The June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War:
"In June 1967 Israel, which seemed on the verge of being annihilated by its Arab neighbours, took six days to redraw the Middle Eastern strategic map in one of the most dramatic reversals of fortune in modern times. The success was over a decade in the making following the Suez Crisis, with the...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Warwick
Helion & Company Ltd.
2024-
|
Schriftenreihe: | Middle East@war
|
Schlagworte: | |
Zusammenfassung: | "In June 1967 Israel, which seemed on the verge of being annihilated by its Arab neighbours, took six days to redraw the Middle Eastern strategic map in one of the most dramatic reversals of fortune in modern times. The success was over a decade in the making following the Suez Crisis, with the Israeli forces being radically changed to create an army and air force upon which the country would rely when it became obvious the international community would take no action to implement guarantees made after the events of 1956. The Israeli forces were honed in low level clashes during the 1960s, notably the Water Wars which the Israelis did so much to provoke. By contrast, the Arab forces became complacent, largely due to supplies of arms from the Warsaw Pact states. With proper training, this complacency could have been turned into military effectiveness but the Arab forces were plagued by internal rivalries and high commands too often depending upon politically reliable officers rather than those who were militarily effective. The Egyptian forces were further undermined by their commitment to the debilitating Yemen Civil War which meant they were in no condition to confront Israel. Syria and Jordan, whose forces could not fight the Israelis alone, complained loudly about President Nasser’s lack of action against Israel. Nasser’s decision in early 1967 to regain the prestige he had lost since the heady days of the Suez Crisis with a demonstration in the Sinai Peninsula was interpreted by the Israelis as preparations for an invasion. Nasser did nothing to persuade them otherwise and when it was clear the international community would do nothing the Israelis decided to strike Egypt, and in turn Syria and Jordan. The Israeli campaign was heralded by a massive surprise air attack first on the Egyptians and then on the other neighbouring states, and ground offensives then followed in succession." |
Internformat
MARC
LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 ca4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV049648202 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
005 | 20240527 | ||
007 | t | ||
008 | 240412m2024uuuu |||| 00||| eng d | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV049648202 | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
100 | 1 | |a Cooper, Tom |d 1970- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1081464763 |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a The June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War |c Tom Cooper |
264 | 1 | |a Warwick |b Helion & Company Ltd. |c 2024- | |
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
490 | 0 | |a Middle East@war | |
520 | 3 | |a "In June 1967 Israel, which seemed on the verge of being annihilated by its Arab neighbours, took six days to redraw the Middle Eastern strategic map in one of the most dramatic reversals of fortune in modern times. The success was over a decade in the making following the Suez Crisis, with the Israeli forces being radically changed to create an army and air force upon which the country would rely when it became obvious the international community would take no action to implement guarantees made after the events of 1956. The Israeli forces were honed in low level clashes during the 1960s, notably the Water Wars which the Israelis did so much to provoke. By contrast, the Arab forces became complacent, largely due to supplies of arms from the Warsaw Pact states. With proper training, this complacency could have been turned into military effectiveness but the Arab forces were plagued by internal rivalries and high commands too often depending upon politically reliable officers rather than those who were militarily effective. The Egyptian forces were further undermined by their commitment to the debilitating Yemen Civil War which meant they were in no condition to confront Israel. Syria and Jordan, whose forces could not fight the Israelis alone, complained loudly about President Nasser’s lack of action against Israel. Nasser’s decision in early 1967 to regain the prestige he had lost since the heady days of the Suez Crisis with a demonstration in the Sinai Peninsula was interpreted by the Israelis as preparations for an invasion. Nasser did nothing to persuade them otherwise and when it was clear the international community would do nothing the Israelis decided to strike Egypt, and in turn Syria and Jordan. The Israeli campaign was heralded by a massive surprise air attack first on the Egyptians and then on the other neighbouring states, and ground offensives then followed in succession." | |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Sechstagekrieg |0 (DE-588)4180597-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
653 | 0 | |a Israel-Arab War, 1967 / Aerial operations | |
689 | 0 | 0 | |a Sechstagekrieg |0 (DE-588)4180597-5 |D s |
689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
940 | 1 | |q BSB_NED_20240527 | |
942 | 1 | 1 | |c 355.009 |e 22/bsb |f 09046 |g 5694 |
942 | 1 | 1 | |c 340.09 |e 22/bsb |f 09046 |g 5694 |
942 | 1 | 1 | |c 355.009 |e 22/bsb |f 09046 |g 56 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1805073801201844224 |
---|---|
adam_text | |
adam_txt | |
any_adam_object | |
any_adam_object_boolean | |
author | Cooper, Tom 1970- |
author_GND | (DE-588)1081464763 |
author_facet | Cooper, Tom 1970- |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Cooper, Tom 1970- |
author_variant | t c tc |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV049648202 |
ctrlnum | (DE-599)BVBBV049648202 |
