Contemporary debates in epistemology:
"Traditional theories of knowledge explain knowledge in terms of things like justification and belief. Knowledge-first theories of justification and belief explain justification and belief in terms of knowledge. When epistemologists ask whether knowledge "comes first," they are asking...
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| Weitere Verfasser: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Hoboken, New Jersey
Wiley Blackwell
[2024]
|
| Ausgabe: | Third edition |
| Schriftenreihe: | Contemporary debates in philosophy
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Traditional theories of knowledge explain knowledge in terms of things like justification and belief. Knowledge-first theories of justification and belief explain justification and belief in terms of knowledge. When epistemologists ask whether knowledge "comes first," they are asking whether traditional theories of knowledge take the right approach, or whether knowledge-first theories of things like justification and belief take the right approach. In her contribution to this debate, Mona Simion defends knowledge-first epistemology by defending a knowledge-first theory of belief and using this theory of belief to motivate a knowledge-first theory of justification. In his contribution to this debate, Aidan McGlynn defends traditional epistemology by critiquing Simion's knowledge-first theory of belief. As Simion and McGlynn both recognize, Simion's argument depends on the idea that beliefs that do not amount to knowledge are epistemically defective. While Simion thinks this is plausible, McGlynn thinks we can produce examples of epistemically non-defective beliefs that do not amount to knowledge. As McGlynn acknowledges, his contribution to the debate does not provide a traditional theory of knowledge in place of Simion's knowledge-first theories of justification and belief. However, if McGlynn is right that we can produce examples of epistemically non-defective beliefs that do not amount to knowledge, this casts doubt on at least one central idea in knowledge-first epistemology: that knowledge has explanatory priority over belief"-- |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Beschreibung: | xxiii, 360 Seiten 25,4 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781119755449 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a "Traditional theories of knowledge explain knowledge in terms of things like justification and belief. Knowledge-first theories of justification and belief explain justification and belief in terms of knowledge. When epistemologists ask whether knowledge "comes first," they are asking whether traditional theories of knowledge take the right approach, or whether knowledge-first theories of things like justification and belief take the right approach. In her contribution to this debate, Mona Simion defends knowledge-first epistemology by defending a knowledge-first theory of belief and using this theory of belief to motivate a knowledge-first theory of justification. In his contribution to this debate, Aidan McGlynn defends traditional epistemology by critiquing Simion's knowledge-first theory of belief. As Simion and McGlynn both recognize, Simion's argument depends on the idea that beliefs that do not amount to knowledge are epistemically defective. While Simion thinks this is plausible, McGlynn thinks we can produce examples of epistemically non-defective beliefs that do not amount to knowledge. As McGlynn acknowledges, his contribution to the debate does not provide a traditional theory of knowledge in place of Simion's knowledge-first theories of justification and belief. However, if McGlynn is right that we can produce examples of epistemically non-defective beliefs that do not amount to knowledge, this casts doubt on at least one central idea in knowledge-first epistemology: that knowledge has explanatory priority over belief"-- | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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Notes on Contributors Preface to the Third Edition Preface to the Second Edition Preface to the First Edition Introduction vii xiii xiv xv xvii 1 Does Knowledge Come First in Epistemology? Knowledge Comes First Mona Simion Known Unknowns and the Limits of Knowledge Aidan McGlynn Knowledge Still Comes First Mona Simion Circumstantial Luck and Knowledge-First Epistemology Aidan McGlynn 1 1 7 14 16 2 Does Justification Supervene on the Internal? Is Justification Just in the Head? Clayton Littlejohn The Possibility of Internalist Epistemology Kurt L. Sylvan 23 23 36 3 Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? Is Suspension of Judgment a Question-Directed Attitude? No, Not Really Matthew McGrath Suspension of Judgment Is a Question-Directed Attitude Jane Friedman 55 4 Are There Practical Reasons for Belief ? There Are Practical Reasons for Belief Susanna Rinard There Are No Practical Reasons for Belief Thomas Kelly and Stewart Cohen Reply to and Kelly and Cohen Susanna Rinard 79 79 81 93 5 Is Evidence Permissive? Introductions and Stage-Setting Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci A Permissive Notion of Rationality Miriam Schoenfield We Are Not Mushy Permissivists and, Moreover, We Should Not Be Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci Is the Disagreement Between Us Substantive? Miriam Schoenfield A Final Plea for Impermissivism Sophie Horowitz and Sinan Dogramaci Some Final Thoughts Miriam Schoenfield Permissivism and Metaepistemology Sophie Horowitz, Sinan Dogramaci, and Miriam Schoenfield 6 Does Fundamental Evidence Consist in Seemings? Evidence Is Seemings Michael
Huemer 55 66 103 103 105 110 116 121 123 124 127 127
