A pluralist theory of perception:
"An argument for "Rich Pluralism" -- a theory of perception that improves upon the currently dominant theories of Representationalism and Naive Realism"--
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England
The MIT Press
[2024]
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "An argument for "Rich Pluralism" -- a theory of perception that improves upon the currently dominant theories of Representationalism and Naive Realism"-- |
| Beschreibung: | XIV, 343 Seitenen |
| ISBN: | 9780262548281 |
Internformat
MARC
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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Contents Preface xi P.l Methodology; the Core Idea P.2 Acknowledgments xiii 1 Rich Pluralism Introduced 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 I xi 1 An Unargued Assumption 1 Some Familiar Options: Representationalism and Naive Realism A New Option: Rich Pluralism 6 The Structure of the Book 8 The Case for Partly Revelatory Awareness 2 A Defense of Partial Revelation 4 13 15 2.1 Partial Revelation Introduced 16 2.2 Partial Revelation Defended (and No Revelation Undermined) 19 2.3 Full Revelation Introduced 25 2.4 Partial versus Full Revelation: Gradually Acquired Concepts 26 2.5 Partial versus Full Revelation: Gradually Revealed Essences 28 2.6 Partial versus Full Revelation: Further Arguments 30 2.7 Holistic Revelation 35 2.8 The Argument for Full Revelation Revisited 38 2.9 The Retreat from Full Revelation 39 2.10 Conclusion 40 Appendix 2A: Awareness of Intrinsic Characters 41 Appendix 2B: The Propositional Awareness Account 45 3 Partial Revelation Extended and Explained 49 3.1 Experiences Other Than Perceptions 50 3.2 Targets of Experience Other Than Sensory Qualities 54
Contents viii 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 4 The Beginnings of Rich Pluralism 58 The Rich Pluralist's Explanation of the Asymmetries 61 Alternative Explanations of the Asymmetries 63 In Defense of Experiential Awareness of Universals 68 Conclusion 73 Hard Problems of Consciousness and the External World 75 4.1 Data about the Hard Problems of the External World 75 4.2 Explanations via Extended Partial Revelation 79 4.3 Data about the Hard Problems of Consciousness; Some Failed Theories 81 4.4 A Better Theory, and Some Further Data 89 4.5 The E-Theory and Extended Partial Revelation 93 4.6 Hard Character and Hard Consciousness Defined 100 4.7 A Theory of Hard Character and Hard Consciousness 105 4.8 Some Objections to the Significance of Hard Character 109 4.9 Conclusion 112 II Rich Pluralism versus Representationalism 115 5 117 Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion 5.1 RepresentationsandContents 118 5.2 Sensory Representations 120 5.3 Perception 121 5.4 Hallucination 125 5.5 Illusion 128 5.6 Intermission 130 5.7 Rich Pluralism versus Representationalism: Hallucinations 131 5.8 Rich Pluralism versus Representationalism: The Unity of Experience 132 5.9 Rich Pluralism versus Representationalism: Parsimony 132 5.10 Rich Pluralism versus Representationalism: Infallibility about Essences 135 5.11 Rich Pluralism versus Representationalism: Fallibility about Instantiation 139 5.12 Rich Pluralism versus Representationalism: The Final Verdict 141 5.13 Looking Forward 142 III Rich Pluralism versus Naïve Realism 6 Awareness of Intrinsic Characters 143 145 6.1 The Intrinsicality Datum: A First
Pass 6.2 The Intrinsicality Datum Generalized 146 148
ix Contents 6.3 Some Naïve Realist Explanations 151 6.4 The Intrinsicality Datum Refined; a Problem for Any Nonrevelatory Theory of Perception 156 6.5 The Intrinsicality Datum Explained via Extended Partial Revelation 158 6.6 Some Challenges to the Explanatory Adequacy of Representationalism and Rich Pluralism 162 6.7 Conclusion 168 Appendix 6A: Campbell on Awareness of Intrinsic and Categorical Characters 170 7 Strong Referential Character 173 7.1 Strong Referential Character Introduced 174 7.2 A Simple Representationalist Account 176 7.3 The Intrinsic Awareness Account of Strong Referential Character 177 7.4 The Significance of the Intrinsic Awareness Account 181 7.5 Presentation and Apparent Presentational Character Introduced 183 7.6 Naïve Realism and the Intrinsic Awareness Account of Presentation 187 7.7 Transferring the Intrinsic Awareness Account: Representationalism and Rich Pluralism 194 7.8 Further Worries about Using Representations to Explain Presentation 196 7.9 Conclusion 197 8 Apparent Presentational Character 199 8.1 Apparent Presentational Character Revisited 199 8.2 Some Initially Tempting Accounts 200 8.3 The Categorization Account Introduced 205 8.4 Evidence for the Categorization Account 208 8.5 Can Categorization Occur within Experience Proper? 211 8.6 Other Objections and Replies 215 8.7 The Epistemology of Presentation 218 8.8 The Categorization Account versus the Causal Content Account 8.9 The Categorization Account versus the Perspectival Content Account 221 8.10 The Significance of the Categorization Account 227 8.11 Conclusion 229 9 A Final
Assessment of Naïve Realism 220 231 9.1 Rich Pluralism versus Naïve Realism: The Current State of Play 9.2 Problems for Flexible Naïve Realism 232 231
X Contents 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 IV Problems for the Imaginative View 235 Problems for the Quality-Awareness View 238 Problems for Pluralistic Naive Realism 241 Problems for Strange Pluralism 242 Conclusion 243 Other Explanatory Challenges; Concluding Thoughts 10 Phenomenal Character 247 249 10.1 A Deep Problem about Phenomenal Character 249 10.2 A Core Idea Introduced 251 10.3 The Deep Context Sensitivity of "What It's Like” 254 10.4 A Failed Attempt at Supplying Context 261 10.5 The First Context: Hard Character 262 10.6 The Second Context: Strong Referential Character 264 10.7 The Third Context: Strong Accessible Character 266 10.8 The Fragmentation of "Phenomenal Character" 270 10.9 The Deep Problem Dissolved 272 10.10 Conclusion 274 Arguments from Hallucination 11 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 A Basic Argument from Hallucination 275 A Screening-Off Argument 277 An Argument from Introspective Access 281 Conclusion 287 12 Conclusion 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 Glossary Notes Index 295 341 289 Part I Revisited: A List of Options 289 Part II Revisited: Rich Pluralism versus Representationalism 290 Part III Revisited: Rich Pluralism versus Naïve Realism 291 Part IV Revisited: Remaining Problems 293 Conclusion 294 305 References 275 331 |
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| spelling | Mehta, Neil Verfasser (DE-588)1340387530 aut A pluralist theory of perception Neil Mehta Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England The MIT Press [2024] © 2024 XIV, 343 Seitenen txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier "An argument for "Rich Pluralism" -- a theory of perception that improves upon the currently dominant theories of Representationalism and Naive Realism"-- Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Pluralismus (DE-588)4046401-5 gnd rswk-swf Consciousness Perception Pluralism Conscience Pluralisme (Philosophie) pluralism Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s Pluralismus (DE-588)4046401-5 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 9780262379151 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=035152543&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Mehta, Neil A pluralist theory of perception Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Pluralismus (DE-588)4046401-5 gnd |
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| title | A pluralist theory of perception |
| title_auth | A pluralist theory of perception |
| title_exact_search | A pluralist theory of perception |
| title_full | A pluralist theory of perception Neil Mehta |
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| title_full_unstemmed | A pluralist theory of perception Neil Mehta |
| title_short | A pluralist theory of perception |
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