format | Book |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nam a2200000 ca4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV049648202</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20240527</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">240412m2024uuuu |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV049648202</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Cooper, Tom</subfield><subfield code="d">1970-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1081464763</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War</subfield><subfield code="c">Tom Cooper</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Warwick</subfield><subfield code="b">Helion & Company Ltd.</subfield><subfield code="c">2024-</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Middle East@war</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"In June 1967 Israel, which seemed on the verge of being annihilated by its Arab neighbours, took six days to redraw the Middle Eastern strategic map in one of the most dramatic reversals of fortune in modern times. The success was over a decade in the making following the Suez Crisis, with the Israeli forces being radically changed to create an army and air force upon which the country would rely when it became obvious the international community would take no action to implement guarantees made after the events of 1956. The Israeli forces were honed in low level clashes during the 1960s, notably the Water Wars which the Israelis did so much to provoke. By contrast, the Arab forces became complacent, largely due to supplies of arms from the Warsaw Pact states. With proper training, this complacency could have been turned into military effectiveness but the Arab forces were plagued by internal rivalries and high commands too often depending upon politically reliable officers rather than those who were militarily effective. The Egyptian forces were further undermined by their commitment to the debilitating Yemen Civil War which meant they were in no condition to confront Israel. Syria and Jordan, whose forces could not fight the Israelis alone, complained loudly about President Nasser’s lack of action against Israel. Nasser’s decision in early 1967 to regain the prestige he had lost since the heady days of the Suez Crisis with a demonstration in the Sinai Peninsula was interpreted by the Israelis as preparations for an invasion. Nasser did nothing to persuade them otherwise and when it was clear the international community would do nothing the Israelis decided to strike Egypt, and in turn Syria and Jordan. The Israeli campaign was heralded by a massive surprise air attack first on the Egyptians and then on the other neighbouring states, and ground offensives then followed in succession."</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Sechstagekrieg</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4180597-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Israel-Arab War, 1967 / Aerial operations</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Sechstagekrieg</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4180597-5</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="q">BSB_NED_20240527</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">355.009</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09046</subfield><subfield code="g">5694</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">340.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09046</subfield><subfield code="g">5694</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">355.009</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09046</subfield><subfield code="g">56</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
id | DE-604.BV049648202 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-03T23:40:05Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-20T05:15:23Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-034991699 |
open_access_boolean | |
psigel | BSB_NED_20240527 |
publishDate | 2024 |
publishDateSearch | 2024 |
publishDateSort | 2024 |
publisher | Helion & Company Ltd. |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Middle East@war |
spelling | Cooper, Tom 1970- Verfasser (DE-588)1081464763 aut The June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Tom Cooper Warwick Helion & Company Ltd. 2024- txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Middle East@war "In June 1967 Israel, which seemed on the verge of being annihilated by its Arab neighbours, took six days to redraw the Middle Eastern strategic map in one of the most dramatic reversals of fortune in modern times. The success was over a decade in the making following the Suez Crisis, with the Israeli forces being radically changed to create an army and air force upon which the country would rely when it became obvious the international community would take no action to implement guarantees made after the events of 1956. The Israeli forces were honed in low level clashes during the 1960s, notably the Water Wars which the Israelis did so much to provoke. By contrast, the Arab forces became complacent, largely due to supplies of arms from the Warsaw Pact states. With proper training, this complacency could have been turned into military effectiveness but the Arab forces were plagued by internal rivalries and high commands too often depending upon politically reliable officers rather than those who were militarily effective. The Egyptian forces were further undermined by their commitment to the debilitating Yemen Civil War which meant they were in no condition to confront Israel. Syria and Jordan, whose forces could not fight the Israelis alone, complained loudly about President Nasser’s lack of action against Israel. Nasser’s decision in early 1967 to regain the prestige he had lost since the heady days of the Suez Crisis with a demonstration in the Sinai Peninsula was interpreted by the Israelis as preparations for an invasion. Nasser did nothing to persuade them otherwise and when it was clear the international community would do nothing the Israelis decided to strike Egypt, and in turn Syria and Jordan. The Israeli campaign was heralded by a massive surprise air attack first on the Egyptians and then on the other neighbouring states, and ground offensives then followed in succession." Sechstagekrieg (DE-588)4180597-5 gnd rswk-swf Israel-Arab War, 1967 / Aerial operations Sechstagekrieg (DE-588)4180597-5 s DE-604 |
spellingShingle | Cooper, Tom 1970- The June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Sechstagekrieg (DE-588)4180597-5 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4180597-5 |
title | The June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War |
title_auth | The June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War |
title_exact_search | The June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War |
title_exact_search_txtP | The June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War |
title_full | The June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Tom Cooper |
title_fullStr | The June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Tom Cooper |
title_full_unstemmed | The June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War Tom Cooper |
title_short | The June 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War |
title_sort | the june 1967 arab israeli six day war |
topic | Sechstagekrieg (DE-588)4180597-5 gnd |
topic_facet | Sechstagekrieg |
work_keys_str_mv | AT coopertom thejune1967arabisraelisixdaywar |