The measurement of subjective probability:
"Beliefs come in degrees, and we often represent those degrees with numbers. We might say, for example, that we are 90 per cent confident in the truth of some scientific hypothesis, or only 30 per cent confident in the success of some risky endeavour. But what do these numbers mean? What, in ot...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge ; New York ; Port Melbourne ; New Delhi ; Singapore
Cambridge University Press
2024
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Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge elements. Elements in decision theory and philosophy
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Zusammenfassung: | "Beliefs come in degrees, and we often represent those degrees with numbers. We might say, for example, that we are 90 per cent confident in the truth of some scientific hypothesis, or only 30 per cent confident in the success of some risky endeavour. But what do these numbers mean? What, in other words, is the underlying psychological reality to which the numbers correspond? And what constitutes a meaningful difference between numerically distinct representations of belief? This Element discusses the main approaches to the measurement of belief. These fall into two broad categories - epistemic and decision-theoretic - with divergent foundations in the theory of measurement. Epistemic approaches explain the measurement of belief by appeal to relations between belief states themselves, whereas decision-theoretic approaches appeal to relations between beliefs and desires in the production of choice and preferences." |
Beschreibung: | 81 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm |
ISBN: | 9781009401326 9781009486965 |
Internformat
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520 | 3 | |a "Beliefs come in degrees, and we often represent those degrees with numbers. We might say, for example, that we are 90 per cent confident in the truth of some scientific hypothesis, or only 30 per cent confident in the success of some risky endeavour. But what do these numbers mean? What, in other words, is the underlying psychological reality to which the numbers correspond? And what constitutes a meaningful difference between numerically distinct representations of belief? This Element discusses the main approaches to the measurement of belief. These fall into two broad categories - epistemic and decision-theoretic - with divergent foundations in the theory of measurement. Epistemic approaches explain the measurement of belief by appeal to relations between belief states themselves, whereas decision-theoretic approaches appeal to relations between beliefs and desires in the production of choice and preferences." | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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adam_text |
Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 Representation and Measurement 4 3 Clarifications and Desiderata 20 4 Epistemic Approaches: Comparative Confidence 35 5 Epistemic Approaches: Alternatives 47 6 Decision-Theoretic Approaches 57 References 77 |
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Elliott, Edward J. R. |
author_GND | (DE-588)1335740678 |
author_facet | Elliott, Edward J. R. |
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author_sort | Elliott, Edward J. R. |
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bvnumber | BV049769457 |
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id | DE-604.BV049769457 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-11-11T09:09:07Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9781009401326 9781009486965 |
language | English |
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oclc_num | 1446257745 |
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owner_facet | DE-12 |
physical | 81 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm |
publishDate | 2024 |
publishDateSearch | 2024 |
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publisher | Cambridge University Press |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Cambridge elements. Elements in decision theory and philosophy |
spelling | Elliott, Edward J. R. Verfasser (DE-588)1335740678 aut The measurement of subjective probability Edward J.R. Elliott (University of Leeds) Cambridge ; New York ; Port Melbourne ; New Delhi ; Singapore Cambridge University Press 2024 81 Seiten Illustrationen 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Cambridge elements. Elements in decision theory and philosophy "Beliefs come in degrees, and we often represent those degrees with numbers. We might say, for example, that we are 90 per cent confident in the truth of some scientific hypothesis, or only 30 per cent confident in the success of some risky endeavour. But what do these numbers mean? What, in other words, is the underlying psychological reality to which the numbers correspond? And what constitutes a meaningful difference between numerically distinct representations of belief? This Element discusses the main approaches to the measurement of belief. These fall into two broad categories - epistemic and decision-theoretic - with divergent foundations in the theory of measurement. Epistemic approaches explain the measurement of belief by appeal to relations between belief states themselves, whereas decision-theoretic approaches appeal to relations between beliefs and desires in the production of choice and preferences." Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd rswk-swf Überzeugung (DE-588)4186657-5 gnd rswk-swf Probabilities Measurement Decision making Error analysis (Mathematics) Überzeugung (DE-588)4186657-5 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-1-009-40131-9 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=035110694&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Elliott, Edward J. R. The measurement of subjective probability Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd Überzeugung (DE-588)4186657-5 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4138606-1 (DE-588)4186657-5 |
title | The measurement of subjective probability |
title_auth | The measurement of subjective probability |
title_exact_search | The measurement of subjective probability |
title_full | The measurement of subjective probability Edward J.R. Elliott (University of Leeds) |
title_fullStr | The measurement of subjective probability Edward J.R. Elliott (University of Leeds) |
title_full_unstemmed | The measurement of subjective probability Edward J.R. Elliott (University of Leeds) |
title_short | The measurement of subjective probability |
title_sort | the measurement of subjective probability |
topic | Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4138606-1 gnd Überzeugung (DE-588)4186657-5 gnd |
topic_facet | Erkenntnistheorie Entscheidungstheorie Überzeugung |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=035110694&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT elliottedwardjr themeasurementofsubjectiveprobability |