefs and desires in the production of choice and preferences Probabilities Measurement Decision making Error analysis (Mathematics) Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd rswk-swf Überzeugung (DE-588)4186657-5 gnd rswk-swf Überzeugung (DE-588)4186657-5 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781009486965 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9781009401326 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009401319?locatt=mode:legacy Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Elliott, Edward J. R. The measurement of subjective probability Probabilities Measurement Decision making Error analysis (Mathematics) Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd Überzeugung (DE-588)4186657-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4138606-1 (DE-588)4186657-5 |
| title | The measurement of subjective probability |
| title_auth | The measurement of subjective probability |
| title_exact_search | The measurement of subjective probability |
| title_full | The measurement of subjective probability Edward J.R. Elliott, University of Leeds |
| title_fullStr | The measurement of subjective probability Edward J.R. Elliott, University of Leeds |
| title_full_unstemmed | The measurement of subjective probability Edward J.R. Elliott, University of Leeds |
| title_short | The measurement of subjective probability |
| title_sort | the measurement of subjective probability |
| topic | Probabilities Measurement Decision making Error analysis (Mathematics) Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd Überzeugung (DE-588)4186657-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Probabilities Measurement Decision making Error analysis (Mathematics) Erkenntnistheorie Entscheidungstheorie Überzeugung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009401319?locatt=mode:legacy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT elliottedwardjr themeasurementofsubjectiveprobability |