The separability thesis:
Debates over the metaphysical status of aesthetic properties have persisted for decades in Aesthetics. One question that consistently arises in any discussion of aesthetic properties is whether they are fundamentally evaluative or descriptive in character. Aesthetic properties are often treated as p...
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Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | English |
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2023
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Zusammenfassung: | Debates over the metaphysical status of aesthetic properties have persisted for decades in Aesthetics. One question that consistently arises in any discussion of aesthetic properties is whether they are fundamentally evaluative or descriptive in character. Aesthetic properties are often treated as parallel to moral properties which means many philosophers take it for granted that aesthetic properties are fundamentally evaluative. There are some philosophers, like Frank Sibley and Jerrold Levinson, who take the road less traveled and treat aesthetic properties as primarily descriptive in character. In this paper, I outline Levinson’s intriguing view that the evaluative aspect of an aesthetic property can be canceled leaving us with the descriptive essence of the property. I refer to this as the separability thesis. It contends that evaluative reactions to aesthetic properties can be separated from the objective, perceptual content of an aesthetic experience thereby leaving us with the non-evaluative core of the property. I go on to defend the separability thesis from a powerful challenge developed by Rafael De Clercq. Ultimately, I contend that while De Clercq’s argument is clever and insightful it fails to undermine the separability thesis. |
ISSN: | 0021-8529 |
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520 | 3 | |a Debates over the metaphysical status of aesthetic properties have persisted for decades in Aesthetics. One question that consistently arises in any discussion of aesthetic properties is whether they are fundamentally evaluative or descriptive in character. Aesthetic properties are often treated as parallel to moral properties which means many philosophers take it for granted that aesthetic properties are fundamentally evaluative. There are some philosophers, like Frank Sibley and Jerrold Levinson, who take the road less traveled and treat aesthetic properties as primarily descriptive in character. In this paper, I outline Levinson’s intriguing view that the evaluative aspect of an aesthetic property can be canceled leaving us with the descriptive essence of the property. I refer to this as the separability thesis. It contends that evaluative reactions to aesthetic properties can be separated from the objective, perceptual content of an aesthetic experience thereby leaving us with the non-evaluative core of the property. I go on to defend the separability thesis from a powerful challenge developed by Rafael De Clercq. Ultimately, I contend that while De Clercq’s argument is clever and insightful it fails to undermine the separability thesis. | |
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spelling | Spoor, Iris Verfasser aut The separability thesis Iris Spoor 2023 txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Debates over the metaphysical status of aesthetic properties have persisted for decades in Aesthetics. One question that consistently arises in any discussion of aesthetic properties is whether they are fundamentally evaluative or descriptive in character. Aesthetic properties are often treated as parallel to moral properties which means many philosophers take it for granted that aesthetic properties are fundamentally evaluative. There are some philosophers, like Frank Sibley and Jerrold Levinson, who take the road less traveled and treat aesthetic properties as primarily descriptive in character. In this paper, I outline Levinson’s intriguing view that the evaluative aspect of an aesthetic property can be canceled leaving us with the descriptive essence of the property. I refer to this as the separability thesis. It contends that evaluative reactions to aesthetic properties can be separated from the objective, perceptual content of an aesthetic experience thereby leaving us with the non-evaluative core of the property. I go on to defend the separability thesis from a powerful challenge developed by Rafael De Clercq. Ultimately, I contend that while De Clercq’s argument is clever and insightful it fails to undermine the separability thesis. Ästhetik (DE-588)4000626-8 gnd rswk-swf Ästhetik (DE-588)4000626-8 s DE-604 volume:81 number:4 year:2023 pages:478-484 The journal of aesthetics and art criticism / American Society for Aesthetics. Ed. Thomas Munro Hoboken, NJ, 2023 Volume 81, number 4 (fall 2023), Seite 478-484 (DE-604)BV002662422 0021-8529 (DE-600)2930-0 |
spellingShingle | Spoor, Iris The separability thesis Ästhetik (DE-588)4000626-8 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4000626-8 |
title | The separability thesis |
title_auth | The separability thesis |
title_exact_search | The separability thesis |
title_full | The separability thesis Iris Spoor |
title_fullStr | The separability thesis Iris Spoor |
title_full_unstemmed | The separability thesis Iris Spoor |
title_short | The separability thesis |
title_sort | the separability thesis |
topic | Ästhetik (DE-588)4000626-8 gnd |
topic_facet | Ästhetik |
work_keys_str_mv | AT spooriris theseparabilitythesis |