Evidence Is Not Seemings Maria Lasonen-Aarnio Four Challenges for Phenomenal Conservatism Michael Huemer Preservative Memory and Trouble for Internalism Maria Lasonen-Aarnio 134 142 146 7 Does Knowledge Exclude Luck? Knowing Can Include Luck Stephen Hetherington There Cannot Be Lucky Knowledge Duncan Pritchard On Whether Knowing Can Include Luck: Asking the Correct Question Stephen Hetherington Reply to Hetherington Duncan Pritchard 151 151 159 8 Is the A Priori/А Posteriori Distinction Important for Epistemology? Is the A Priori/А Posteriori Distinction Superficial? Timothy Williamson The Significance of A Priori Justification Paul Boghossian Response to Boghossian Timothy Williamson Reply to Williamson Paul Boghossian 175 175 183 191 194 9 How Should We Use Thought Experiments in Epistemology? How to Use Thought Experiments Elijah Chudnoff A Guide to Thought Experiments in Epistemology Wesley Buckwaiter How to Think About How to Use Thought Experiments Elijah Chudnoff Thinking About Using Thought Experiments: Further Questions Wesley Buckwaiter 201 201 209 218 10 Is Belief a Species of Credence? Credences Are Degrees of Belief Roger Clarke Is Belief Credence 1 ? Depends on What You Mean! Two in the Model, One in the Head Roger Clarke Julia Staffel 169 171 222 229 229 237 247 11 Is Epistemic Normativity Instrumental? Epistemic Normativity Is Independent of Our Goals Alex Worsnip Epistemic Normativity Is Not Independent of Our Goals J. Adam Carter A Brief Reply to Carter Alex Worsnip 253 253 263 274 12 Is Testimony a Basic Source of Justification? A Defense of Local
Reductionism About Testimony Elizabeth Fricker Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony Sanford C. Goldberg Comments on Sanford Goldberg’s ‘Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony” Elizabeth Fricker Comments on Elizabeth Fricker’s ‘A Defense of Local Reductionism About Testimony” Sanford C. Goldberg 279 279 290 13 Does Common Sense Conflict with Skepticism? Skepticism Is Common Sense Allan Hazlett Skepticism Is Not Common Sense Krista Lawlor Reply to Lawlor Allan Hazlett Reply to Hazlett Krista Lawlor 305 305 311 318 323 14 Is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion? Knowledge Is the Norm of Assertion Matthew A. Benton Knowledge Is Not Our Norm of Assertion Peter J. Graham and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen 329 329 Index 355 300 301 339
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology is the perfect introduction to contemporary epistemology for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and non-specialists in epistemology. Blending accessibility and originality, this acclaimed volume contains head-to-head chapters offering forceful advocacy of opposing philosophical stances. Throughout the text, readers develop a clear understanding of the current state of epistemology as they engage in comparative analysis of constantly changing and developing epistemological concepts. A timely introduction to the major topics in contemporary epistemology, this new edition integrates the latest developments in the field. Entirely new essays defend divergent perspectives on topics such as epistemic normativity, belief and credence, internalist epistemology, epistemic instrumentalism, norms of assertion, and more. Two original chapters guide readers on the use of thought experiments in epistemology and offer best practices for students and researchers alike. With a lively debate format that sharply defines the issues and encourages further discussion, Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Third Edition, remains an essential resource for advanced undergraduate philosophy majors, graduate students in philosophy, professors who are not specialists in epistemology, and epistemologists who want to keep up to date with contemporary epistemological debates. |
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| spelling | Contemporary debates in epistemology edited by Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri Third edition Hoboken, New Jersey Wiley Blackwell [2024] © 2024 xxiii, 360 Seiten 25,4 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Contemporary debates in philosophy Includes bibliographical references and index "Traditional theories of knowledge explain knowledge in terms of things like justification and belief. Knowledge-first theories of justification and belief explain justification and belief in terms of knowledge. When epistemologists ask whether knowledge "comes first," they are asking whether traditional theories of knowledge take the right approach, or whether knowledge-first theories of things like justification and belief take the right approach. In her contribution to this debate, Mona Simion defends knowledge-first epistemology by defending a knowledge-first theory of belief and using this theory of belief to motivate a knowledge-first theory of justification. In his contribution to this debate, Aidan McGlynn defends traditional epistemology by critiquing Simion's knowledge-first theory of belief. As Simion and McGlynn both recognize, Simion's argument depends on the idea that beliefs that do not amount to knowledge are epistemically defective. While Simion thinks this is plausible, McGlynn thinks we can produce examples of epistemically non-defective beliefs that do not amount to knowledge. As McGlynn acknowledges, his contribution to the debate does not provide a traditional theory of knowledge in place of Simion's knowledge-first theories of justification and belief. However, if McGlynn is right that we can produce examples of epistemically non-defective beliefs that do not amount to knowledge, this casts doubt on at least one central idea in knowledge-first epistemology: that knowledge has explanatory priority over belief"-- Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Knowledge, Theory of (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 Roeber, Blake (DE-588)133085831X edt Sosa, Ernest 1940- (DE-588)129527033 edt Steup, Matthias 1955- (DE-588)136171648 edt Turri, John (DE-588)1053917724 edt Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-1-119-75548-7 Digitalisierung UB Augsburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=035088279&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Augsburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=035088279&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext |
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